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Abstract 
Essays on Energy Reforms, Regulation and Institutions 
Mahmud Ibrahim Imam 
This thesis contents a doctoral research that examines whether 
implementations of the reforms have succeeded in reducing the negative 
influence of weak institutions on Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries‟ 
electricity sector performance. Chapter 1 of the thesis examines how 
corruption contributes to low levels of economic development of SSA 
countries, defines the concept of corruption and discusses its major 
determinants as it relates to the region. 
By using a panel data on 48 SSA covering the period 2002 to 2013, chapter 2 
investigates how corruption could negatively affect electricity sector 
performance of SSA countries, and how this performance effects of 
corruption would be mitigated or amplified by implementations of electricity 
sector reform policies. The findings show that corruption can significantly 
reduce technical efficiency of the sector and constrain the efforts to increase 
access to electricity and national income. However, these adverse effects of 
corruption are reduced when independent regulatory agencies are established, 
and privatisation is implemented. 
Chapter 3 extents the findings of chapter 2 by using data on 45 SSA 
governments from 2000 to 2015 to investigate the ideological differences in 
the effect of independent sector regulation on access to electricity and 
installed capacity. The findings suggest that independent regulation in left-
wing governments deteriorates both installed capacity and electricity access. 
However, independent regulation in right-wing governments improves 
installed capacity and has no significant impact on electricity access. 
  
iii 
 
Chapter 4 uses data on 49 SSA countries from 2002 to 2013 to examine the 
impact of electricity access on human development index (HDI) and its three 
components (health, education, and income) post the implementations of 
electricity sector reforms and other policies by SSA countries. The findings 
indicate that increased access to electricity has positively boosted human 
development. Similar results are found on the impact of electricity access on 
the three components of HDI. 
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Chapter 1: Corruption and Economic Development 
1.1. Introduction 
According to the United Nations (2013), rapid economic growth in developing countries has 
helped uplift millions of people out of poverty on an unprecedented scale in last three 
decades. However, in SSA, corruption continues to hold back the efforts to translate the 
benefits of economic growth into improvements in living standards. For example, despite the 
optimistic assessment by the United Nations report, millions in the region continue to be 
trapped in poverty (Transparency International, 2012) because corruption acting as a 
regressive tax diverts resources from their productive uses (Mauro, 1998) towards supporting 
the lifestyles of the elites at the expense of the poor (Gupta et al., 2002). 
A considerable number of theoretical and empirical investigations have found how corruption 
could distort the economy through various channels and thereby have adverse effects on 
economic development (e.g., Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 
2001; Li et al., 2000; Mo, 2001; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; UNDP, 1997; Wei 2000; Tanzi, 
1998; Gupta et al., 2001). These channels include acting as a tax on investment thereby 
stifling the creation of new businesses, as an obstacle to doing business, and the possibility of 
corruption to cause misallocation of public expenditure, taxation, composition and 
effectiveness public expenditure on infrastructure. 
Corruption also distorts incentives and market forces, misallocates resources, diverts talent 
and resources, including human resources, towards “lucrative” rent-seeking activities, such as 
defence, rather than productive activities (Transparency International, 2014). Corruption can 
generate undesirable outcomes even when economic policies and plans were well thought out 
and implemented. As a result of its adverse effects, the World Bank (2000) described it as the 
single greatest threat to economic and social development as it distorts the rule of law and 
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weakens the institutional framework on which economic development depends. 
Notwithstanding these, there are other conflicting views on the corruption-economic 
development nexus. As a result, views on the relationship are diverse and have polarised both 
economists and policymakers. For example, Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), and Lui (1985) 
argued that corruption is a beneficial grease that lubricates the engine of economic growth. 
Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) similarly argue that some degree of corruption may form part 
of an optimal allocation of resources in the presence of incomplete contracts or market 
failures. These arguments tend to underpin the views that corruption serves as a piece-rate 
payment to politicians and bureaucrats and therefore leads to more efficient provision of 
government services, while providing a leeway for businesses to bypass inefficient 
regulations. Overall, corruption is viewed as a lubricant that smoothens operations and 
thereby raises the efficiency of an economy (Mo, 2000). 
Despite these conflicting views on the economic development-corruption nexus, there is a 
common consensus among policymakers and development experts that corruption is a major 
contributor to the developmental challenges faced by SSA countries. The negative economic 
development consequences of corruption in SSA countries are attributed to weak and 
fragmented institutions that usually fail to constraint corruption related activities (Gyimah-
Brempong and Camacho, 2006). As a result, most of the studies in the corruption literature on 
SSA countries tend to investigate the effects of corruption on economic development 
indirectly through institutional quality. 
Recently different variants of this literature have emerged to extend the economic 
development effects of corruption to other specific channels. In a study relevant to this 
research, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) show that corruption can affect economic performance, 
by reducing the quality of public infrastructure. Corruption can also affect the quality 
infrastructure through its negative effects on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) needed to 
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upgrade and expand access especially in developing countries that lack required resources. 
For example, Gani (2007) finds evidence that show FDI is positively correlated with 
governance indicators such as rule of law, control of corruption, regulatory quality, among 
others. Wei (2001) also finds corruption as a significant factor that reduces inflow of FDI. In 
a similar study of United States FDI outflows to 42 countries, Sanyal and Samanta (2008) 
noted that US firms are less incline in investing in countries considered as highly corrupt. 
It is within this context that this thesis focuses on how corruption would affect economic 
development through the operation and regulations of electricity networks. For example, 
corruption can affect important indicators of economic development by reducing the 
productivity of workers, constraint efforts to extend electricity services to the millions 
without access in the region and limit the inflow of investments needed to increase the overall 
efficiency of the sector.  
By inhibiting electricity sector performance, corruption would indirectly inhibit the 
operations of modern communications, industrial development and constraint the provision of 
social services such as healthcare and education. In some countries such as Nigeria, failure to 
pay bribes to utilities workers in exchange for basic services usually results in curtailing 
electricity supply to certain areas (Olukoju 2004), thereby having deleterious impact on 
economic development. In SSA countries, a 1% increase in electricity shortages has been 
estimated to have reduced GDP per capita by 2.86% between 1995 and 1997 (Anderson and 
Dalgaard, 2013). Thus, the constraining effects of corruption on electricity sector 
performance to boost economic performance. 
1.2. Definition of corruption 
Almost all studies that seek to analyse issues related to corruption tend to begin with a 
definition of corruption (Jain, 2001). It may be tempting to question the necessity of this 
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approach, but the relevance of this should not be underestimated. This is because, the fact that 
corruption is a complex concept and the likelihood that it can exist in many contexts, makes it 
inherently difficult to define. Therefore, in order to have a grasp of what it is, a discussion of 
the concept is valuable. 
The consequences and causes of corruption have been studied not only in recent times but 
have a long history in economics that may date back to the seminal contributions of rent-
seeking by Krueger (1974), Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Bhagwati (1982). Although, Horwitz 
(1982) has stated that corruption is a recent phenomenon because the concept of „public‟ and 
„private‟ ownership did not exist in the past, Lipset and Lenz (2000) argue that issues related 
to corruption are as old as the world itself. There is no consensus on the exact meaning of 
corruption as it has been defined differently under different conditions to encompass a wide 
range of misconduct. According to Aliyu and Elijah (2008), corruption covers a wide range 
of social misconduct ranging from extortion, embezzlement, massive fraud, nepotism, rigging 
of elections, influence peddling, bribery, abuse of public property, and sale of fake or expired 
drugs among many. 
Corruption has also been described as a clandestine activity which takes place away from the 
glare of public and hence, difficult to measure (Blackburn et al., 2006). According to Rose-
Ackerman (1999), corruption exists when institutions that mean to regulate the relationship 
between the state and the citizens are used instead for personal enrichment and provision of 
benefits to the corrupt and undeserving. Thus, it is difficult to find a uniform definition of 
corruption because it depends not only on the profiteers, initiators, and on how and where it 
takes place but also on the existing laws and institutions guiding certain actions. It has been 
defined in its broadest form by some countries while others legislate on its narrow definition 
(Adenike, 2013). Whichever of the two definitions used by countries, corruption serves as a 
stumbling block to economic progress through its adverse effects on economic development. 
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As a result, corruption has different meanings to different people depending on the 
individual‟s political and cultural background, region, discipline or religious beliefs. Despite 
the absence of consistency in defining the concept, the chapter follows the Transparency 
International and Gyimah-Brempong (2002) to define corruption as the use of public office 
for private gain. However, Horwitz (1982) have argued that historically there has been no 
distinction between private and public property because political authority was regarded as a 
species of private property which could be handed down to descendants as part of their 
patrimony. Therefore, the idea that rulers cannot simply own their dominions and the notion 
that there will be potential conflict of interest between private and public was a recent 
phenomenon that started with the rise of modern European countries (Horwitz, 1982). In this 
regard, public can be broadly defined to include the political elites, international 
organizations, private businesses and government agencies. Following this view, therefore, 
there is the possibility that corruption can take place in any transaction that involves a public 
official. As defined in this fashion, corruption represents the special case of the principal-
agent problem. Even though significant types of corruption are regarded as illegal, the 
chapter do not follow this approach and accept the view by Gyimah-Brempong and Camacho 
(2006) that not all corrupt practices are illegal, and not all illegal activities are regarded as 
corrupt practices. 
Notwithstanding, the literature has identified three forms of corruption (Jain, 2001). First, 
grand corruption mostly associated with high-level political elites and regarded as the worst 
form of corruption. As policies enacted by the political elites are influenced by corruption 
and the incentive for corrupt practices, it may lead to the diversion of scarce resources (both 
natural and human resources), towards rent-seeking rather than productive activities. This 
may have severe long-run consequences on the economy. Political elites could also channel 
resources into unproductive sectors, such as defence which offers opportunities for rent-
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seeking (Gupta et al., 2002) hence leading to the neglect of goods and services needed by the 
poor. 
Second, bureaucratic corruption which is regarded as a lower form of corruption because it 
usually emanates from the lower levels of the bureaucracy that interacts with the general 
public, and sometimes results from the relationship between the political elites and 
bureaucrats (Gupta et al., 2001). In this context, corrupt bureaucrats are induced in the form 
of bribe to provide services or speedup bureaucratic procedures (Mauro, 1995). There is also 
the tendency for bureaucrats to extract bribes to execute tasks assigned to them by the 
political class or to carry out tasks that were not delegated to them. 
Lastly, legislative corruption which is a form of corruption associated with the voting 
procedures of the legislators. Individuals and lobby groups can bribe the legislators to enact 
laws that are profitable or favourable to pursue and capture economic rents associated with 
their business activities. 
These three forms of corruption can only be different by the ways in which decisions of the 
individuals can be influenced by corrupt practices, but the end result of corruption could be 
the same across the three forms, which is a misallocation of resources and inefficiencies that 
would eventually lead to poor economic performance. Hence, the definition of corruption 
envisaged by this thesis is broad enough to encompass these three forms of corruption. 
However, the definition chosen has been subjected to criticism by some scholars. Shaxson 
(2007) is of the view that this definition is too narrow, while Knack (2007) states that one 
cannot assign one definition to the work of TI because TI‟s indexes by definition are 
composite indexes, hence it consists of various definitions from the data which they are 
compiled from. Thus, these shortcomings attributed to the definition chosen, and the 
discussions above have indicated the complexity of corruption is not only present in how it is 
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viewed but also in the fundamental ways in which it has been defined. 
Furthermore, to correctly understand the concept of corruption, the concept of rent-seeking 
must be understood, which refers to the pursuit of economic rents. A rent has been defined as 
“spending money in socially unproductive efforts to acquire, maintain, or exercise 
monopoly” (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2009, p.378). The authors defined rent “as the amount 
that firms are willing to pay for an input less the minimum amount necessary to obtain it” 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2009, p.542). Similarly, Svensson (2005, p.21) defines rent as “the 
socially costly pursuit of rents, often created by government interventions in the economy”. 
In other words, some level of rent-seeking is inevitable in all types of political systems and 
all the regions of the world. Rent-seeking usually arises in cases where government policy 
creates an artificial or contrived rent, such as through licenses or protected monopolies (Weil, 
2009), that is, the opportunities for rent-seeking often arise in the public sector. Thus, the 
ability of the government to artificially create rents through licensing and regulations makes 
the most common forms of corruption to revolve around it (Treisman, 2000). 
These have motivated some studies (e.g., Murphy et al., 1993) to argue that the concept of 
rent-seeking can be divided into illegal corruption and legal lobbying. It is generally 
considered that lobbying is targeted at elected politicians and corruption is targeted at 
bureaucrats who are to enforce policies enacted by the elected politicians. For example, while 
corruption is often associated with money given to bureaucrats who are enforcers of policies, 
lobbying is mostly associated with political campaign activities or any other practices aimed 
to influence the elected politicians who enact laws or policies (Campos and Giovannoni, 
2008). 
It is also the view of Svensson (2000) that corruption and lobbying can be partially 
substituted for each other because a firm could switch the rules through lobbying while 
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through bribery it could bend the rules. If politicians can successfully be lobbied by the firm 
to change the rules, then the firm does not need to bribe officials to bend them. But if firms 
can easily bribe the bureaucrats, then it might not engage in lobbying to change the rules 
since there is the tendency that the outcomes of lobbying will be substantially uncertain. 
1.3.  Causes of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 
This subsection aims to provide answers to questions such as: why do politicians and 
bureaucrats in some countries are more corrupt than their counterparts in other countries? 
Why corruption is of the uncoordinated and unorganised type in SSA countries? Although, 
there are many determinants of corruption identified in the literature address these questions, 
the chapter only explores a set of factors that has been established both theoretically and 
empirically to be among the most significant determinants of corruption in SSA countries. 
Economic Development 
The phenomenon of corruption has been linked to the level of economic development 
although views on this relationship is conflicting. Shleifer and Vishny (1993), argue that high 
level of corruption reduces economic development, while Treisman (2000) argue that lower 
levels of economic development causes corruption. Despite these conflicting views, Mauro 
(1995) argues that there is a strong negative correlation between GDP per capita and a 
country‟s score on corruption perception indexes. The insight is that it is easier for corrupt 
activities to take place in less developed countries than in developed countries. This is 
because positive economic performance tends to increase the levels of education, literacy and 
depersonalized relationships (Treisman, 2000; Tanzi, 2000). 
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Figure 1.1 is scatterplot of World Bank control of corruption index and the average income 
growth rate of SSA countries in 2018. The figure shows differences in the growth effect of 
corruption among SSA countries. For example, some countries such as Angola combine high 
incidence of corruption and slow economic, others such as Congo Dem. Rep. combine high 
rates of corruption and high economic growth.   
These has led to debates on whether corruption enhances or cripples economic performance. 
For example, Leff (1964), Bayley (1966) and Huntington (1968) are of the view that that 
corruption enhances growth for two reasons. First, corruption could be used as a “speed 
money” to avoid delays due to bureaucratic red tape, hence the “grease the wheels” 
hypothesis. Second, corruption could be used to incentivise corrupt employees to work harder 
or put greater work effort. Through these, corruption would facilitate growth or, if the 
government is observed to be indifferent, hostile to development or have other priorities than 
growth. Corruption is also noted to be beneficial to investment since it may induce some 
elements of competition especially when the critical sectors of the economy are being 
dominated by national monopolies or ineffective enterprises that are supported by 
government subsidies (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 2006). 
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Figure 1.1: Corruption and Growth Rates in SSA Countries 
 
Sources: World Bank Development and Governance Indicators Databases 
In contrast to the above views, most studies argued that corruption has adverse effects on 
economic growth. Mauro (1995) argues that weak government institutions constitute a severe 
obstacle to investment, innovation and entrepreneurship and thus exerts a significant negative 
impact on growth and thus can be costly to economic development (Keefer and Knack, 1995; 
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corruption are more pronounced in developing countries and due to its pervasive nature, it 
has led to increased income inequality and poverty (Gupta et al., 1998). 
In this regard, some studies argue that income inequality is not only a consequence of 
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democracy versus autocracy, and regimes that are development-oriented and neo-patrimonial 
ones. Aidt el al., (2008) investigated the role of political institutions in determining the 
relationship between corruption and economic growth. The authors find that, the relationship 
between two variables as regime specific. For example, in a regime with high quality political 
accountability, corruption has a substantial negative impact on growth, while in a regime with 
low quality institutions; corruption has no impact on growth. Mendez and Sepulveda (2006) 
also argue that the relationship between growth and corruption is quadratic and this 
relationship depends on the degree of political freedom within a country. 
Dreher et al. (2007) find that weak political institutions lead to corruption, and democracy 
through political competition raises the level of transparency and accountability, which in 
turn reduces corruption. Similarly, Buehn and Scheider (2012) show how weak governance 
leads to a higher level of corruption, however, when political competition is promoted, 
transparency and accountability increase, which in turn reduce corruption. Some studies have 
attempted to provide a more intricate nature of democracy by examining the effect of 
corruption in certain features of democracy, rather than focusing on corruption reducing 
potentials of democracy. Gerring and Thacker (2004), Lederman et al. (2005) and Kunicova 
(2006) investigated whether parliamentary systems fare better with respect to perceived 
corruption than presidential systems and they find evidence that parliamentary systems are 
associated with lower levels of corruption than presidential systems. 
Other studies (e.g., Persson et al., 2003) examine the features of the electoral system to 
determine the relationship between corruption and economic performance. Some authors find 
that a lower level of corruption is associated with larger voting districts and the larger the 
number of contestants listed lists the higher the level of corruption. In studies related to SSA 
  
12 
 
countries,
1
 neo-patrimonial type of governance has been strongly associated with corruption 
because of rent-seeking behaviour by bureaucrats at the highest level of government in neo-
patrimonial states (Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman, 2000). 
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization 
Nowhere in the world is the effects of ethno-linguistic fragmentation so pronounced than in 
SSA countries. According to Easterly and Levine (1997), the 15 most heterogeneous 
countries in the world are in Africa.
2
 Since these partitions were not generally guided by the 
need to safeguard the identities of the indigenous states or ethnic groups, it has resulted in 
splitting of ethnic groups across different borders. This has further exacerbated the pre-
existing levels of ethnic and linguistic diversity. This is important because if societies do not 
internalize the effects of their actions on other groups (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) they would 
attempt to obtain as much rent as possible when they come into power or attempt to block 
other competing ethnic groups from having access and may give rise to corruption. 
Views in the literature on the relation between ethno-linguistic fragmentation and corruption 
are varied. Mauro (1995) has demonstrated an empirical association between ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation and high level of corruption, while Rose-Ackerman (1999) argues that 
corruption is high in countries with higher ethno-linguistic fragmentation and lower 
corruption is associated with homogeneous societies (Tanzi, 1998). However, Treisman 
(2000) argues that ethno-linguistic fragmentation can be an indirect cause of corruption; 
hence, corruption may decrease economic development indirectly through ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation. 
                                                          
1
 This is another strand of the literature was originated by French scholars in the 1980s and examine corruption by 
focusing on the informal aspect of power, hence the so-called “politics of the belly” or “neo-patrimonial” 
approach. The approach shows how African politics is unique from the rest of the world, where governance is 
associated with political relations, clientelism and political corruption (Hope and Chikulo, 2000; Bayart, 1993; 
and Bratton and van de Walle, 1994). 
2
 The borders of the continent were determined through series of negotiations between the European powers based 
on the Berlin conference of 1884 – 1885. 
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Foreign Aid 
The exact impact of aid on the quality of governance is difficult to assess even though SSA 
countries are among the largest recipients of foreign aid both bilaterally and multilaterally. 
According to OECD (2005a), one-third of the aid disbursed in 2005 went to SSA countries. 
Notwithstanding, when aid is used to raise public service wages or attract better human 
capital, it would help reduce corruption or demands for bribes (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 
2001). Importantly, if aid is channelled towards legal and judicial reforms as well as the 
public service reforms, it would be effective in curbing corruption. However, according to 
Brautigam (2000) foreign aid could also lead to misallocation of labour in the recipient 
country because civil servants would be attracted to work with donor agencies, where the 
wage level is higher than those offered by the recipient‟s public service. 
Findings on the impact of foreign aid on corruption seem ambiguous in the literature. Alesina 
and Weder (2005) find weak evidence that foreign aid causes corruption. Svensson (2000), 
by examining the relationship between corruption and concessional assistance, finds evidence 
that foreign aid causes corruption particularly in countries that are more likely to suffer from 
competing social groups. Although Knack (2007) finds evidence that aid erodes bureaucratic 
quality and the rule of law, the study finds no significant relation between aid and corruption. 
However, Tavares (2003) finds evidence that show foreign aid reduces corruption. 
Colonial Influence 
Some studies examine how colonial heritage may influence corruption in SSA countries.
3
 
These studies were motivated by the view that the main factor that drove colonialism in 
Africa was the need to conquer and exploit natural resources. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue 
that the institutional legacy left in Africa by the European colonisers are “extractive” because 
the colonialists did not introduce institutions that protect private property or checks and 
                                                          
3
 For example, Young (1995, p.24) notes that “overall, colonial legacy cast its shadow over the emergent African 
state to a degree unique among major world regions”. 
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balances against government expropriation. According to the authors, the main purpose of the 
creation of extractive states was the need to transfer natural resources to the colonising 
countries with minimum amount of investment. 
This has motivated some studies to conclude that former British colonies in SSA are less 
corrupt than the French, Spanish, Portuguese and Belgian former colonies (e.g., Swamy et al., 
2001; Treisman, 2000; Sera, 2006). These studies point to the tradition of free press, strong 
legal institutions, the importance of education and the impartiality of the British civil service 
as factors. Hence, one may suggest that former colonial masters have left an institutional 
legacy that has continued to shape the subsequent form and extent of corruption in their 
former colonies. 
Level of Education 
Studies on the role of education as a determinant of corruption are conflicting in the 
literature. Ehrlich and Lui (1999) argue that corruption and education jointly influence 
economic development while individually they do not have an impact. Dreher et al. (2007) 
find low school enrolment leads to increase in corruption, while Buehn and Schneider (2012) 
find no such evidence. Barro (2000) and Li et al. (1998) find similar results that more years 
of schooling have an income equalizing effect thus decrease in corruption. Mauro (1997b) 
looked at the issue indirectly through the fraction of government spending on education and 
finds a negative correlation education and corruption. In other words, the lower the 
government expenditure on education, the less a country‟s population becomes educated but 
the effect this has on corruption is not well established. Therefore, corruption tends to reduce 
the quality of education and health care, hence decreasing economic development through 
reducing human capital development. 
Public Sector Wages 
Some countries may be corrupt due to low public service wages relative to the minimum 
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required to have a “decent” living. As a result, most anti-corruption measures advocated to 
developing countries by multilateral donor agencies in mid-1990s, involved ambitious efforts 
to overhaul the public service along Weberian lines (Treisman, 2000). Gould (1980) in a 
study on Zaire finds that, due to the low public service wages, which is below the poverty 
line relative to the earnings of the political elites, there is a widespread perception among the 
general public that civil servants must indulge in corruption to survive. 
Notwithstanding, theoretical works by Bestley and McLaren (1993), Flatters and Mcleod 
(1995), and Becker and Stigler (1974) have shown that it is prohibitively expensive to have 
less corrupt civil service because only paying higher wages would incentivise public servants 
not to indulge in corruption. In an empirical study Van Rijckehem and Weder (2001) show, a 
large increased in the levels of wages in public service is needed to eliminate corruption. In 
other words, incentivising public sector workers by increasing wage dispersion and setting 
formal recruitment and promotion criteria will reduce corruption in the public sector. 
Legal System 
The type of legal system operated by country has been identified as a determinant of 
corruption. This is because protection of private property especially from corrupt government 
officials may vary depending on the effectiveness of the legal systems, formulation and 
original intent of the laws made by countries. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that common law 
systems differ from civil law systems. An example of this is an attempt by the Parliament and 
the autocracy in England in the 17
th
 century to limit the power of the sovereign from 
regulating and expropriating their wealth. Thus, a common law system can be argued to have 
the intention of limiting the powers of the state rather than strengthening it. The difference of 
civil law from common law is that it was formulated mainly to find solutions to a dispute, 
rather than following a set of procedures. Therefore, common law systems tend to improve 
several aspect of government performances, and this includes reducing corruption (La Porta 
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et al., 1999). 
Religious Beliefs 
Most countries in SSA are regarded as deeply religious and this has shaped cultural attitudes 
towards corruption. Corrupt activities could be influenced by religion through the dimensions 
of hierarchy and influence between the church and the state. La Porta et al. (1999) identify 
Catholic, Islam and Greek Orthodox beliefs as hierarchical in nature, and that countries 
associated with these religions tend to exhibit weak level of governance compared to largely 
Protestant countries (La Porta et al., 1999). Hence, it is possible that countries with greater 
religious hierarchy have corrupt activities transposed to other areas, compared to countries 
that are associated with egalitarian beliefs, such as Protestantism (Lipset and Lenz, 2000). 
A conflicting study by Treisman (2000) finds a strong negative association between 
corruption and Protestantism. Specifically, the author found a highly significant negative 
impact of the percentage of Protestants in the total population on the perceived levels of 
corruption. This evidence is corroborated by other studies such as, Lipset and Lenz (2000), 
Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000), Paldam (2001), Gerring and Thacker (2004) and Serra (2006). 
The conclusion one can reach from this, is that the more societies are associated with 
egalitarian beliefs, the less would be the negative effects of corruption on economic 
development. 
Table 1. 1 Summary of literature review on Causes of Corruption  
Study Transmission Channel Policy Impacts and Relevance 
Mauro (1995) Investment  Improving integrity and efficiency of bureaucracy can boost 
investment rate thereby increasing growth 
Knack and Keefer (1997) Weak institutions  institutions that protect property rights are crucial for economic 
growth 
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Sachs and Warner (2001) Natural resources Diversifying the economy away from natural resources would boost 
economic growth 
Li et al. (2000) Income distribution  Reducing corruption will reduce income inequality 
Mo (2001) Investments, government 
expenditure, political 
instability and human capital 
Reducing institutional inefficiency, such as bureaucratic red tape 
and weak legislative and judicial systems would increase private 
investment, reduce political instability and boost human capita 
Gyimah-Brempong (2002) Investment and income 
inequality 
institutional reforms by African countries would expand employment 
opportunities and thus improve income distribution and in flow of 
private investment 
UNDP (1997) Weak governance  To enhance economic growth, anticorruption laws should be 
enforced, institutional checks and balances and economic reforms 
programmes should be implemented  
Wei (2000) foreign direct investment   A decrease in either the tax rate on multinational firms or the 
corruption level developing governments would boost inward foreign 
direct investment. 
Tanzi (1998) International trade and 
economic reforms 
Make regulations transparent and nondiscretionary. Increase public 
sector pay and impose penalties corrupt public servants.  
Gupta et al. (2001) Health and education sectors  Combating corruption in both health and education sectors would 
decrease child and infant mortality rates, percent of low-birthweight 
rates, and primary school dropout rates. 
 
1.4. Corruption as a motivation for reforms 
It is more than three decades since developing countries started implementing Electricity 
Sector Reforms (ESR). The implementations of these market-oriented reforms were in 
response to a combination of political, ideological, technological and economic factors that 
aimed at dismantling the dominance of state-owned utilities and encourage the private sector 
participation (Jamasb, 2016). Efficiency improvements post reforms implementation in some 
pioneer countries like Chile, UK and other OECD countries, led to the emergence of the 
textbook/standard electricity reform model. The reform model essentially calls for the 
enactment of reform legislation, unbundling and commercialization of the vertically 
integrated state-owned utilities, privatization of the unbundled parts and attracting other 
forms of private sector investments, and the creation of independent regulators to oversee and 
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regulate the activities of all players in the sector. 
Following the success of these pioneer countries, reforms were implemented in SSA 
countries to improve the poor performance of state-owned electricity utilities, remove the 
burden of price subsidies, mobilise the needed investments to maintain network 
infrastructures, expand electricity services to the millions without access, and improve the 
reliability of service in areas where services has been provided. Apart from these and other 
motivators of reforms in the region, there is another important, but less explored, factor that 
drove ESR in SSA countries: corruption. The potentials of ESR to mitigate the crippling 
effects of corruption on electricity sector performance because reforms were underpinned by 
an anti-corruption agenda (World Bank, 2000). 
Although, studies such as Besant-Jones (2006) argue that outcomes of reforms in developing 
countries should be assessed based on improvements in quality of service provision, 
expansion services to those without access, and improved government‟s fiscal position, a 
lower level of corruption in the sector is also an expected outcome (Estache et al., 2009). This 
is because, different aspects of the reform model have different corruption reducing effects. 
For instance, unbundling of the vertically integrated state-owned utilities would help identify 
all sources of inefficiency including corruption, competition among the unbundled units give 
consumers freedom of choice and escape from corruption associated with the state-owned 
monopolist. Similarly, privatised firms as residual claimants have incentives to close all 
sources of inefficiencies including those related to corruption and regulators safeguard 
smaller firms from dominant firms, collusions among firms, safeguard firms from 
government corruption and consumers from exploitations. However, despite nearly three 
decades of reforms in SSA countries, there has been no detailed evaluation and analysis on 
this important motivator of reforms in the region. 
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1.5. Outline of the thesis and research contributions 
The main aim of this thesis is to analyse the impact of corruption on electricity sector 
performance and evaluate how reform policies mitigate this performance effects of 
corruption. In order to achieve this, the chapter started by defining corruption and identified 
some causes of corruption that are relevant to SSA countries. These identified causes gave 
insights on how the relationship between corruption and economic development can operate 
through various channels especially through the electricity sector. 
This observation leads us to Chapter 2 which examines how corruption affects economic 
development and electricity sector performance, and how reform policies – creation of 
independent regulatory agencies and private sector participation – influence this relationship. 
The findings show that corruption can significantly reduce technical efficiency of the sector 
and constrain the efforts to increase access to electricity and national income. However, these 
performance effects are reduced where independent regulatory agencies are established, and 
privatisation is implemented. The findings suggest that well-designed reforms not only boost 
the performance of the sector directly, but also indirectly reduce the negative effects of macro 
level institutional deficiencies such as corruption on micro and macro performance. 
Chapter 3 extends the findings of the previous chapter by examining how politicians, who by 
advancing the ideologies of their parties, intrude into regulatory functions thereby affecting 
electricity sector performance. The chapter uses data on 45 SSA countries with different 
ideological orientations and find negative impact from independent regulatory agencies on 
installed capacity in countries with left-wing governments while in countries with right-wing 
governments there is a positive effect on capacity. Also, the results show negative impact on 
electricity access when regulators are established in countries with left-wing governments, 
while there are no significant impact for the right-wing governments. 
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Chapter 4 analyses the expansion of access in SSA countries in terms of human development 
post reforms and other policies implemented to increase access to electricity. The results 
show that expansion of electricity access has positively and significantly improved human 
development in SSA countries. Similarly, findings were established on the three individual 
components of human development (life expectancy, GDP per capita, and education). The 
results indicate the importance of electricity in enhancing human development as it has 
potentials to eliminate of energy poverty usually associated with SSA countries and thus 
eliminate poverty in the region sustainably. 
Figure 2.2: Flowchart of the thesis’ chapters 
 
 
 
           
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
The three independent, but related stand-alone research chapters are depicted in Figure 1.1. 
The three chapters have some characteristics and similarities. First, the three chapters are on 
SSA countries. Second, the analysis in the three chapters are based on a dynamic panel data 
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approach. Lastly, the chapters are concerned with policy implications of ESR implementation 
on socio-economic development of SSA countries. 
There are some important contributions of the thesis to both policy and research. First, it 
provides insights on how corruption and political interferences could weaken institutions and 
regulatory frameworks necessary to encourage private investments to finance the construction 
of critical infrastructures in SSA countries and the implication of this on the socio-economic 
development of the region. In this regard, the thesis shows how implementation of electricity 
reforms in SSA countries have, to some extent, addressed the root cause of inefficiency, low 
access and low generation capacities of utilities and thus have contributed to the socio-
economic development of the region. 
Second, the research show where and how corruption is hurting the economic development of 
SSA countries. In this regard, this contributes to policy by highlighting the importance of 
designing appropriate policies that would reduce uncertainties surrounding issues related to 
market access, tariffs, and revenues but also help improve the overall governance of the 
sector thereby tackling one of the numerous challenges such as energy poverty faced by 
countries of the region. 
The thesis fills a gap in the literature by specifically focusing on the effects of corruption on 
one important indicator of economic development of SSA countries, i.e., electricity sector 
reform performance. The research, therefore, contributes to the literature by moving forward 
the current scholarly investigation on the effects of Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) on economic 
development of SSA countries (AU/ECA, 2014). Similarly, it contributes to the institutional 
aspect of power sector reforms that emphasizes the importance of corruption (Estache et al., 
2009) and adds to a broader literature that studies the impacts of political corruption and rent-
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seeking on economic development by using indirect methods
4
 (Aidt el al., 2008; and Fisman 
and Svensson, 2007). 
  
                                                          
4
 Through assessing its effects on the operation and regulation of electricity networks and human development. 
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Chapter 2: Sector Reforms and Institutional Corruption: Evidence from 
Electricity Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Abstract 
In order to reduce the influence of corruption on electricity sector performance, most SSA 
countries have implemented electricity sector reforms. However, after nearly two and half 
decades of reforms, there is no evidence whether the reforms have mitigated corruption. 
Neither is there evidence of performance improvement of the reforms in terms of technical, 
economic or welfare impact. This chapter aims to fill this gap. The chapter uses a dynamic 
panel estimator with a novel panel data of 47 SSA countries from 2002 to 2013. The chapter 
analyse the impact of corruption and two key aspects of electricity reforms – creations of 
independent regulatory agencies and private sector participation – on three key performance 
indicators: technical efficiency, access to electricity and income. The result show that 
corruption can significantly reduce technical efficiency of the sector and constrain the efforts to 
increase access to electricity and national income. The adverse effects are reduced where 
independent regulatory agencies are established and privatisation is implemented. These 
findings suggest that well-designed reforms not only boost the performance of the sector 
directly, but also indirectly reduce the negative effects of macro level institutional deficiencies 
such as corruption on micro and macro performance indicators. 
 
Keywords: electricity sector reform; corruption; Sub-Saharan Africa; panel data; dynamic 
GMM. 
 
JEL classification: Q48, D02, K23, D73. 
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2.1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, a body of literature has emerged that establishes the various 
transmission channels through which corruption can constrain economic development. For 
example, corruption, defined as the “abuse of entrusted power for private gain”,5 is found to 
have corrosive effects on economic development through increasing transaction costs and 
uncertainty (Murphy et al., 1991), inefficient investments (Mauro, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993), reduced human capital development (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005), and 
misallocation of resources (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
Recently, attention has shifted to another important but less explored micro-level channel, 
i.e., the operation and regulation of electricity sectors particularly in developing countries 
(Wren-Lewis, 2015; Estache et al., 2009; Dal Bó, 2006; Bergara et al., 1998). The 
preponderance of evidence from this strand of literature suggests that corruption can cripple 
economic development by inhibiting the performance of the electricity sector. For instance, 
corruption reduces labour productivity (Wren-Lewis, 2015; Dal Bó, 2006), increases 
transmission and distribution losses and constrains the efforts to increase access to electricity 
services (see Estache et al., 2009). 
The impact of corruption on electricity sector performance is particularly relevant in SSA, 
where welfare improvements can be linked to widespread corruption (Gyimah-Brempong and 
de Camacho, 2006). Despite the difficulty of measuring corruption, the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) produced by Transparency International (TI, 2013) shows that eight of the 
twenty most corrupt countries in the world are in SSA and the only region with more than 
two countries in this group. Thus, in weak institutional settings, major undertakings such as 
the construction of large hydroelectric dams, government intervention, monopolistic 
characteristics of the sector, absence of competition and substantial revenues from the sales 
                                                          
5
 See Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997) for discussions on this definition. 
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of electricity make the sector vulnerable to corruption (Bosshard, 2005; World Bank, 2009; 
Reinikka and Svensson, 2005). 
The above factors could be partly blamed for turning the electricity sectors in SSA countries 
into sources of corruption and cronyism (Patterson, 1999) and the concentration of electricity 
services to urban areas whilst rural areas remained unconnected or underserved (Byrne and 
Mun, 2003). This is referred to as „electricity poverty‟ and is widespread in the region.6 In 
order to improve efficiency and reduce corruption, many SSA countries have implemented 
ESR (Eberhard et al., 2016). Such reforms, also referred to as the „standard electricity reform 
model‟ and often prescribed to developing countries by multilateral development 
organisations, were first implemented in OECD countries such as Chile, Norway and the UK 
in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The experiences of these pioneer countries supported the notion that effective implementation 
of ESR would not only enhance technical efficiency of the sector but would also translate the 
efficiency gains into social welfare and economic growth (Sen et al., 2018). Moreover, 
according to the World Bank (2000), as part of wider economic liberalisation, deregulation 
and demonopolisation policies, ESR policies were further underpinned by anticorruption 
agendas. Thus, reforms not only promised improved efficiency and access to reliable and 
affordable services, they also promised reduction in corruption in the sector (Estache et al., 
2009) and the wider economy (World Bank, 2000). 
Despite the anticipated positive outcomes from implementation of the reforms, there are 
widespread perceptions that reforms have hurt the poor through increased tariffs, stronger 
enforcement of bills collection (Scott and Seth, 2013) and unemployment, while benefitting 
                                                          
6
 The majority of the estimated 500 million people who lack access to clean and affordable electricity in the 
region are poor and rely on traditional biomass – wood, agricultural residues and dung – for cooking and heating 
needs (IEA, 2014). 
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the powerful and wealthy notably through corruption (Auriol and Blanc, 2009). As a result, 
the reforms often lacked social legitimacy, and this usually manifests through increases in 
electricity theft and vandalism (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). Moreover, as Estache et al. 
(2009) have noted, large numbers of people believe that corruption still remains a problem in 
the sector. However, despite the anecdotes that connect corruption to sector performance after 
the reform efforts, there is a lack of empirical evidence on whether the electricity sector 
reforms in SSA region have mitigated or exacerbated the effect of corruption in the electricity 
sector. 
Previous empirical studies have shown the relevance of corruption as a driver of ESR in 
developing countries, but they either focus on labour efficiency in electricity distribution 
utilities (e.g., Wren-Lewis, 2015; Dal Bó and Rossi, 2007) or on different sectors (e.g., 
Estache et al., 2009). Moreover, the former two studies focused on Latin American countries 
while the latter study includes countries from different developing regions. Therefore, to my 
knowledge, this is the first empirical study to assess the electricity reforms in SSA countries 
and among the few studies that examine the interactions between country level institutions 
and micro-level electricity reform steps (e.g., Wren-Lewis, 2015; Estache et al., 2009). Most 
studies of this strand of literature tend to focus on specific aspects of the textbook reform 
model or on specific countries without explicitly accounting for the role of institutions apart 
from those earlier mentioned. 
The chapter addresses the gap in the literature and contributes to better understanding of the 
institutional aspect of electricity sector reforms (e.g., Dorman, 2014; Chang and Berdiev, 
2011; Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a; Cubbin and Stern, 2006; Erdogdu, 2013) and the political 
economy literature of regulatory agencies (e.g., Pitlik, 2007; Potrafke, 2010; Scott and Seth, 
2013). This study indirectly contributes to the literature on obsolescing bargaining (Vernon, 
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1971) since political corruption entails government commitment to honour the terms of 
electricity reforms and particularly the privatisation of state assets, could be doubtful. Thus, 
the findings provide further insights into why investments in the SSA electricity markets tend 
to be more concentrated in the generation segment than in the distribution utilities since the 
former is more susceptible to corruption. 
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the nearly three decades of 
ESR in SSA countries and discusses how each of the key steps of the reform model may 
mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on the performance of the electricity reforms. 
Section 2.3 presents three research hypotheses related to key performance aspects of reforms 
to be tested. Section 2.4 presents the empirical methodology and the data used in the study. 
Section 2.5 presents and discusses the results. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
2.2. Electricity Sector Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Historically, the generation, supply and marketing of electricity in most SSA countries, as in 
many other regions of the world, were dominated by vertically integrated state-owned 
utilities (Clark et al., 2005). These arrangements were partly regarded as primary functions of 
the state, such as, the high fixed costs of large plants, the desire of governments to enhance 
welfare, national security concerns, social equity objectives (World Bank, 1993) and 
ideological reasons (Erdogdu, 2013). The state-ownership was reinforced by the idea that 
permitting more than one firm would increase costs while this resulted in higher investments 
by public utilities relative to private utilities (USAID, 2005). The 1980s and 1990s saw SSA 
countries unable to sustain investments in the sector. Decades of government investments had 
not produced the anticipated results as services and subsidies remained concentrated in urban 
areas, nor were there improvements in quality and reliability of service. 
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The first electricity reform took place in Chile in 1983, and then in OECD countries such as 
Norway and United Kingdom. From these experiences emerged the theory and practice of the 
„standard textbook reform model‟. It was believed that reforms would reduce the dominance 
of the state through creation of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) and private sector 
participation (Jamasb et al., 2016). The expected outcomes were the enhancement of 
economic and technical efficiency of utilities and the transfer of efficiency gains to 
consumers in the form of improved access to affordable and reliable electricity (Nepal and 
Jamasb, 2012b; Estache et al., 2009). 
In SSA, macroeconomic conditions such as the deteriorating international business climate, 
fiscal constraints faced by governments, structural adjustment programmes (Jamasb, 2006) 
compelled the countries to undertake structural and institutional reforms of their sectors. 
Many of the arguments that supported state ownership of utilities disappeared by the 1980s as 
the economies of scale of vertically integrated utilities had been exhausted (Joskow, 2006; 
Gilbert et al., 1996), therefore state-ownership came to be seen as a hindrance to adoption of 
new technologies by the private sector (Downing et al., 2006). The reforms in SSA were 
triggered by investment shortfalls and concerns that monopolisation of the sector by state-
owned utilities were wasteful and inefficient (Victor, 2005). 
The standard reform model calls for the unbundling of state-owned electricity utilities 
vertically (generation, transmission, distribution and retailing) and horizontally (generation 
and retailing). The unbundled parts amenable to competition would then be sold to the private 
sector and an independent sector regulator would supervise and regulate the natural 
monopoly parts of the sector (Victor and Heller, 2007). The electricity sector specific and 
external factors that triggered ESR varied in developed and developing countries (Jamasb et 
al., 2016). In addition, the extent and outcome of reforms have differed in these countries 
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(Nepal, 2013). The reforms in developed countries were undertaken in the context of excess 
capacity and stable institutions aimed at improving economic and financial performance of 
technically reliable systems, encourage interregional trade, transfer investment risks to the 
private sector, offer consumer choice, and reduce overinvestment (Jamasb et al., 2014; 
Erdogdu, 2013). Conversely, ESR in the developing countries were implemented within a 
context of poor technical and financial performances of state-owned utilities, weak 
institutional setting, inability of utilities and governments to mobilise sufficient investments 
to provide access, low tariffs and poor service quality (Jamasb et al., 2005). 
However, the suitability of the standard reform model for developing countries has been 
questioned as it has usually resulted in higher prices, loss of employment, unreliable service, 
and concentration of service to profitable areas since private firms did not have incentives to 
extend the service to poor people (Transnational Institute, 2002; Victor, 2005). Thus, in the 
unprofitable segments there has been an absence of service provision (Auriol and Picard, 
2006). The poor access rates in SSA relative to other developing regions may be partly 
attributed to this lack of incentives. For example, although between 2000 and 2014, there was 
some progress in increasing access to electricity in all developing regions of the world; access 
deficit is overwhelmingly concentrated in SSA region, as progress has fallen consistently 
short of population growth. The poor outcomes have led the reform critics to argue that the 
state should take the responsibility for such investments (Victor, 2005). 
Moreover, the experiences of ESR around the world have shown the difficulty of creating 
efficient electricity sectors underpinned by genuine competitive markets that show significant 
potentials to benefit consumers through reliable service, low tariffs, and choice of alternative 
sources (IEA, 2014). As a result, the reform experience in SSA has lagged behind the 
anticipated outcomes of the standard reform model and has led to extensive political backlash 
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against the reforms. Higher electricity prices have been an obvious source of political 
resistance in many countries, especially for groups that have become accustomed to paying 
near nothing for electricity services (Victor, 2005) and this resistance was further reinforced 
by the awareness that elections can be won or lost because of electricity prices (UNDP and 
World Bank, 2005). 
Table 2. 1 Implementations of Electricity Sector Reforms in SSA countries 
No ESR  
Initiated 
Vertically 
integrated w. 
priv.
* 
Vertically 
integrated w. 
IRA only 
Vertically  
integrated w.  
IRA and priv. 
Unbundled w. 
IRA  
and priv. 
Unbundled 
w. IRA only 
Benin 
Burundi 
Central African 
Rep. 
Djibouti 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Eritrea 
Seychelles 
Congo Dem. 
Rep. 
Guinea 
Botswana 
Chad 
Madagascar 
Mauritius  
Liberia 
Guinea Bissau 
Comoros  
Congo, Rep. 
Mauritania Angola 
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde 
Cameroon 
Côte d‟Ivoire 
Ethiopia 
Gabon  
Gambia 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Lesotho 
Rwanda 
São Tomé & 
Príncipe 
Senegal 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Zambia 
Ghana 
Kenya
** 
Nigeria 
Uganda 
Zimbabwe
**
 
Sudan 
Niger 
Swaziland  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
All forms of private participation excluding management contracts, lease contracts and concession. 
** 
Kenya and Zimbabwe have only undertaken partial unbundling. 
*** 
Somalia and South Sudan are not included in the analysis. The former due to the lack of data. The latter 
country gained independence from (North) Sudan in 2011 and the data covers until 2013. 
Sources: Eberhard et al. (2016) and World Bank Infrastructure Database (2017). 
However, the difficulties of ESR in developing economies have not deterred SSA countries 
from implementing some aspects of the textbook reform model. Twenty-four of the countries 
in the region have enacted ESR law, three-quarter have attracted private participation, nearly 
all have corporatized their utilities, two-thirds have set-up regulatory bodies, and more than a 
third have Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in place (Eberhard et al., 2016). Table 2.1 
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summarises the reform efforts in the SSA countries studied here. 
2.3. Literature on Corruption and Sector Reform 
Corruption and Corporatization/Commercialization 
Although independent and incorporated under the same laws governing private corporations, 
the state retains ownership of corporatized utilities and in some cases runs them through 
appointed independent board of directors. Whether managed by an appointed board of 
directors or private contractors, corporatizations of utilities were mainly aimed at reducing 
the inefficiencies induced by government interference in their operations, facilitate the entry 
of private capital and move utilities toward cost-recovery in pricing through improved 
metering, billing and collection (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011). 
Corporatized utilities have achieved modest performance improvements especially those 
operated by management contractors.
7
 Positive outcomes such as improvements in bill 
collections and reductions in system losses in almost all SSA with management contractors, 
made international aid agencies involved in most management contracts, to regard them as a 
first step towards comprehensive reforms. However, contracting out to private sector has 
been difficult and contentious in some countries.  
For example, most governments were unwilling to honour their financial obligations needed 
to expand capacities, reject tariff hikes (e.g., in Senegal), unwilling to compel government 
agencies to pay their bills, forbidding utilities from reducing the workforce or disconnecting 
delinquent consumers (Nellis, 2005). Stakeholders removed from management positions or 
employees laid off criticised such contracts especially where large fees were paid to 
management contractors (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011). The large payouts were argued not 
to be commensurate with the modest improvements in the finances of utilities. This helped 
                                                          
7
 See Appendix I-1: Table A1 for types, project names and status of management contracts in the countries of 
our sample. 
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galvanise a political backlash against such contracts in the region. Moreover, many regulators 
failed to capture the efficiency gains and competition from management contractors (Nellis, 
2005). As a result, management contracts were viewed as unsustainable. Of 16 such contracts 
in SSA, 4 were cancelled before their expiration dates, 12 were allowed to expire after their 
initial terms, and only in Liberia and Lesotho there are active contracts. Eberhard and 
Gratwick (2011). Meanwhile, Gabon and Mali have adopted further reforms. 
The eventual disengagement of management contractors from many SSA countries shows 
that state-owned utilities still dominate the sector. Some governments force utilities to charge 
electricity prices below the costs of generation and supply, dictate the choice of plants 
locations or mandate utilities to purchase their energy from state-owned companies (Nellis, 
2005) even while lower cost alternatives exist. Thus, it became increasingly difficult to 
insulate corporatized utilities from corruption usually associated with state ownership of 
utilities, which has been a key motivator of reforms in the region. 
Corruption, Unbundling and Competition 
In order to target the sources of inefficiency such as corruption, reformers have advocated for 
the introduction of competitive electricity markets after the sector is unbundled vertically and 
horizontally. Thus, irrespective of ownership status, reformers anticipate that competition 
between the unbundled segments and generating plants offers a reliable mechanism to reduce 
energy losses and increase capacity utilisation. The gains are expected to increase access 
rates, while reducing the cost of service to existing consumers (Zhang et al., 2008). More 
importantly, unbundling and the subsequent competition entails consumers will have more 
freedom of choice. This also means that consumers can escape from corruption hitherto 
associated with government-owned utilities. In SSA, only Nigeria has taken steps towards 
wholesale competition after unbundling and privatising the generation and distribution 
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segments (Gratwick et al., 2006).
8
 Although, the lack of competition in electricity markets of 
SSA countries can partly be linked to the difficulties of reforming small systems, the absence 
of private participation in countries such as Sudan,
9
 indicates that governance issues are still 
at the core of the electricity reform efforts in many countries. 
Despite the governance enhancing virtues of competition, experience reveals the difficulties 
of creating genuine competitive electricity markets even in developed countries which are 
usually associated with strong institutions. In SSA, the emergence of hybrid electricity 
markets and the lack of robust anti-competitive laws may explain the absence of competitive 
electricity markets apart from the TEM in Nigeria and the predominance of private sector 
largely in the form of IPPs. This is because competitive retail or wholesale electricity markets 
require sophisticated institutional and financial infrastructures (Eberhard et al., 2016). In 
order to mitigate investment risk in weak institutional environments, private participants such 
as IPPs often enter into power purchase agreements with the incumbent off-takers by 
requiring government guarantees, and inclusion of international arbitration clauses. 
Corruption and Private Sector Participation 
Privatisation can improve the performance of the sector through changing the incentive 
structure. The owners of privatised utilities are the residual claimants of revenue generated by 
the utility, incentivising them to close inefficiencies including those related to corruption 
(Olson, 2002). In order to attract investments many reformers advocated privatisation of 
state-owned utilities to complement private sector participation. The withdrawal of the state 
from the sector would not only attract private investments and reduce the burden of subsidies 
on the government from financial overruns of state-owned utilities. Therefore, privatisation 
can reduce political interference or bureaucratic rigidities in the operations and management 
                                                          
8
 Nigeria established a Transitional Electricity Market (TEM) on February 1, 2015. 
9
 Sudan has successfully unbundled its power sector vertically and horizontally and has established an IRA. 
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of utilities since control rights over these factors would no longer be under the direct control 
of politicians or civil servants. Despite the increase in private participation after the financial 
crisis of 2008 in SSA electricity sectors (Figure 2.1)
10
, there remains a funding gap for 
connecting the estimated 500 million people without access to electricity services in SSA 
(IEA, 2014). ADB (2010) notes that social welfare improvements and productivity in the 
region, continues to be constrained by the inadequate generation capacity, large technical and 
commercial losses, limited electrification, unreliable services, and high tariffs. 
Figure 3. 1: IPP Investments in SSA Countries, 1990-2016 
 
Source: World Bank PPI Database 
Corruption and Independent Regulatory Agencies 
Previous studies have linked large energy shortages and investment gaps to historical, 
financial, social, technical, and economic factors (e.g., Jamasb et al., 2016; Dornan, 2014; 
Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011). Recently other studies have linked the poor outcomes to the 
failure of IRAs to improve the institutional conditions of the sector as private investments 
largely depend on their credibility and independence when investing in countries with weak 
institutions. Moreover, the emergence of hybrid electricity markets which does not entail total 
                                                          
10
 Close inspection of the World Bank PPI database reveals that more than 90% of the investments that poured 
into the region‟s electricity sectors between 1990-2016 were targeted at the generation segment because 
investors seeking to isolate themselves from corruption prefer selling power to uptakers than to distributors.   
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withdrawal of the state from the sector (Eberhard et al., 2016),
11
 have made the IRAs to 
struggle to balance the interests of private utilities and the dominant state utilities. Thus, in 
the context of weak institutional environments of SSA, political expediency tied to the state-
owned utilities tends to undermine the independence of the IRAs (Eberhard, 2007). As a 
result, the regulatory frameworks in these countries are often viewed as compromised. This 
leads many consumers to assume that the utilities are in collusion with the IRAs and make 
excessive profits since the regulatory framework has become prone to political capture or a 
tool for corrupt government officials (Stiglitz, 1998). 
According to Eberhard et al. (2016) as of 2014, only 26 of the SSA countries have set up 
IRAs, while in the remaining countries, energy ministries or departments have the regulatory 
responsibilities and social and economic objectives.
 
Thus, in the latter group of countries, 
governments have full regulatory discretion in determining and enforcing tariffs and service 
standards. Some argue that self-regulation allows corruption to be pervasive in the operations 
of utilities as most positions in IRAs are usually staffed with friends, family, or political and 
financial allies of politicians (Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2010). In weak institutional settings, 
the sector could be influenced by the private agendas of regulators, government, or 
corruption. Despite the links between weak institutions and performance of utilities, the issue 
of how corruption and weak governance influence the electricity sector performance post 
reforms has been neglected in the reform literature and the policies of SSA governments. In 
order to fill this gap, the chapter analyse whether the implementations of ESR have offset or 
exacerbated the negative influence of corruption on performance. 
2.3.1 Hypotheses 
As noted earlier, the main objective of ESR in SSA countries was to improve technical 
efficiency and translating this into increase electricity access and keep up with economic 
                                                          
11
 This is one of the key factors often suggested for the vulnerability of the electricity sector to corruption. 
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growth. In order to develop a set of hypotheses to test whether these objectives have been 
achieved, the chapter rely on the literature on corruption in regulated sectors about how a 
well-designed regulatory framework may insulate firms from corruption (Levy and Spiller, 
1994; Laffont and Tirole, 1986; Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009). The chapter is further 
guided by the development literature that states economic performance could be affected 
indirectly through the impact of corruption on private investment (Wei, 2000). The chapter 
draw on this literature to identify three indicators of electricity sector performance to assess 
the corruption reducing potential of ESRs. The variables are placed into three categories each 
reflecting different dimensions of performance – i.e., technical efficiency, electricity access 
and economic performance. The first hypothesis focuses on the technical efficiency of 
electricity sector proxy by Transmission and Distribution (T&D) losses per capita and is as 
follows: 
 H1: Electricity sector reforms in SSA countries, by offsetting or overcoming the 
adverse effects of corruption, have improved technical efficiency. 
T&D energy losses are a proxy for technical efficiency because high losses indicate that firms 
are not only undertaking the needed investments to upgrade and maintain supply networks. It 
also indicates that firms have operational challenges. Also, vandalism, illegal connections and 
bribes to workers to avoid electricity bills contribute to high losses and prevents the utilities 
from undertaking further investments. These factors adversely affect the overall sustainability 
and productivity of the sector.  
Therefore, it is expected that the reforms to enhance investor confidence to undertake 
investments, improve operations and close sources of inefficiencies leading to efficiency 
gains. The chapter extends the assessment of impacts of ESR and corruption beyond the 
sector since one motivation of reforms in SSA was to expand the service to the unelectrified 
majority. Therefore, the second hypothesis traces the impacts of reforms to their effect on 
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access to electricity. Previous research has suggested how corruption and clientelistic 
practices (e.g., Min, 2010) undermine government efforts to extend the service to the poor. 
Therefore, we expect the loosening of the ties between the government and utilities, through 
the creations of IRAs and privatisation, to reduce corruption normally related to government 
operations and regulation of utilities. Moreover, it is expected technical efficiency gains from 
ESR to translate into expansion of electricity service to those who lack access. Thus, the 
second hypothesis is as follows: 
 H2: Implementation of ESR by reducing the negative association between corruption 
and technical efficiency has increased electricity access in SSA countries. 
According to IEA (2014), reforms will boost the economic performance of SSA region by 
30% in 2040, not only through private investments but also through governance improvement 
inside and outside the energy sector. Moreover, World Bank (2000) notes that ESR as part of 
wider economic liberalisation policies has the anticorruption potential to reduce the negative 
association between corruption and economic performance. Therefore, due to the positive 
association between the economy and electricity use on the one hand, and the negative 
association between corruption and economic performance, it is expected that the reforms to 
increase income levels. Therefore it is postulated that: 
 H3: Implementations ESR policies in SSA countries have enhanced economic 
performance of SSA countries by reducing negative association between corruption 
and economic growth. 
2.4. Methodology and Data 
2.4.1. Electricity Sector Performance Estimation 
The setup and analysis of the performance equation is influenced by the awareness that ESR 
in developing countries, as in other sectoral reforms, is not an isolated undertaking but is 
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closely interlinked with the legal and institutional environments of reforming countries. 
Therefore, in its simplest form, it is postulated that electricity sector performance (Y) depends 
not only on the vector of reform policies (REF) implemented by SSA countries but also on 
corruption (cor) which measures the institutional quality of the countries, and a set of control 
variables (X). Thus, the performance output equation can be expressed as: 
        ∑          
 
             ∑    
 
   (            )     
                 ∑       
 
                  (1) 
where i and t index a country and year, Y is the performance output reflecting either of the 
three performance indicators: technical efficiency (T&D energy losses; losses), electricity 
access (per capita electricity consumption; access)
12
, and economic performance (GDP per 
capita; gdpper). βs are the parameters to be estimated, the term time represents a linear time-
trend, which takes into account technological progress. αi are country-specific effects, 
included to control for time-invariant unobservables and          
2
), is the stochastic error 
term. The vector of reform policies (REF) consists of two dummies that reflect the existence 
of an independent regulatory agency (ira)
13
 and privatisation (priv), a proxy for all forms of 
private sector participation in electricity sectors
14
. These two reform policies entail whether 
country i at time t has succeeded in establishing an independent regulatory agency and 
opened its doors for private participation. The vector of Q control variables (X) depends on 
which of the three performance indicators is used. It captures the demand side of the market 
and consists of GDP per capita (gdpper), total gross electricity generation (genper), structure 
                                                          
12
 The data on access (electricity consumption per capita) was calculated by total electricity supplied (total production + 
imports), hence the reason the values for the variable are higher than those of genper. 
   
13
 Some of the IRAs in region are multisectoral and all included in the data are active. 
  
14
 Both IRA and PRIV are scored as 0 if countries have not implemented either of the reform steps and 1 if otherwise. 
Measuring   the two reform steps this way does not reflect the degree, amount of investment, extent, or intensity of reforms 
implemented by the countries. Therefore, the two indicators do not capture the differences in the rate of investments that 
poured into power markets of SSA countries nor the quality of regulation. 
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(struc) and size (urban) of the electricity sector. 
In order to capture the corruption reducing effects of ESR on performance, the chapter 
follows Estache et al. (2009) and Wren-Lewis (2015) and use interaction terms between 
corruption and the two reform policies (iraXcor and privXcor). The coefficients of these two 
interaction terms measure the corruption reducing potential of reforms. An interaction term is 
also included between the two the reform policies (iraXpriv) to assess whether IRAs have 
constrained or improved the performance of privatised utilities or if private utilities have 
constraint or reinforced regulatory activity. This is important because, private investors in 
electricity sectors of developing countries mostly require credible and transparent IRAs to 
safeguard their investments from expropriation by the state. 
Similarly, as noted in the literature on regulatory capture, there is a tendency for regulatory 
capture in regulated electricity markets due to economic incentives that may push regulators 
to cater for the interest of the regulated (e.g., Olson, 1965; Dal Bó and Di Tella, 2003; 
Leaver, 2009). These incentives may arise due to reliance of the regulators on the regulated 
entity for information they need to do their duties and the desire to hold future well-paid jobs 
with the regulated since human capital in the sector tends to be industry-specific. Hence, this 
is the motivation for the inclusion of the third interaction term. 
2.4.2. Estimation method 
In panel data regressions, the choice of an estimator mostly lies between the Random Effects 
(RE) or Fixed Effects (FE) estimators to deal with the bias of unobserved heterogeneity. 
However, both estimators address the bias at the expense of a strong exogeneity assumption. 
For instance, Equation (1) includes not only country-specific effects that can be correlated 
with other regressors, but also other theoretically established endogenous regressors (e.g., per 
capita GDP), thus the orthogonality condition is not likely to be met for a RE or FE estimator 
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to produce consistent estimates. Jamasb et al. (2005) note that most ESR researchers tend to 
ignore (implicitly or explicitly) another sources of endogeneity which arises from the 
possibility of current values of ESR variables and past performance being a function of past 
condition or performance. The RE and FE estimators do not produce consistent coefficient 
estimates in the presence of endogenous regressors and dynamics, and thus it is not possible 
to make inferences based on their estimates. 
In order to overcome the methodological concerns, equation (1) is transformed into a 
dynamic panel specification where lagged values of the three indicators of performance, i.e., 
the alternative dependent variables (technical efficiency, electricity access and per capita 
GDP) are included as additional regressors. The dynamic performance equation can be 
expressed as in (2): 
              ∑          
 
             ∑    
 
   (            )    
                     ∑       
 
                   (2) 
where       denotes the lagged value of performance, whilst   is the parameter associated 
with that variable. Other variables and coefficients are defined as before. As noted, neither 
the pooled OLS, FE nor RE estimates of   are consistent in dynamic models when the time 
span is small (Nickell, 1981). The study could consider using the dynamic panel General 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This 
estimator has the potential to produce consistent estimates in the presence of endogeneity of 
regressors, unobserved country fixed effects and dynamics. This estimator first eliminates the 
country-specific effects αi by differencing the model and instrumenting the lagged dependent 
variable (     ) with lagged levels of this variable (Arellano and Bond, 1991). However, 
differencing the data removes all time-invariant variables of interest during the estimation. 
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Moreover, the Difference GMM (Diff-GMM) is noted to perform poorly in the presence of 
persistent processes since the lagged levels may convey little information on future changes, 
thus implying the problem of weak instruments and biased estimates (Roodman, 2008). 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed a System GMM (Sys-
GMM) estimator to improve the efficiency of the Diff-GMM estimator. The Sys-GMM 
estimator solves the endogeneity problem by treating the model as a system of equations in 
first difference and in levels. The endogenous regressors in the first difference equation are 
instrumented with lags of their levels, whilst the endogenous regressors in the level equation 
are instrumented with the lags of their first differences. The consistency of the Sys-GMM 
estimator depends on the assumption of no serial autocorrelation in the errors and existence 
of an array of exogenous regressors. The estimator relies on internal instruments contained 
within the panel itself and therefore eliminates the need for external instruments and it also 
avoids full specification of the serial correlation and heteroscedasticity properties of the 
stochastic error term, or any other distributional assumption. 
Despite its advantages, the Sys-GMM estimator has limitations especially as it relies on using 
the lags of both the dependent and independent variables for identification. This would 
potentially give rise to a problem of weak instruments, which is usually magnified as the 
number of instrumental variables increases. Although, increasing the instruments‟ lag length 
could make them more exogenous, it may also make them weaker. Furthermore, when using 
panel data estimators such as the Sys-GMM, the bias resulting from errors in regressors may 
also be magnified (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). In order to reduce the influence of these 
and other limitations of the estimator on the results, the analysis avoids the instruments 
counts exceeding the number of countries in the sample or overfitting of the instrumented 
regressors. Thus, the instrument set is collapsed as recommended by Roodman (2009) and 
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report the instrument count for each of the estimations. 
Obtaining consistent, efficient and unbiased results using the Sys-GMM estimator is 
contingent on two specification tests; Hansen test for over-identification restrictions and the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for serial correlation (AR) of the disturbances up to the second 
order. The Hansen test of over-identification restrictions is a joint test of model specification 
and appropriateness of the instrument vector. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of the test 
would indicate that the instruments used in estimation are valid and the model has been well 
specified. The appropriate check of the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for serial correlation 
(AR) relates only to the absence of second-order serial correlation (AR2) since the first 
differencing induces first serial correlation in the transformed errors. 
2.4.3. Data 
The econometric analysis is based on annual country-specific observations from 47 SSA 
countries from 2002 to 2013. The selection of countries and period are determined by data 
availability. Since the main focus of the chapter is on the influence of IRAs and privatisation 
on corruption, the limited reforms implemented so far in the region would not permit us to 
assess the impacts of ESR and corruption before 2002. Similarly, the final year 2013, 
represents the last year for which data are available on electricity consumption per capita and 
T&D losses at the time when the analyses was conducted. Also, there is no complete data for 
all the years and countries. Therefore, as the analyses being conducted with different 
performance indicators the sample size also changes.
15
 Table 2.1 shows all the countries 
included in the analysis
16
. 
                                                          
15
 The different sample sizes are reported at the bottom of the estimation results tables in the next section. 
16
 For comprehensive definition and measurement of some the variables, check data section in chapter three. 
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The data for the control variables urban and genper
17
 were obtained from the World Bank 
Development Indicators and the U.S. EIA respectively. Data for struc
18
 was obtained from 
World Bank Development Indicators Database and updated with data from African 
Development Bank Energy Utilities Database, included in the Africa Infrastructure 
Knowledge Program. Using these data, the chapter follow Jamasb et al. (2004) to create an 
index of binary numbers 1 and 0 to indicate whether a country has unbundled its electricity 
sector. urban is a proxy for the size of electricity markets and is measured as the percentage 
of total population that resides in urban areas. In addition, the data on total household 
electricity consumption (hols) was obtained from the United Nation‟s Energy Statistics 
Database. 
Table 2. 2: Summary Statistics 
Variables Names Labels Unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Electricity Gen., Per Capita genper kWh per capita 562 435 880 8 5,306 
Regulator ira Dummy 564 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Privatisation priv Dummy 564 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Corruption cor Index 564 -0.60 0.58 
 
-1.71 
1.25 
Urbanisation urban % 562 38.49 16.27 8.68 86.66 
Elect. Consumption, Per Capita access kWh per capita 562 628 1,467 7 10,566 
Household Elect. Consumption hols Million kWh 528 1,755 5,806 4 41,173 
Export export % 528 35.11 22.38 4.43 122.26
*
 
Industrialization ind % 522 26.24 14.30 3.33 84.28 
T&D Losses losses % 271 20.52 14.36 2.93 86.75 
GDP, Per Capita gdpper 2010 US$ 562 1,792 2,404 194 12,634 
Population Density popden Inhab./km
2
 562 86.63 112.45 2.38 620 
Structure struc Dummy 564 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Note: genper, access, hols, gdpper and popden were log-transformed prior to estimation 
*
 Equatorial Guinea is a notable exception with exports being larger than GDP 
                                                          
17
 The variable does not include data from isolated systems or self-generated electricity which are quite prevalent 
in the region. 
18
 The variable refers only to legal unbundling of the hitherto vertically integrated state-owned utilities. 
  
44 
 
Finally, in order to test the robustness of the results when the three additional explanatory 
variables are included - share of industrial output (ind), trade openness (export), and 
population density (popden) – are included in the performance equations in alternative 
estimations.
19
 The data for these variables were obtained from World Bank Development 
Indicators Database. 
2.5. Results 
This section presents the results of the three performance dimensions of electricity (technical, 
welfare and economic impacts) using a dynamic panel Sys-GMM estimator. The estimates of 
the T&D energy losses equation is first discussed, then electricity consumption per capita, 
and finally the estimates of the GDP per capita equation. The results in Tables 2.3-2.5 
indicate that they fit the data well. The AR(1) and AR(2) test statistics indicate that there is 
first order serial correlation, but not at the second order, which suggests the inconsistency of 
OLS and appropriateness of a GMM estimator in this context (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In 
addition, the Hansen test of model specification and over-identifying restrictions indicates 
that all three models are correctly specified with appropriate instruments. The estimation 
strategy differs from earlier studies that use static models to analyse the impacts of ESR on 
performance (Zhang et al., 2008; Estache et al., 2009; Wren-Lewis, 2015). 
2.5.1. Technical Impact – T&D Losses 
The immediate impacts of ESR are the technical improvements on the sector. The estimates 
of the Sys-GMM estimation in Table 2.3 shows that, the coefficient of cor is negative and 
highly significant, suggesting that an increase in the corruption index (i.e., the country is 
                                                          
19
 The results of the robustness checks do not show major differences with respect to those finally presented in 
this chapter. These alternative models are presented and briefly discussed in Appendix I-2: Tables A2-A4. 
  
45 
 
cleaner in terms of corruption) is associated with reduction in energy losses.
20
 Thus, 
corruption can be considered here as a major source of inefficiency in SSA countries. 
Therefore, adopting measures to reduce corruption can have positive impact on technical 
efficiency. This result is similar to those obtained by other studies that have found a positive 
relationship between corruption and inefficiency in the sector (Dal Bó, 2006; Estache and 
Trujillo, 2009; Dal Bó and Rossi, 2007; and Wren-Lewis, 2015). 
The coefficient of ira is significant and positive suggesting that, the creation of IRAs has led 
to a statistical increase in energy losses. A similar result was obtained by Nagayama (2010) 
who finds the establishments of IRA led to an increase in T&D losses in Latin American and 
some former Soviet Union countries. Similarly, Smith (2004) and Zhang et al. (2008) find 
reform policies such as the creations of IRAs are associated with deterioration in energy 
losses
21
. Similarly, as shown on Figure 2.1, there has been deterioration in energy losses post 
the creation of Ghana‟s electricity regulator (the Energy Commission).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 It should be noted that the dependent variable of this model, i.e., T&D losses, is expressed in the form of 
percentage and has not been log-transformed. This explains the large magnitude of the estimated coefficients, 
which must be interpreted as the effects, measured as changes in percentage points of the dependent variable, 
due to increases in the explanatory variables. 
21
  As noted by Estache et al. (2009), there could be two explanations why there has been increase in losses: “(i) 
performance got worse or (ii) the measurement of actual performance improved with the creation of an IRA. In 
the second case, the apparent deterioration simply reflects better statistics; actual performance may even have 
improved”. 
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Figure 2. 1: Ghana’s T&D losses 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators database 
The coefficient of priv is not significant indicating that, private sector participation has no 
impact on the technical efficiency of the sectors during the period of the study. This result 
contrasts with Clark et al. (2005) who find the introduction of private participation in 
countries such as Namibia, Nigeria, Uganda and Mali is associated with efficiency 
improvements. This also contradicts earlier studies that find private participation in the 
electricity sector is associated with technical efficiency improvements (e.g., Andres et al., 
2008; Nagayama, 2007; Balza et al., 2013). 
Table 2. 3: Two-Step GMM Estimates of T&D Losses Equation 
Technical Impact (losses) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
losses(t-1) 0.429*** 4.42 
cor -16.431** -2.19 
ira 8.626** 2.24 
priv 12.703 1.59 
struc 1.081 0.67 
iraXcor 9.749*** 4.94 
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privXcor 9.342 1.18 
iraXpriv -2.105 -0.58 
ln hols -3.677*** -3.15 
urban 0.015 0.21 
time 0.228*** 2.86 
intercept 18.547*** 3.80 
No of obs. 231 
No of countries 23 
Instruments 22 
AR(1) test (p value) -2.26 (0.024) 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.71 (0.475) 
Hansen test (p value) 13.60 (0.192) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The failure of independent regulators and private sector participation in SSA countries to 
reduce the energy losses can in part be explained by the need of the reforms to initially direct 
their efforts to improve the conditions of the generation segment of the sector. This, however, 
in practice, often tends to come at the expense of delays in the regulatory reform of the 
transmission and distribution network utilities where most of the energy losses occur. Indeed, 
economic regulation of network utilities has proven to be a rather difficult task in developed 
as well as in developing countries. 
Do electricity reforms reduce the influence of corruption on technical efficiency? This can be 
examined through the two interaction terms iraXcor and privXcor. The coefficient of iraXcor 
is positive and significant suggesting that creations of IRAs have a statistical impact on the 
relation between corruption and technical efficiency. The estimated coefficient suggests that 
IRAs has partially mitigated the influence of corruption on technical efficiency. The 
establishment of IRAs acts as a limiting factor of losses when corruption increases, but also 
limits loss reduction as countries become less corrupt. Smith (2004) argues that reform 
policies such as the creation of IRAs were not effective in reducing energy losses and 
especially electricity theft in developing countries such as in SSA. The study attributed this to 
weak quality of governance such as, ineffective accountability and political stability. 
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The coefficient of the privXcor interaction term is positive but not significant suggesting that, 
the SSA countries that have opened their electricity sectors to private participation have not 
been able to offset the negative influence of corruption on efficiency. Similarly, the 
coefficient of the interaction term iraXpriv is negative but not significant indicating that 
regularised privatised networks have no effect on technical efficiency. It appears that even 
though IRAs on their own increase energy losses privatization has no effect on technical 
efficiency. Nagayama (2010) obtained a similar finding in the former Soviet Union, Eastern 
European and Latin American countries. 
Regarding the control variables, the negative and significant coefficient of hols suggests that 
an increase in household demand for electricity has led to reduced T&D losses, likely due to 
a positive size effect. The coefficients of struc and urban are not significant and suggest that 
unbundling and urbanisation have not influenced technical efficiency during the period of the 
study. The coefficient of the time trend is positive and significant thus indicating that there 
has been an increase in the electricity losses of the countries over the sample period. It should 
be noted that this and the subsequent results should be interpreted with some caution since 
the dummies used are nominal values and thus may not capture the intensity of reform 
policies among countries in the sample. Moreover, the measure of corruption used is at best 
the perception of corruption, which could be different from reality. 
2.5.2. Welfare Impact – Per Capita Electricity Consumption 
The main aim of electricity sector reforms in developing countries has been to improve the 
socio-economic welfare of the population. The parameter estimates of the performance 
equation (access) are presented in Table 2.4. The estimated coefficient of cor is positive and 
significant, suggesting that, an increase in corruption (i.e., a decline in cor) decreases access 
to electricity services. This result is consistent with the findings by other studies on how 
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corruption reduces the quality and quantity of publicly consumed services (e.g., Fredriksson 
et al., 2004; Estache et al., 2009). 
The coefficient of the IRA dummy is positive and significant, indicating that for the period 
covered by the study, countries that have created IRAs have increased access to electricity. 
This result contrasts with those obtained by Estache et al. (2009) who associated the creation 
of IRAs with reduction in electricity access. The coefficient of priv is not significant 
indicating that the privatisation policies have no significant effect on electricity access. The 
estimate also contrasts with the findings of earlier studies such as Sihag et al. (2007) and 
Bhattacharyya (2006) who find that reform steps (e.g., privatisation) have led to a decline in 
access rates in the State of Orissa in India. 
The coefficient of the interaction term iraXcor is positive and significant indicating that, 
creations of IRAs have amplified the influence of changes in corruption levels on electricity 
access, i.e., IRAs have been effective in enhancing electricity access when corruption has 
declined. The estimate of the interaction privXcor, is not significant suggesting that private 
sector participation has not been effective in addressing the negative influence of corruption. 
It may also suggest that corruption has not constrained the efforts of privatised utilities to 
increase access to electricity. 
Regardless of the impacts of individual reform policies, the coefficient of iraXpriv suggests 
that together they exert a significant decreasing effect on access to electricity. In other words, 
although the creation of IRAs has led to increase in electricity access while privatisation has 
no effect, their interaction has led to reductions in electricity access. This may be attributed to 
the conflicting objectives of independent regulators and private utilities. Independent 
regulation may be keen to extend the often-subsidised service to mostly unelectrified poorer 
areas. However, private firms have shown little interest to extend the service to new low-
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income and low-usage consumer groups. 
The coefficients of gdpper, urban and struc are all not significant suggesting that income 
level, the size, and the structure of electricity markets have no impact on electricity access.
22
 
The electricity generation per capita variable (genper) is positive and highly significant 
indicating that further increases in electricity generation leads to increase in electricity access. 
The time trend is not significant indicating that there has been no improvement in the 
electricity access of the region over time. 
The earlier results indicated that the implementation of electricity reforms in SSA countries 
can reduce the negative influence of corruption on the performance of the sector. Similarly, 
the implementation of reforms in developing countries was noted to have anticorruption 
potentials to reduce the effects of corruption on economic development (World Bank, 2000). 
Therefore, it is expected that the electricity reforms in SSA to enhance economic 
performance at two levels. First, by enhancing the performance of the sector by improving 
technical efficiency and extending the service to those without access. Second, as part of 
wider economic reforms, often underpinned by an anticorruption strategy, the reforms can 
reduce the effect of corruption on economic performance. 
Table 2. 4: Two-Step GMM Estimates of Per Capita Energy Consumption Equation 
Welfare Impact (ln access) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
ln access(t-1) 0.871*** 23.46 
cor 0.093*  1.74 
ira 0.270*** 2.86 
priv -0.051 -1.00 
struc 0.032 1.09 
iraXcor 0.157** 2.06 
                                                          
22
 The non-significant coefficient for gdpper could be related to an ambiguous relationship between per capita 
electricity consumption and income. It is expected that higher levels of per capita income imply higher per 
capita electricity consumption. However, it is also expected a negative relationship between these two variables 
for high levels of per capita GDP. This derives from the acquisition of more energy efficient appliances and the 
subsequent energy efficiency gains. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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privXcor -0.106 -1.60 
iraXpriv -0.209*** -2.97 
ln genper 0.092** 2.17 
ln gdpper 0.018 0.41 
urban 0.001 0.92 
time 0.001 1.13 
intercept -0.167 -0.62 
No of obs. 515 
No of countries 47 
Instruments 37 
AR(1) test (p value) -4.04 (0.000) 
AR(2) test (p value) -1.55 (0.120) 
Hansen test (p value) 31.74 (0.134) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2.5.3. Economic Impact – GDP Per Capita 
In Table 2.5, where gdpper is a dependent variable in the performance equation, the 
coefficient of cor is positive and significant indicating that a decrease in corruption augments 
national income. This is consistent with other well-established findings on the relationship 
between these two variables (e.g., Barreto, 2000; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Shleifer and Vishny 
1993). Thus, an increase in the corruption control index is associated with an increase in per 
capita GDP. The coefficient of ira is not significant; suggesting that creation of IRAs has not 
had impact on the level of income. 
The coefficient of priv is positive and significant indicating that private sector investments 
have boosted economic performance of SSA reforming countries. A similar result was 
obtained by Chisari et al. (1999) who find privatisation of electricity generation and 
distribution assets led to positive economic performance in Argentina. Similarly, the estimate 
of priv confirms the argument by the IMF that ESR policies such as privatisation has the 
potential to free up energy subsidies and thereby boost economic performance over the long 
run (IMF, 2013). 
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Do the electricity reforms reduce the negative association between corruption and economic 
growth? The coefficient of iraXcor is not significant suggesting, that, for the period of this 
study, countries that established IRAs have not exerted beneficial effects on the negative 
association between corruption and per capita GDP nor has corruption affected the relation 
between regulation and economic performance. This is inconsistent with Jalilian et al. (2007) 
who stressed the importance of credible and independent regulation on economic growth. The 
coefficient of privXcor is positive and significant indicating that countries that open their 
electricity sectors to private investments have seen reinforced the influence of corruption on 
per capita GDP. Thus, countries with lower corruption levels have had further success in 
boosting income levels through private participation in the electricity sector. 
The coefficient of iraXpriv is not significant suggesting that the interaction of the regulator 
and privatisation does not exert an influence on the economic performance. One of the two 
control variables in the model, struc, is positive and significant. This suggests that 
unbundling impacted positively on per capita GDP, after controlling for the effect of 
corruption. The time trend variable is significant which indicates that per capita GDP has 
increased over the period covered by the study. 
Table 2. 5: Two-step GMM Estimates of Per Capita Income Equation 
Economic Impact (ln gdpper) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
ln gdpper(t-1) 0.565*** 7.20 
cor 0.261*** 3.38 
ira -0.050 -0.51 
priv 0.140** 2.34 
struc 0.237*** 4.32 
iraXcor -0.185 -1.63 
privXcor 0.238** 2.34 
iraXpriv 0.006 0.10 
urban 0.014*** 3.75 
time 0.001 0.73 
intercept 2.563*** 5.98 
No of obs. 515 
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No of countries 47 
Instruments 41 
AR(1) test (p value) -2.57 (0.010) 
AR(2) test (p value) -1.13 (0.259) 
Hansen test (p value) 30.45 (0.443) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2.6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Sub-Saharan African countries are noted to have some of the highest levels of corruption in 
the world. Various studies have studied how corruption has constrained the economic 
development of these countries through different transmission channels. However, one 
important transmission channel not yet investigated is the organisation and regulation of the 
electricity sectors. Research that has analysed this channel in other developing regions has 
found that corruption can reduce technical efficiency, restrict access to electricity services to 
urban areas, and reduce income levels. 
In order to mitigate the influence of corruption in the electricity sector, reformers have called 
for the unbundling of state-owned utilities vertically (generation, transmission, distribution, 
and retailing) and horizontally (generation and retailing). The unbundled parts that are 
amenable to competition could be sold to the private sector and an independent regulatory 
agency would supervise and regulate the natural monopoly-prone networks of the sector. 
After more than two decades of electricity reforms in SSA, researchers and policymakers can 
now study whether the reforms have reduced the influence of corruption on technical 
efficiency of the sector and whether the efficiency gains have resulted in higher electricity 
access and incomes. The chapter uses a purpose-built panel dataset and a dynamic panel 
estimator to investigate the effects of corruption on the performance of the sector. Using 
World Bank‟s control of corruption perception index, the chapter shows that corruption has 
an adverse and statistically significant effect on three performance indicators – i.e., technical 
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efficiency, access to electricity and economic performance. This finding adds to the body of 
evidence that stress the detrimental impacts of corruption on economic development and 
electricity sector performance. 
The chapter finds that the creation of independent regulators and private sector participation, 
not only can enhance the performance of the sector but they can also have wider economic 
benefits. Specifically, the chapter find that independent regulation can increase social welfare 
although it can also reduce technical efficiency. In addition, the result show that private 
sector participation is associated with improved economic performance, while the result show 
that privatisation policies have no statistically significant impact on electricity access and 
technical efficiency. 
Furthermore, the chapter also analyse how corruption interacts with different reform steps 
and how these interactions impact on the three indicators of performance. The creation of 
independent regulators has mitigated the association between corruption and technical 
efficiency, while it has amplified the relationship between corruption and electricity access, 
i.e., independent regulation has been effective to enhance electricity access in less corrupt 
countries. The chapter also find that creations of independent regulators have not mitigated 
the often-cited negative association between corruption and income level. Private sector 
participation has reinforced the influence of corruption on income. Thus, countries with lower 
corruption levels have had further success in boosting income levels through private 
participation in the electricity sector. However, private participation has no impact on the 
association between corruption and electricity access and technical efficiency. 
The results suggest that implementation of well-designed micro level electricity reforms have 
the potential not only to boost the firms‟ economic performance directly, they would also 
indirectly reduce the negative effects of macro-level institutional deficiencies such as 
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corruption on micro and macro levels indicators of performance. For example, one of the 
policy implications from the results is the benefit of having an independent regulator that is 
transparent, fair, and accountable with the capacity for producing credible and predictable 
policies and with commitments to cost-reflective tariffs and protection of consumer interest. 
Establishing such an institutional body would not only help reduce uncertainties surrounding 
issues related to market access, tariffs, and revenues but also help improve the overall 
governance of the sector. 
By improving sectoral governance, the regulator would reduce the need for risk mitigation 
measures such as World Bank guarantees, ring-fencing of revenues accruing to off-takers
23
 
and other measures required by investors when investing in SSA countries‟ power markets. 
Thus, by serving as a risk mitigator, the regulator would help attract the crucial investments 
needed to upgrade and build new transmission and distribution infrastructures and increase 
generation capacities thereby improving the overall performance of the sector. 
Another finding of the study highlights the importance of privatizing SSA countries‟ state-
owned utilities and incentivising private investors through well-delineated electricity policies 
that would be easily translated into investment opportunities. Therefore, at crux of the 
electricity reform should the desire to encourage investments needed to increase efficiency by 
reducing the large T&D losses which are the main feature of sectors in SSA electricity 
sectors. Also, privatised utilities when incentivised, would reduce nontechnical or 
commercial losses by improving metering, billing, and collection of tariffs, monitoring 
consumption regularly, particularly of the high-value consumers, and by enforcement of 
payment discipline among consumers. 
                                                          
23
 This would boost the creditworthiness of the off-taker. 
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Furthermore, the financial viability of the off-takers is important for attracting private 
investments since full wholesale or retail competition has not been achieved in the power 
sectors of the region.
24
 This is because a financially fragile off-taker that does not recover 
enough revenue from consumers, would threaten the viability of whole system since it would 
be difficult for power generators to pay primary energy suppliers. 
Although, the results emphasise the importance of independent regulation and private sector 
participation, this does not suggest that other aspects of the reform model such as unbundling 
and competition are irrelevant or unimportant. For example, unbundling would have the 
effect of levelling the playing field for private generating plants, while competition would 
allocate resources efficiently and lower tariffs for consumers. Therefore, all aspects of the 
reform model are important for improving the sectoral governance, strengthening the 
enabling environment, and reduce the risk perceived by prospective investors. 
Overall, this chapter shows that implementation of electricity reforms in SSA countries have, 
to some extent, addressed the root cause of inefficiency and low access and thus have moved 
utilities towards better performance through cost recovery in pricing and improved metering, 
billing, and revenue collection. By improving the performance of the sector, some aspects of 
reforms have boosted economic performance, since improvements in technical efficiency can 
be translated into higher electricity access and national income. 
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 Despite reforms the SSA countries‟ state-owned utilities have remained the major buyers power. 
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Chapter 3: Political Economy of Reform and Regulation in the 
Electricity Sector of Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Abstract 
As part of their electricity sector reforms, SSA countries have established independent 
regulatory agencies to signal legal and political commitment to end self-regulation and 
provision of service by the state. The reforms aimed to encourage private investments, 
improve efficiency, and extend the service to the millions who lacked the service. However, 
after nearly two and half decades of reforms, these expectations have not been met and the 
electricity sectors of these countries remain undeveloped. There are anecdotes that these 
outcomes are due to poor design, non-credible, unpredictable regulations, and political 
interference. This chapter investigates the performance of the reforms in the context of 
government political ideology. The chapter uses a dynamic panel estimator and data from 45 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 2000 to 2015 to investigate the ideological differences 
in the effect of independent sector regulation on access to electricity and installed capacity. 
The chapter find negative impact from independent regulatory agencies on installed capacity 
in countries with left-wing governments while in countries with right-wing governments they 
have positive effects on capacity. Also, chapter find negative impact on electricity access 
when regulators are established in countries with left-wing governments, while the chapter 
find no significant impact for the right-wing governments. The results have interesting policy 
implications for attracting private sector participation to increase generation capacity and 
access rates especially in countries with left-wing governments. 
 
Keywords: independent regulatory agencies; electricity sector reforms; government ideology; 
dynamic GMM; Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
JEL classification: D73, Q48, L51, L94, O55, P16. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Over the past three decades, SSA countries have aimed to reduce public ownership of 
electricity utilities through sectoral reforms. The reforms were partly due to critical budgetary 
conditions and part of macroeconomic stabilisation programs. Although no country in the 
region have implemented all aspects of comprehensive reforms,
25
 the reforms have largely 
ended the era of self-regulation of the sector by the state. In its place, Independent Regulatory 
Agencies (IRAs) were created to regulate; set standards; define terms of interconnection 
among networks; issue, enforce or alter licences; and prevent abuse of dominant market 
position.
26
 
These objectives may suggest IRAs were primarily established to promote economic 
regulation. However, as Thatcher (2002) have noted, independent regulators (as in other 
sectors) were also delegated powers over „social‟ matters such as the promotion of universal 
access to services and protection of consumers from exploitations. In order to fulfil these 
mandates, IRAs were expected to reduce the risk to the private sector to increase generation 
capacity and extend the reach of electricity services (Jamasb et al., 2015) to the millions 
without access in the region (IEA, 2014). Despite these expected performance improvements 
from regulatory changes, SSA countries struggle to provide efficient and affordable 
electricity services to businesses and households (Eberhard et al., 2011) due to low 
generation capacity and underdeveloped distribution and transmission networks (World 
Bank, 2017; Ahlborg et al., 2015). 
Some studies have linked the poor reform outcomes in developing countries to historical, 
financial, social, technical, political as well as economic factors (e.g., Dorman, 2014; 
Eberhard et al., 2011). Some researchers have shifted their attention to the institutional and 
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 With the exception of Nigeria, which have implemented all aspects of the reform model. 
26
 These agencies were created as part of electricity sector reforms which were heavily advocated to developing 
countries by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
  
59 
 
political context within which IRAs are embedded and expected to fulfil their regulatory 
functions (e.g., Imam et al., 2019; Pearce, 2006; Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a; Chang and 
Berdiev, 2011; Eberhard, 2007). These studies suggest that IRAs are susceptible to 
interferences particularly in countries with long history of weak institutions and unpredictable 
political intervention. For example, in countries with weak institutions, politicians may 
intervene in the functions of IRAs to favour state utilities at the expense of private utilities or 
require the IRAs to set artificially low tariffs which could erode the investments made by 
private utilities (World Bank, 1993). 
As the reforms in the region have not led to full withdrawal of the state from the sector but 
rather to the emergence of hybrid electricity sectors with dominant state-owned utilities 
(Eberhard et al., 2016), there has been a lack of compatibility in these sectors between the 
governments political ideologies and the reforms which were often viewed as a neoliberal 
agenda (Gore et al., 2018). Therefore, in some SSA countries regulators have struggled to 
cater for the economic incentives of private utilities and social objectives of governments 
such as increasing access to affordable electricity services. 
Despite the anecdotes that relate government ideology to regulatory outcomes in the region, 
there is a lack of empirical evidence that links political interference in the IRAs functions to 
electricity sector performance. Some studies have shown how energy regulators function 
under different institutional settings such as different government ideologies (e.g., Pitlik, 
2007; Potrafke, 2010; Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987). These studies suggest that right-wing 
governments tend to favour deregulation and privatisation, while left-wing governments 
favour interference in regulatory functions to advance their social objectives. Some studies 
have focused on the effect of government ideology on regulatory output (e.g., Fudge et al., 
2008; Conway and Nicoletti, 2006; Serralles, 2002; Damsgaard, 2003). However, most of 
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these studies are either theoretical or on the experiences of developed countries where data 
are readily available. 
To my knowledge, the chapter is among the few studies to empirically assess the impacts of 
electricity sector reforms in SSA countries (e.g., Imam et al., 2019) and is the first to 
empirically examine the effects of interactions between government ideologies of SSA 
countries and independent electricity sector regulators. Most studies of this strand of 
literature on developing countries tend to focus on specific aspects of institutional quality 
such as corruption (e.g., Imam et al., 2019; Estache et al., 2009; Wren-Lewis, 2015) or on 
specific countries without explicitly accounting for the role of political ideology apart from 
those earlier mentioned. 
In order to fill this gap, the chapter uses a dataset on governments ideology first compiled by 
Beck et al. (2012) and later updated by Cruz et al. (2018) to investigate whether there are 
ideological differences in the effects of IRAs on electricity sector performance among SSA 
countries. Following Potrafke (2010), the sample is divided into three different government 
ideologies – left-wing, right-wing, and centrist governments in order to reflect the ideological 
orientation and different economic and social objectives of SSA countries. Whether a 
government transfers functions such as provision of electricity service to the private sector 
and make non-interference commitments depends not only on the degree of independence of 
the regulator, but also on the prevailing ideological orientation of the governments. 
This chapter makes two contributions to the literature. First, the chapter contribute to the 
analysis of the institutional aspect of the reforms (e.g., Imam et al., 2019; Nepal and Jamasb, 
2012a, 2012b; Dorman, 2014; Erdogdu, 2013) and the political economy literature on 
regulatory agencies (e.g., Kapiki and Eberhard, 2013; Pitlik, 2007; Potrafke, 2010; Scott and 
Seth, 2013). Second, the analysis of political ideology and electricity reforms provide insights 
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into why some SSA countries choose to reform while others do not. Why is it difficult to 
implement the Chilean and United Kingdom examples of rapid and full implementation of 
the textbook reform model? Why start reforms with the generation rather than the distribution 
segment? And, whether there are differences among reforming countries in terms of political 
commitments to allow regulatory agencies to function unhindered. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The chapter review the literature on 
energy reforms and ideology in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents the model, which tries to 
capture how government ideologies and independent regulators influence SSA countries‟ 
electricity sector performance. The section further presents the estimation strategy, data, and 
their sources. Section 3.4 discusses the obtained results. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
3.2. Literature Review 
The role of energy in economic development has been well established in the literature even 
though there is no clear consensus on the direction of causality between them (Masih and 
Masih, 1997; Lorde et al., 2010; Burk et al., 2018).
27
 Notwithstanding, researchers 
acknowledge that electricity is essential for the smooth operation of modern communications, 
industrial development, and enhancement of social amenities such as healthcare and 
education (e.g., Ahlborg et al., 2015). Due to its welfare enhancing effects, the business of 
electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and retailing have historically been the 
prerogative of the state and public sector and therefore closed to private investment (Conway 
and Nicoletti, 2006). 
The historical dominance of the state was mainly due to the view that provision of electricity 
is among the central functions of governments especially in countries where the state 
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 A literature review by Narayan and Prasad (2008) showed that two-thirds of the studies published in the 
journals Energy Policy and Energy Economics find that energy production and consumption lead to economic 
growth in developed and developing countries. 
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occupies a large space in the economy (Victor and Heller, 2011). As a result, the electricity 
sector in most countries was dominated by vertically integrated state-owned utilities 
(Eberhard et al., 2005). Even in countries with significant number of private utilities such as 
the United States (Min, 2008), the government funded the development and construction of 
national electricity infrastructure such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Hoover 
Dam in 1920s and 1930s (Garwood and Tuthill, 1963; Hirsch, 1999). The Soviet Union at its 
founding in 1920s, created the State Commission for Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) to 
extend electricity services to the entire country (Min, 2008). Similarly, the governments of 
Germany, Netherlands, and Scandinavia made political commitments to electrify 90%t of 
households by 1930 (Nye, 1992). These interventionist policies show that no country 
successfully extended electricity to all its parts without the support of the state (Barnes and 
Floor, 1996). 
However, beginning in the 1980s and in response to a combination of political, ideological, 
economic and technological factors the sector has undergone extensive restructurings to 
facilitate market solutions and private sector investments and participation (Jamasb et al., 
2015). These restructurings, which were also referred to as the “Standard Textbook Reform 
Model”, were part of a broader set of economic policy objectives that formed part of the 
„Washington Consensus‟. The reform model which were first implemented in Chile and the 
United Kingdom, provided evidence that its effective implementation would significantly 
enhance technical efficiency by reducing generation costs and price-cost gaps, and increase 
investment (Jamasb et al., 2015). Moreover, the efficiency gains are further expected to be 
translated into affordable access to improved services. 
The electricity reforms aim to reduce the dominance of state-owned utilities in the sector 
(Dornan, 2014). Following the experiences of the pioneers and other OECD countries, 
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developing countries were encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank to unbundle the 
functions of electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and retailing. These countries 
would then sell the unbundled parts amenable to competition or regulation to the private 
sector and create independent regulatory agencies to supervise and regulate the monopoly-
prone parts of the sector (Victor and Heller, 2007). Therefore, the main features of the 
Electricity Sector Reform (ESR) in developing countries were the introduction of market 
competition and private sector participation into the electricity markets. 
In the 1990s, SSA countries began to implement ESR, even though no country in the region 
succeeded in implementing the entire suite of the reform model with the exception of Nigeria. 
This is because some aspects of the ESR model were viewed by politicians to pose 
differential risks; thus the reform parts considered as low-threats (e.g., entry of Independent 
Power Producers, IPPs) were mostly encouraged (Karekezi et al., 2004). Also, resistance to 
tariff increases by citizens who associate the reforms with neoliberal agenda, labour unions 
with socialist traditions, and Africans educated with Afro-socialist leaning views, galvanise 
to pressurise politicians to resist reforms even if the governments‟ view on ESR were positive 
(Batley, 2004; van de Walle, 1989; Gore et al., 2018). 
Notwithstanding the politics surrounding the implementation of reforms in the region, as of 
2014, 24 countries had enacted ESR laws, three-quarters had attracted private sector 
participation, two-thirds had corporatized their electricity utilities, a similar number had set-
up regulatory bodies, and more than a third had IPPs in place (Eberhard et al., 2008). As a 
result, the dominance of governments in the sector has declined as they maintain their 
presence in the sector by creating IRAs to oversee and regulate the sector. The design and 
creations of IRAs which were influenced by the literature on central bank independence, 
credible commitments of governments and political uncertainties (e.g., Rogoff, 1985; 
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Thatcher, 2002), were motivated by the desire to insulate policies from future political 
interference, signal the credibility and commitments of reforming governments‟ to end self-
regulation as well as replace political considerations by economic concerns (Estache et al., 
2009; Pearce, 2006; Jamasb et al., 2004). 
Therefore, IRAs are expected to protect private investors from the whims of the state, and 
consumers seeking protection from the incentives of dominant firm to influence prices 
through exerting market power or by tacit collusion with others (Jamasb et al., 2015). Also, 
the creation of IRAs does not entail complete abandonment of the role of government in the 
sector. Rather, it shifts the functions of government towards regulation and away from 
service provision, subsidising or financing of the sector. Therefore, the main outcome of 
implementations of an ESR is a switch from self-regulation or politically regulated provision 
of electricity to private sector provision of service and regulation by IRAs without political 
interference and conflict of interests (Estache et al., 2009). 
The creation of the IRAs has been a major aspect of the reforms in SSA countries. During the 
period covered by this study, more than 50% of the countries in the region have established 
IRAs. These countries were also major beneficiaries of private sector investments (Eberhard 
et al., 2016). Table 3.1 shows the creation dates of the regulators in SSA. Performance of the 
regulators in the region has been mixed. For example, effective regulation has been credited 
with significant improvements in financial and operating performance of the privatised 
utilities (Eberhard et al., 2016). However, these contrast sharply with studies that argue that 
SSA countries continue to suffer socially and economically post the reforms, due to 
insufficient investment levels required to improve generation capacity and reliability of 
service, increase access rates, and reduce transmission and distribution losses (Aurial and 
Blanc, 2009; Eberhard et al., 2011; Ahlborg et al., 2015). 
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Table 3. 1 SSA Countries with IRAs 
SSA IRAs and Year of Establishment 
Year Countries 
1994 South Africa 
1997 Zambia 
1998 Cameroon, Cote d‟Ivoire, Senegal 
1999 Niger, Madagascar, Uganda 
2000 Ghana, Mali, Namibia, Togo 
2001 The Gambia, Mauritania, Rwanda, Tanzania 
2003 Cape Verde, Congo Republic, Zimbabwe 
2004 Lesotho, Mozambique 
2005 Central African Republic, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe  
2006 Kenya 
2007 Angola, Malawi, Swaziland 
2009  Benin 
2010 Burkina Faso, Gabon 
2011 Burundi, Sierra Leone, Sudan 
2012 Seychelles 
2014 Ethiopia 
Source: Eberhard et al. (2016) and updated with data from Foster et al. (2017), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/28853/WPS8235.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; 
and Cape Verde, Seychelles, and São Tomé and Príncipe regulatory agencies‟ websites: Agência de Regulação 
Económica, http://www.are.cv/index.php; Seychelles Energy Commission, http://www.sec.sc/; and Autoridade 
Geral de Regulação, http://www.ager-stp.org/index.php/pt/. 
 
  Although, these poor reform outcomes have been attributed to a number of factors,
28
 some have linked them to 
the broader national and institutional context within which IRAs are embedded (e.g., Minogue and Carino, 
2006; Berg, 2000). This is because the quality of political institutions, credibility and reliability of the judiciary, 
institutional norms, administrative capacity and related factors were noted to have the potential to shape the 
functions of IRAs (Dubash and Rao, 2007). For example, in the SSA context, Eberhard (2007) argues that the 
failures of IRAs to achieve their mandates may be linked to unpredictable and inconsistent regulatory policies 
which are usually the fallouts of unstable and changing policy environments in which they operate. 
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 See World Bank (2017), Ahlborg et al. (2015), Eberhard et al. (2011), Sokona et al. (2012), and Khennas 
(2012) for details on these factors. 
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Similarly, Chang and Berdiev (2011), Pitlik (2008), Vowles (2008) and Bodea (2010) have 
noted that the degree of government fragmentation, institutional constraints, political strength 
and government authority can induce governments to reverse or change previous enacted 
policies such as commitment not to interfere in regulatory functions. For example, in Uganda, 
the electricity regulatory authority was routinely harassed by the government, summoned and 
questioned before the Parliament (although not accountable to the Parliament) for increasing 
electricity tariffs and investigated by the police (Kapika and Eberhard, 2013). 
This shows that even though the regulators in the SSA countries are independent and have 
desire to improve efficiency and access rates, their regulatory powers can be undermined by 
the institutional environment in which they operate. Thus, institutions which consist of formal 
and informal rules and norms (North, 1990) may determine the incentives of governments not 
to interfere with regulatory functions. However, the main institutional factor identified by 
most studies, were political interferences in regulatory functions. Implementation of reforms 
in SSA was heavily influenced by domestic political dynamics and citizens expectations of 
state provision of electricity (Gore et al., 2018). Also, governments tend to fill positions in 
the regulatory agencies with political and financial allies in order to keep electricity prices 
low and to incentivise poor voters (Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2010). Karekezi and Kimani 
(2002) find examples of this in Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda. 
Therefore, to understand the performance of the regulators in the region, the focus should not 
only be on technical aspects of regulation such as tariff setting methodologies and their 
implementations, but also on the larger contextual factors such as the political environment in 
which IRAs operate. This has led many studies to examine how political institutions 
influence the functions of IRAs in the sector (Imam et al., 2019; Chang and Berdiev, 2011; 
Cubbin and Stern, 2006; Erdogdu, 2013; Nepal and Jamasb, 2012b). These studies find 
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evidence that political factors impact regulatory decisions which in turn affect regulatory 
outcomes. Although, there are several reasons (e.g., redistribution and economic 
development) why politicians intrude into IRAs‟ functions, however, the most widely cited is 
the need to correct market failure and enhance citizens‟ welfare (Munger, 2008). 
However, studies such as Pitlik (2007) suggest that although government interference may 
have detrimental effects, some regulation and public intervention is needed for a well-
functioning economic system. Notwithstanding these conflicting arguments, a vast literature 
has emerged to show how governments based on ideological orientations of their political 
parties interfere in regulatory functions and influence outcomes (e.g., Benoit and Laver, 
2006; Bjornskov and Potrafke, 2011; Duso, 2002). Similarly, other studies specific to the 
energy sector have shown how energy regulators function under different institutional 
settings such as under different government ideologies (e.g., Pitlik, 2007; Potrafke, 2010; 
Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987). For example, analysis of political economy of energy reforms in 
developing countries have noted that consumer opposition to energy price increases often 
forces governments to reverse their earlier policy commitments.  
Apart from consumer resistance to price increases, political opposition to reforms in 
developing countries was often backed by ideological arguments (Dorman, 2014). This is 
because political parties tend to promote economic policies in conformity with the ideology 
of their government (Hibbs, 1977; Chang and Berviev, 2011). Moreover, giving in to 
pressures from international multilateral organisations to transfer policy making powers to 
IRAs could depend on politicians who are more or less inclined towards the ideological 
orientations of their political parties. Therefore, government ideology may affect the 
functions of IRAs in SSA countries because it could determine government perceptions about 
these functions. 
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In this regard, the right-wing ideologies are mostly associated with policies aimed at 
protecting private property, deregulation, and privatisation which are all aimed at expanding 
the free market ideology. This has been supported by studies such as Pitlik (2007), Potrafke 
(2009) and Duso (2002), which show that liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation 
policies are pursued by right-wing governments. In other words, right-wing governments 
promote economic freedom and prefer minimum government involvement in the economy, 
while left-wing governments are more likely to pursue social regulation to protect citizens 
from exploitation (Chang and Berdiev, 2011). Serrallés (2006) argues that the promotion of 
neoliberal economic ideologies mounted heavy pressure on the monopolistic European 
electricity sector to implement reforms.  
The third consecutive general election victory for Thatcher government in 1987 contributed 
to the liberalisation and restructuring of state-owned electricity utilities in the United 
Kingdom (Damsgaard, 2003). As an opposite example, in Finland, where energy policy 
formulations and implementations have been dominated by the Centre Party and the Social 
Democrats, the production and import of electricity has been highly controlled and regulated 
by the government (Chang and Bendiev, 2011). 
Therefore, in view of recent scepticisms towards neoliberalism and multilateral bodies, it is 
useful to analyse the political economy aspect of reforms and their outcomes in the SSA 
region. Some argue that, politics in SSA countries are not driven by government ideology, 
rather by other institutional factors such as corruption, political instability, and ethnic 
fractionalisation. For example, Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) and van de Walle (2002) 
argue that failures to implement reforms such as ESR, stalemates of reforms - where they 
have been initiated - or to attract private investments will not be explained by government 
orientations in SSA towards capitalism or socialism, self-reliance policies or globalisation. 
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Although, these arguments which are related to the weak governance literature and so far, 
have received great deal of attention, the main argument against the reforms in the region 
could be traced to the ideological beliefs of the governments about the role of the state in the 
economy. After gaining political independence, various governments in the region advocated 
for comprehensive ownership of means of production and concerted efforts were made 
towards a centralised management of the economy. For example, the Nkrumah government in 
Ghana pushed for the nationalisation of gold mines, while in Zambia the government took 
over the copper mines. Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Malawi adopted pure Marxism as 
form of government (Stambuli, 2002).  
Similarly, with regards to sectoral reforms such as electricity, when SSA countries were 
confronted with the debt crisis of the 1980s, the World Bank and the IMF directed them to 
restructure their economies prior to the extension of financial support. The economic 
structuring mostly referred to as Structural Adjustment Programmes required them among 
other measures to reduce the control of government on the economy through privatisation of 
state assets and introduction of competition. As expected, there were widespread opposition 
towards such conditionalities which were seen as part of a neoliberal agenda (Nwagbara, 
2004). Similarly, the current vertically-integrated nature of South Africa‟s electricity sector 
despite ESR, has been attributed to government focus on social imperatives; lack of 
regulatory and policy certainty; and conflicts in political ideology (Khan et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, some case studies on ESR in SSA countries highlight that ideology is a very 
important factor in countries of the region. For example, Gore et al. (2018) find in Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Ghana, citizen expectations for the state to provide electricity were a 
significant factor that constrained ESR implementations. Despite these debates, and their 
tendency to shape the current political landscape as well as implementations of ESR, there is 
little evidence on how government ideology may have influenced the performance of 
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electricity sector reforms through regulatory decisions. 
The above studies do not investigate the ideological differences in the impact of IRA on 
electricity sector performance. While IRAs are expected to increase efficiency, generation 
capacity, and expand access to service in SSA, the expected performance improvements of 
IRAs may be larger in some countries, especially in those with truly independent IRAs. 
While some of the reviewed studies treat IRAs and other institutional variables as exogenous 
(e.g., Estache et al., 2009), we treat these variables as endogenous, and use an Instrumental 
Variables (IV) estimator to investigate the impact of regulation and ideology on two 
indicators of electricity sector performance. 
3.2.1. Hypotheses 
The preceding subsection described how ideological orientations of governments could not 
only influence the creation of IRAs but also their subsequent credibility, independence, and 
performance. Thus, three hypotheses are formulated to test whether SSA countries have 
upheld the independence of IRAs or interfered in regulatory functions to advance their 
ideological objectives and what implications this has on the generating capacity of the sectors 
and expansion of access rates. In this regard, it is expected that right-wing governments to be 
more inclined towards creating credible, independent, and effective IRAs since they favour 
the protection of property rights, and legal equality which are the attributes of market-
oriented economies. This is because implementation of electricity reforms entails reducing 
the reach of the government in the sector and introduction of market competition, thus it is 
more compatible with the ideological orientations of right-wing governments that tend to 
favour smaller size of governments. 
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Although, the right-wing ideology is widely associated with the freedom of choice and 
protection of property rights, the successful implementation of the reform model in Chile 
shows that ideology can also thrive under authoritarian regimes even though it is difficult for 
such regimes to make commitments due to time-inconsistency problem (McGuire and Olson, 
1996). Therefore, SSA countries regarded as dictatorships are also capable of implementing 
reforms like their democratic counterparts. Thus, since building large-scale transmission and 
distribution infrastructures and extending them towards poor areas is costly (Ahlborg et al., 
2015), it is expected that the benefits of having access to affordable and reliable electricity by 
low income households to be limited under right-wing governments since the ideology tends 
to be driven by economic motives. This observation brings us to the first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Governments associated with right-wing ideologies would create credible and effective 
IRAs to promote economic regulation thereby increasing the installed generation capacity 
but not the access rates to the service. 
Gilardi (2008) show that due to the pressure to make creditable commitments not to adopt 
interventionist policies post reforms, left-wing governments would create independent 
regulators and liberalise markets. Thus, the creation of IRAs by left-wing governments can be 
seen as a commitment device since they are more likely to pursue policies aimed at protecting 
consumers. In contrast to right-wing governments which aim to pursue economic regulation, 
left-wing governments tend to pursue social regulation. However, extending services to those 
without access will also depend on increasing the capacity of utilities. Therefore, left-wing 
governments will also have incentives to support investments to increase capacity. Although 
left-wing governments have incentives to promote social regulation aimed at protecting 
citizens from the consequences of liberalisation (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; Hawkins and 
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Hutler, 1993), they may also promote economic regulation especially when these 
interventions could fulfil their social objectives. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: Left-wing governments may interfere with IRA functions to increase both generation 
capacity and access rates. 
Although, some governments in SSA are observed to be inclined either towards the left or the 
right in the dataset compiled by Cruz et al. (2016), there are other SSA governments that do 
not easily fit into neither of the two wings. In other words, such government policy objectives 
consist of ideologies of the two competing wings, focused on strengthening private enterprise 
in a social-liberal context and hence party platform does not focus exclusively either on 
economic or alternatively on social issues. These group of countries are categorised as having 
centrist governments based on the definitions in Cruz et al. (2016)
29
 on government ideology. 
Thus, the final hypothesis is: 
H3: There will be uncertainty on IRA’s credibility, when there are competing wings in the 
government or governments that do not have clear economic or social objectives thus 
performance may improve or deteriorate. 
3.3. Methodology 
3.3.1. Econometric model 
In order to analyse the effects of political ideologies and IRAs on performance, an 
econometric model is specified and estimated. The study postulates that electricity sector 
performance (esp) depends on a dummy that indicates whether an independent regulatory 
agency exists in country i at year t, and a vector of control variables (x). In order to capture 
the ideological differences on the performance of IRAs (ira), two ideology dummy variables 
included– left-wing (left) and right-wing (right) that interact with ira as regressors. The 
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 For definitions and categorisations of government ideology see Cruz et al. (2016). 
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comparison group consists of the countries in the sample, are categorised as centrist 
governments. The coefficients of the interaction terms show the effect of ideological 
differences on electricity sector performance. The performance model estimated is given in 
(3): 
                                )                  )  ∑      
 
   
                  ) 
where esp is the performance indicator reflecting either of the two performance indicators: 
total installed capacity and access to electricity (i.e., access rates, access). βs are parameters 
to be estimated, αi are country-specific effects and control for time-invariant unobservables 
and          
2
), is the stochastic error term. The vector x of control variables includes GDP 
per capita, total electricity generation, the size of electricity markets, corruption, and a time 
trend (time) to take into account technical change. Also, included as controls are two dummy 
variables indicating whether a country has privatised its utilities and has opened its electricity 
sector for private investments and has unbundled its electricity sector.
30
 
3.3.2. Estimation strategy 
Using the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator to estimate the parameters of 
Equation 1 yields inconsistent and unreliable results for two reasons.
 
First, due to the 
presence of endogenous variables such as corruption (corr) and GDP per capita (gdpper), and 
second, the likely correlation between country-specific factors (captured by αi) such as 
history, colonisation, and culture, and other regressors. This issue could be addressed by 
using a Fixed Effects (FE) estimator to ameliorate the bias arising from unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity of regressors. An issue is that most indices and dummy 
variables in the model have little variation over time, which may lead to large standard errors 
of the coefficient estimates if an FE estimator is utilised. The Random Effects (RE) estimator 
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This consists of four types of private sector investments in power sector utilities of SSA namely management 
and lease contracts, brownfield, greenfield projects, and divestures. 
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is not appropriate either because, as noted, the regressors are likely to be correlated with 
unobserved country-specific factors. 
Apart from the sources of endogeneity, reform performance equations tend to be represented 
as dynamic (e.g., Imam et al., 2019; Jamasb et al., 2015; Wintoki et al., 2012). In other words, 
performance depends not only on the current values of the regressors, but also on their past 
values. The OLS, the FE, and the RE estimators cannot produce consistent coefficient 
estimates in the presence of endogenous regressors and dynamics. Instead a dynamic panel 
General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed and developed in a series of studies 
(e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) is used. 
These studies, particularly Arellano and Bond (1991), proposed two estimators, the one-step 
and the two-step GMM. The study uses the two-step GMM estimator because it provides 
more efficient estimators over the one-step GMM estimator (Gyimah-Brempong and de 
Camacho, 2006). 
The use of a dynamic panel two-step GMM estimator improves on both the OLS and FE 
estimators by allowing for the inclusion of country-specific effects (αi) to account for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and the current performance to be influenced by previous 
realisation of performance. Similarly, unlike Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) which relies 
on difficult and sometimes unreliable instruments, the Difference GMM (Diff-GMM) 
estimator relies on internal instruments contained within the panel. In other words, past 
values of the regressor and performance can be used as instruments, and this eliminates the 
need for external instruments.  
However, Diff-GMM estimator like the FE not only eliminates αi, but also removes all time-
invariant variables through differencing the model during estimation. As noted by Roodman 
(2008), Diff-GMM performs poorly in the presence of persistent processes because the 
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lagged levels may convey little information on future changes. As a result, the estimator tends 
to produce inconsistent estimates since the differencing produces weak instruments. 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) improved on the shortcomings of 
the Diff-GMM estimator and developed its variant, the System GMM (Sys-GMM) estimator 
which allows for the inclusion of time-invariant regressors, which would have otherwise 
disappeared in the Diff-GMM estimation. Thus, the estimator solves the problems of 
endogeneity of regressors and dynamics by treating the model as a system of equations in 
first differences and in levels. It does so by instrumenting the endogenous regressors by lags 
of their levels, while instrumenting those in the level equation with lags of their first 
differences. The study uses these advantages of dynamic panel System GMM estimator to 
obtain consistent estimates. This entails transforming Equation 1 into a dynamic panel 
specification where the lagged values of the two performance indicators (installed capacity 
and access rates) are included as additional regressors in (4): 
                                         ) 
                 )  ∑      
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where         denotes the lagged value of performance, whilst   is the parameter associated 
with that variable. All other variables and coefficients are defined as before. Using the 
dynamic System GMM estimator to obtain consistent and unbiased results depends on two 
specification tests. The first is a Hansen test for overidentification restrictions which is a joint 
test of model specification and appropriateness of the instrument vector. Failure to reject the 
null hypothesis of the test indicates that instruments used in estimation are valid and the 
model is well specified. The second is the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for serial correlation 
of the disturbances up to the second order. The appropriate check of the test for serial 
correlation (AR) relates only to the absence of second-order serial correlation, AR(2), since 
the first differencing induces first-order serial correlation, AR(1), in the transformed errors. 
3.3.3. Data 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in the model are installed capacity (cap) and access rates (access). 
Generation capacity is measured as total installed capacity and access rate by percentage of 
total population with access to electricity. There are several ways to measure both, none of 
which is ideal. The analysis focus on these two indicators of performance, because for SSA 
governments to increase access rates and meet supressed demand, install capacity must grow 
by more than 10% annually (Eberhard et al., 2011). Therefore, it is expected that reforms 
would increase the generation capacity and access to affordable electricity. Data on annual 
installed capacity (cap)
31
 and access (access) were sourced from the United States Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), and the World Bank Development Indicators Database. 
Additionally, electricity consumption per capita (comper) has been used as dependent 
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 Total installed capacity may increase but operating capacity may remain low if there are no corresponding 
investments in both transmission and distribution segments required to evacuate and transport the electricity to 
end users.  
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variable in one model presented in the Appendix. Data on total electricity consumption 
averaged by total population was obtained from the United Nations Energy Statistics 
Database, while the data on total population was obtained from the World Development 
Indicator Database. 
Independent variables 
Information on government ideology is sourced from Beck et al. (2012) database of political 
institutions and updated by Cruz et al. (2016) which classifies governments as either left-
wing, right-wing, centrist, or lacking an ideology. The variable ranges between 0 and 3, 
where the value 1 represents right-wing governments, the value 2 represents centrist 
governments, 3 represents left-wing governments, and countries without ideology were coded 
as 0. Three dummy variables are constructed in order to reflect the three respective 
government ideologies of SSA governments.
32
 
In addition to the government ideology index, the Freedom House measure of freedom 
ratings
33
 is used which consists of a combined score of a country‟s political rights and civil 
liberties to investigate the robustness of the estimates. In other words, freedom rating is the 
total sum of two ratings –political rights and civil liberties ratings. The rating is dichotomised 
at 5.5, based on Freedom House‟s judgement that countries with scores of 2.5 and below are 
free, countries with scores from 3.0 to 5.0 are partly free and countries with scores of 5.5 and 
above are not free. These scores are used to construct three dummy variables
34
 to reflect the 
level political rights and civil liberties in SSA countries. The Freedom rating is used since it 
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 In the category of centrist governments, countries which lack ideology and countries without information on 
government ideology in the database are also included. 
33
 For more understanding and how both the government ideology and Freedom House indexes were measured 
and vary overtime please see: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324418292_Database_of_Political_Institutions_2017 & 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/methodology  
34
 The intuition for this is that free societies are mostly associated with laissez faire policies that aimed to reduce 
the role of the state in economic affairs and thereby avoid interfering with individual freedom. Moreover, 
Erdogdu (2013) argues that ESRs have been more extensive in countries with more investment freedom. 
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is generally accepted that human freedom or liberty is intimately related or interwoven with 
property rights which are mostly associated with right-wing governments. Conversely, 
countries with left-wing governments tend to implement policies that put property rights at 
risk thereby discourage private investments, innovation and beneficial risk taking. Therefore, 
strong legal protections for property rights are a necessary condition for attracting the private 
sector investments to increase both generation capacity and access rates. 
The data on the independent regulatory agencies (ira) is drawn from Eberhard et al. (2016) 
and updated with additional data from Foster et al. (2017), Cape Verde, Seychelles, and São 
Tomé and Príncipe electricity regulatory agencies‟ websites as indicated in Table 3.1. 
Following Jamasb et al. (2004), a dummy variable is created that takes value 1 to indicate the 
existence of an IRA and 0 otherwise. The existence of an IRA has been associated with 
improved electricity sector performance (Cubbin and Stern, 2006), while political institutions 
can influence and improve the performance of IRAs (see Nepal and Jamasb, 2015). 
Control variables 
We include corruption (corr) in the model since the implementation of ESR also entails 
reducing the corruption levels (World Bank, 2000) which are noted to have a significant 
impact on generating capacity of utilities and access (Estache et al., 2009). We use the control 
of corruption index obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2010) which is included in the World 
Bank Governance Indicator Database. The corruption index, which measures corruption in 
both public and private sectors, ranges from -2.5 (highly corrupt) to 2.5 (highly clean). 
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Summary statistics of the data used in the estimations are presented in Table 3.2. The 
summary statistics indicate that total installed capacity, access, and other variables vary 
greatly across the SSA countries in the sample. For example, there is a wide variation in the 
data on installed capacity with cap ranging from a low of 0.01 GW for Liberia in 2005 to a 
high of 46.12 GW for South Africa in the same year. The sample therefore includes countries 
with high level of installed generation capacity as well as countries with very low levels of 
installed capacity. 
In order to represent the demand side, we use two control variables. First, previous studies 
have shown that investments are needed to increase both the generating capacities of utilities 
and increases in access rates are largely dependent on level of economic development 
(Zomers, 2001; Ahborg et al., 2015). Thus, we include a measure of countries‟ GDP per 
capita (gdpper). Second, we include the percentage of population that lives in urban areas 
(urban) as a proxy for size of electricity markets. The data on both variables were obtained 
from World Bank Development Indicators Database. 
Table 3. 2: Summary Statistics of the Data 
Variables Labels Unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables        
Access Rates access % 720 33.17 23.86 0.01 99.4 
Installed Capacity, Total cap GW 720 1.76 6.49 0.01 47.44 
Elect. Consumption, Total comper GWh 716 356.22 659.32 1.61 4,187 
        
Independent Variables         
Regulator ira Dummy 720 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Centrist governments centre Dummy 565 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Left-wing governments left Dummy 696 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Right-wing governments  right Dummy 696 0.10 0.30 0 1 
        
Partly free governments pfree Dummy 720 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Not free governments nfree Dummy 720 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Free governments free Dummy 720 0.16 0.37 0 1 
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Control Variables        
Privatisation priv Dummy 720 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Structure struc Dummy 720 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Elect. Generation, Total gen GWh 720 8,439 36,139 21.68 263,479 
Corruption corr Index 675 -0.64 0.59 -1.77 1.22 
Ethnic fractionalisation ethnic Index 720 0.67 0.22 0 0.93 
Conflict conflict Index 720 0.57 1.45 0 7 
Ruggedness rugged Index 720 1.26 1.59 0.15 6.66 
Latitude lat Degrees 720 0.01 14.21 -29.58 20.26 
GDP, Per Capita gdpper 2010 US$/Inhab. 701 2,006 2,953 193.87 20,334 
Population Density popden Inhab./km
2
 716 86.23 118.35 2.31 621.97 
Urbanisation urban % 716 38.63 16.60 8.25 86.12 
Population Growth poprate % 716 2.56 0.84 0.13 5.54 
Note: access, cap, comper, gen, gdpper and popden were log-transformed prior to estimation. 
On the supply side, we include total electricity generation (gen) and two ESR variables, 
privatisation (priv) and structure of the electricity market (struc). Data on priv was obtained 
from the World Bank Infrastructure Database. Data on gen is sourced from United Nations 
Energy Statistics Database, while data struc of the electricity market is from Foster et al. 
(2017). The database is composed of annual observations for a sample of 45 SSA countries 
for the period 2002-2015.
35
 For robustness checks of the results, we add two each of 
institutional variables (ethnic fractionalization and conflict), topographical variables 
(ruggedness and latitude) and demographic variables (population density and population 
growth) to both installed capacity and access rates equations. For data sources, descriptions 
of these variables as well as the results of the robustness tests see section 3.3. 
3.4. Results 
This section presents the coefficient estimates of the installed capacity and access equations 
using the dynamic panel Sys-GMM estimator. The first subsection discusses the estimates of 
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 SSA countries in the sample are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep. Congo, Cote d‟Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Countries 
contained in the sample were dictated by data availability especially data on ideology. 
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the installed capacity equation while the second subsection discusses the estimates of access 
equation. We then report two robustness tests of the results. The regression statistics 
presented at bottoms of all results tables indicate that the models fit the data well. Arellano 
and Bond (1991) tests for serial correlation, AR(1) and AR(2), indicate that there is first order 
serial correlation, but not at the second order, which shows the inconsistency of OLS and the 
appropriateness of using a GMM estimator in this analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In 
addition, Hansen‟s test of model specification and overidentifying restrictions indicates that 
the models are correctly specified with appropriate instruments. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of the test indicates that the instruments used in estimation are valid and the model 
is well specified. 
3.4.1. Total installed generation capacity 
The results of the two-step Sys-GMM estimates of the installed capacity are presented in 
Table 3.3. The coefficient of ira is positive and significant indicating that, all things being 
equal, the establishment of an IRA is positively correlated with improvements in generation 
capacity. This result is in line with results obtained by several other studies (e.g., Cubbin and 
Stern, 2006; Nakano and Managi, 2008). This is also consistent with Eberhard et al. (2016) 
observation that countries that established IRAs (e.g., Cameroon, Côte d‟Ivoire, Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda) were able to increase installed capacity by attracting new IPPs 
compared to countries without IRAs. However, this result contrasts with results obtained by 
some studies (e.g., Nagayama 2010; Zhang et al., 2008) on the effects of IRAs on installed 
capacity. 
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The results support the view that IRAs help mitigate or insulate IPPs from investment risks 
especially when investing in weak institutional environments. For example, the Energy 
Regulatory Commission of Kenya helped reduce the power purchase agreement charges 
radically between the first set of IPPs negotiated and the second (Eberhard and Gratwink, 
2011). 
The coefficients of both left and right are not significant suggesting that, the effect of the two 
government ideologies on installed capacity are not different from that of centrist 
governments in SSA countries. The coefficient of priv is positive and significant indicating 
that privatisations of hitherto state-owned utilities and other forms of private participations 
have increased generation capacity. This result is consistent with Eberhard et al. (2016) 
observation that private utilities post reforms, account for more than 25% of SSA countries‟ 
total installed generation capacity. Moreover, other empirical studies have found private 
sector investments in electricity sector are positively correlated with performance 
improvements (e.g., Cullmann and von Hirschhausen, 2008; Zhang et al., 2008; Megginson 
and Netter, 2001; Nagayama, 2010). However, the result contrast with other studies that find 
IPPs and other forms of private sector participation have no impact on generation capacity 
(e.g., Bonifaz and Santín, 2000). 
The coefficient of struc is negative and significant, indicating that structure of electricity 
sectors, especially the unbundling of the hitherto state-owned utilities, has negatively affected 
generating capacity of utilities. This may indicate that in the five countries that unbundled 
their electricity markets in SSA, it could be that system operators are grappling with the 
complexities of coordinating generation and transmission post reforms. The result contrast 
with those of Nepal and Jamasb (2012b) who find that reform measures such as unbundling 
did not result in efficiency improvements in the sector and Nagayama (2010) who finds that 
key reform measures (i.e., unbundling, IPPs investments, and establishment of IRAs) has led 
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to improved efficiency. 
Table 3. 3: Two-step GMM Estimates of Total Installed Capacity Equation 
Total Installed Capacity (cap) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
cap (t-1) 0.910*** 42.68 
ira 0.261*** 5.41 
left -0.022 -0.32 
right -0.152 -1.11 
priv 0.141*** 2.88 
struc -0.597*** -3.37 
iraXleft -0.195** -2.61 
iraXright 0.343** 2.27 
corr 0.200 1.24 
ln gdpper 0.111* 1.68 
urban -0.002 -0.72 
intercept -0.764* -1.76 
No of obs.  590 
No of countries  45 
Instruments  42 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.46(0.014) 
AR(2) test (p value)  0.88(0.381) 
Hansen test (p value)  26.80(0.634) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The coefficients of corr and urban are both insignificant indicating that, corruption and size 
of electricity markets has no statistical impact on generation capacity. These estimates 
especially on corruption, contrasts with those obtained by Imam et al. (2019), Wren-Lewis 
(2013) and Estache et al. (2009) for technical efficiency. However, this result may be 
explained by the choice of installed capacity as dependent variable. This is likely because 
electricity generating utilities, especially IPPs, seeking to mitigate investment risks while 
operating in weak institutional environments such as in SSA countries, often sale their 
electricity output to off-takers or require sovereign and World Bank guarantees thereby 
effectively insulating them from corruption. The coefficient of gdpper is positive and 
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significant indicating that income has positive impact on the installed capacity of the sectors. 
Are there government ideological differences in efficiency impact of IRAs? The answer is 
provided by the coefficient estimates of the two interaction terms. The coefficient of iraXleft 
is negative and significant, suggesting that installed capacity impact of IRAs in countries with 
left-wing governments is lower than impacts of IRAs in countries with centrist governments. 
This result is in line with the results obtained by earlier studies that showed the adverse 
effects of left-wing governments on regulation (e.g., Pitlik, 2007; Bjørnskov, 2005) and thus 
regulatory outputs. 
The coefficient of iraXright is positive and significant, implying that the generation capacity 
effect of IRAs is larger in countries with right-wing governments than those with centrist 
governments. This result is in line with Potrafke (2010), Bortolotti et al. (2003), and 
Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008) who noted that right-wing governments favour the independence 
of IRAs to promote their economic objectives. 
The coefficients of the interaction terms also reinforce the arguments of the World Bank 
(1993) and Megginson and Netter (2001) on how interventionist policies such as government 
financed provision of electricity and sheltering of utilities from competition tends to be less 
efficient compared to services provided by private utilities in competitive electricity markets. 
This is because countries that have institutionalised the protection of property rights and rule 
of law
36
 (Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998) are mostly the countries that attract private 
investments in the form IPPs and thus increase their generating capacity in SSA (Eberhard et 
al., 2006). In contrast, In SSA countries with history of interventionist policies, aversion to 
neoliberal reforms or with leaders who can effectively use the institutions of the state to 
reward loyalists or punish foes, less ESR have been implemented (van de Walle, 2001) and 
direct government regulation of the sector exist. 
                                                          
36
 Mostly associated with right-wing governments. 
  
85 
 
The interactions coefficient estimates suggest that we reject Hypothesis 2 and thus conclude 
that left-wing ideologies by interfering with IRAs‟ functions have led to lower generation 
capacity in SSA countries during the period covered by the study. And we fail to reject 
Hypothesis 1, which suggests that right-wing governments promote IRAs‟ independence and 
thus have increased generation capacity. These two coefficient estimates indicate that there 
are significant differences in terms of ideology in generation capacity effects of regulators. 
We therefore reject the proposition that there are no ideological differences in the generation 
capacity of IRAs. 
3.4.2. Access to electricity (access rates) 
There are conflicting arguments in the literature on the definition of access rates.
37
 For 
example, Min (2008) use share of population in unlit areas based on analyses of satellite night 
time images, while Ahlborg et al. (2015) and Estache et al. (2009) have used electricity 
consumption per capita and kilograms of oil used per capita as indicators of electricity access 
rates. Notwithstanding the conflicting choice of indicators by these researchers, we have used 
the percentage of total population of a country with access to electricity services as dependent 
variable in the access equation. However, we have also presented the estimation results for 
electricity consumption per capita in the Appendix.
38
 
The coefficient of ira in Table 3.4 is positive and significant suggesting that, that SSA 
countries that have established IRAs have increased access rates. This result confirms the 
result obtained by Imam et al. (2019) on the positive impacts of SSA countries‟ IRAs on 
access improvements and World bank (2017) report that show how Rwanda‟s electricity 
regulator (RURA) by overcoming regulatory risks that inhibit electrification efforts, was able 
to reduce connection costs and increased access rates from 6% in 2008 to 16% in 2012
39
. 
                                                          
37 See Ahlborg et al. (2015), Min (2008), and Doll and Pachauri (2010) on choice of access indicators. 
38 The results in the Appendix II-1 Table: B1 confirm the estimates of the access equation presented in Table 3.4. 
39 This was achieved in conjunction with Electricity Sector Wide Approach (eSWAp) policy of the Rwanda. 
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Similar findings were established by studies on other developing countries. For example, 
studies, such as Cubbin and Stern (2006) and Zhang et al. (2008), find regulatory governance 
as a result of power sector reforms have not only expand generation capacity expansion, 
utilization of generation capacity and reserve margin, but also enhanced service penetration. 
Table 3. 4: Two-step GMM Estimates of Access Rates Equation 
Access Rates (access) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
access (t-1) 0.727*** 107.11 
ira 0.094*** 3.22 
left 0.004 0.23 
right -0.121** -2.58 
priv -0.039*** -3.25 
struc -0.020 -0.76 
iraXleft -0.115*** -4.27 
iraXright 0.083 1.62 
corr 0.042 1.23 
ln gdpper 0.090*** 7.00 
ln gen 0.034*** 4.80 
urban 0.004*** 4.30 
intercept -0.067 -0.97 
No of obs.  590 
No of countries  45 
Instruments  43 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.51(0.012) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -0.10(0.920) 
Hansen test (p value)  33.02(0.322) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The coefficient of right is negative and significant suggesting that access to electricity is 
lower in countries with right-wing governments than countries with centrist governments. 
This result is consistent with the arguments that right-wing governments provide less for 
basic needs (Moon and Dixon, 1985) and prefer minimum government involvement in the 
economy (Chang and Berdiev, 2011). The coefficient of left is insignificant indicating that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
government. 
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access rates effects of left-wing governments are not different from that of countries with 
centrist governments. The coefficient of priv is negative and significant suggesting that 
privatisation of utilities and other forms of private sector participation have led to reductions 
in access rates. This result consistent with other findings that show how privatisation policies 
have led to access rates reductions (e.g., Bhattacharyya, 2006; Sihag et al., 2007) and led to 
concentration of services to profitable areas in SSA countries (Victor, 2005). Similarly, in 
Nigeria were the distribution segment has fully been privatised, the distribution companies 
have no incentives to expand services due to non-implementation of cost reflective pricing.  
The coefficient of struc is not significant suggesting that unbundling of electricity sectors of 
SSA countries have no effect on access. The coefficients of gdpper, urban and genper are all 
positive and significant indicating that average income, the size of electricity markets and 
electricity production have all boosted access to electricity services in SSA countries during 
the period covered by the study. This is because post reforms implementations, increased 
income level, expansion of transmission and distribution networks, and electricity generation 
especially by private utilities have helped expand the electricity supply capacity and thus 
enhanced access to electricity (Jamasb et al., 2016).The coefficient of the interaction term 
iraXleft is negative and significant.  
This indicates that, the access rate impact of IRA in SSA countries with left-wing 
governments is lower than those of countries with centrist governments. This result suggests 
that ideologically motivated interventions especially by left-wing governments in regulatory 
functions have constrained the efforts of IRAs to incentivise utilities to increase access rates. 
In fact, a significant number of SSA countries‟ electricity utilities well-documented failures 
to extend services to the millions without access has been blamed on inappropriate regulation 
and government intrusiveness, rather than effectiveness of ESR (Kipaki and Eberhard, 2013; 
Eberhard et al., 2016).  
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The coefficient of iraXright is not significant, suggesting that the access rates effect of IRAs 
in SSA countries with right-wing governments is not different from that of SSA countries 
with centrist governments. These two estimates entail the rejection of Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2 which postulated that interference in the regulatory functions by left-wing 
governments, increases access rates while by right-wing governments have access reducing 
effects. 
Moreover, these estimates contrast with the ideas presented by some theoretical works (e.g., 
Gilardi, 2005; Hawkins and Hunter, 1993) that left-wing governments place more weight on 
social issues (e.g., access to electricity by the poor) and thus interfere in the IRAs functions to 
promote social regulation. Similar arguments were put forward on the effects of right-wing 
governments. For example, right-wings governments associated with promotion of 
competition and preventing dominant firms from abusing market power (Ennser-Jedenastik, 
2016), are also expected to increase social welfare indirectly through these policies. The 
results did not live up to the expectations of these theories and indicate that there are 
significant differences in access rates effects of political ideologies. 
3.4.3. Robustness test 
It is possible that the obtained results on installed generation capacity and access rates 
impacts of IRAs and ideologies are affected by omitted variable bias or choice of the 
ideology variable. Hence, in this subsection we test the robustness of the estimates of the two 
performance indicators. We begin by adding six addition regressors (two each of 
demographic, institutional, and topographical variables), two at a time, to both to the installed 
capacity and access rates equations to see if this would significantly change the coefficient 
estimates of the two interaction terms. We then estimate the two equations by using an 
alternative of measure of ideology (Freedom Index) to see if the results are driven by the 
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choice of the institutional index used. 
3.4.3.1. Additional regressors. 
Min (2008) argue that physical geography of a country and countries at higher absolute 
latitude influences investments in electricity infrastructure needed to extend services 
especially to those in rural areas. Excluding these two variables from the performance 
equations could, potentially, lead to biased coefficient estimates of the effects of IRAs and 
government ideologies on installed capacity and access rates. Therefore, the variables 
ruggedness (rugged) and latitude (lat) are used as additional regressors in the two 
performance equations. Rugged is measured in hundreds of meters of elevation difference for 
grid points 30 arc-seconds (926 meters on the equator or any meridian),
40
 while lat is 
expressed in decimal degrees, for the geographical centroid of a country. Data on both 
variables were obtained from Nunn and Puga (2012).  
Other studies have argued that ethnic fractionalization and, civil wars and conflicts are among 
the major challenges facing efforts to increase infrastructure investments and increase access 
to electricity services (Min, 2008; Ahlborg et al., 2015). Therefore, an include index of 
conflict which is the total summed magnitudes of both societal and interstate conflicts 
(conflict)
41
, and a time-invariant ethnic fractionalization (ethnic) index are added to the two 
performance equations. These two variables are obtained from Alesina et al. (2003) and 
Marshall et al. (2017) respectively. 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 However, the measure used in this chapter is an index which gives more weight to densely populated areas. 
41
 This index varies overtime reflecting the onset and end of conflicts and thus it also captures the cessation of 
conflict in SSA countries as democracy takes root in the region. 
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Table 3. 5: Two-step GMM Estimates of Total Installed Capacity Equation 
Installed generation capacity (cap) 
 rugged + latitude ethnic + conflict popden + poprate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
cap(t-1) 0.923*** 45.09 0.911*** 43.27 0.644*** 9.68 
ira 0.258*** 6.92 
0.415*** 
5.62 
0.846** 
2.08 
left 0.026 0.45 
0.056 
0.86 
0.070 
0.25 
right -0.180 -1.49 
0.010 
0.09 
0.075 
0.16 
priv 0.096*** 2.91 
0.134*** 
3.07 
0.235 
1.66 
struc -0.378** -2.26 
-0.984*** 
-4.10 
-2.765*** 
-3.26 
iraXleft -0.239*** -3.59 
-0.371*** 
-4.39 
-0.625* 
-1.79 
iraXright 0.192* 1.87 
0.415* 
1.90 
1.581** 
2.46 
corr 0.275 1.67 
0.210* 
1.95 
0.335** 
2.39 
ln gdpper 0.125** 2.24 
-0.059 
-0.62 
-0.414* 
-1.75 
urban -0.003 -1.11 
0.002 
0.48 
0.017 
1.61 
rugged -0.028 -1.36 
-0.009 
-0.52 
0.005 
0.04 
lat 0.003 1.36 
-0.003 
-1.11 
-0.030* 
-1.92 
ethnic   0.329 1.31 
2.607* 
1.91 
conflict   -0.030** -2.06 
0.013 
0.58 
ln popden     0.091 1.10 
poprate     -0.153 -1.41 
intercept -0.710* -1.86 
0.020 
0.03 
0.043 
0.03 
No of obs.  590  590  590 
No of countries  45  45  45 
Instruments   44  40  39 
AR(1) test (p 
value) 
 -2.45(0.014)  -2.48(0.013)  -2.37(0.018) 
AR(2) test (p 
value) 
 0.90(0.366)  0.76(0.444)  -2.29(0.771) 
Hansen test (p 
value) 
 25.90(0.680)  23.32(0.501)  18.02(0.648) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, several studies find population density (popden) and growth rate of population 
(poprate) to have effects on electricity sector performance (Min, 2008; Imam et al., 2019; 
Eberhard et al., 2016). Therefore, annual population density, which is in people per square 
kilometres of land area and growth rate of total population is added. Data on popden is from 
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the World Bank Development Indicators Database while data on poprate is from the United 
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2018). 
Table 3. 6: Two-step GMM Estimates of Access Rates Equation 
Access rates (access) 
 rugged + latitude ethnic + conflict popden + poprate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Est.                t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
access(t-1) 0.734*** 83.60 0.705*** 88.13 0.735*** 56.22 
ira 0.116*** 3.01 
0.060** 
2.18 
0.047** 
2.63 
left -0.003 -0.13 
0.020 
0.84 
0.069 
1.61 
right -0.119* -1.75 
-0.093* 
-1.84 
-0.075* 
-1.85 
priv -0.040*** -2.93 
-0.004 
-0.24 
-0.020 
-0.92 
struc 0.032 1.31 
0.026 
1.00 
0.181** 
2.52 
iraXleft -0.109*** -3.11 
-0.080** 
-2.67 
-0.150*** 
-3.17 
iraXright 0.054 0.92 
0.035 
0.77 
-0.065 
-1.42 
corr 0.114*** 2.76 
0.034 
0.95 
0.061 
1.39 
ln gdpper 0.072*** 3.56 
0.037 
1.28 
0.035 
1.24 
ln gen 0.024*** 2.85 
0.053*** 
5.78 
0.061*** 
6.08 
urban 
0.0052**
* 4.09 
0.008*** 
6.10 
0.007*** 
3.84 
rugged 0.029** 2.58 
0.012 
0.64 
-0.008 
-0.72 
lat 0.002** 2.11 
0.005*** 
5.50 
0.007*** 
6.96 
ethnic   -0.525*** -4.14 
-0.480*** 
-3.12 
conflict   -0.013* -1.84 
-0.096*** 
-4.87 
ln popden     0.010 0.81 
poprate     -0.042** -2.60 
intercept 0.063 0.57 
0.425* 
1.94 
0.446* 
1.84 
No of obs.  590  590  590 
No of countries  45  45  45 
Instruments   39  41  43 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.56(0.010)  -2.53(0.011)  -2.49(0.013) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -0.03(0.975)  -0.02(0.983)  -0.20(0.839) 
Hansen test (p 
value) 
 21.36(0.618)  21.37(0.617)  22.40(0.555) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results of the robustness test are presented in Tables 3.5-3.6. Columns 1, 3, and 5 in both 
tables present the coefficient estimates of iraXleft, iraXright and the rest of the variables 
when the six variables divided into 3 different sets are included as additional regressors in the 
capacity and access equations. Coefficients of the dummy interactions remain significant and 
with the same signs regardless of the additional regressors included in the two equations. The 
coefficient of ira also remain significant and with the same sign. The estimates suggest that 
the ideology dummy variables are not acting as proxies for some omitted regressors which 
should have been included in the global performance equations. 
3.4.3.2. Alternative measure of ideology (Freedom House Index). 
The results of the installed capacity and access estimations are based on the ideology index 
compiled by Beck et al. (2012) and updated by Cruz et al. (2018). It is possible that the 
earlier obtained results are driven by this choice of index. To investigation this possibility, an 
alternative institutional index – the Freedom House Freedom rating- is used to investigate the 
ideological differences in the performance impact of IRAs. 
The results of the estimations of installed capacity equations and access rates using the 
Freedom House index as the alternative measure of ideology is presented in Table 3.7. The 
coefficient estimates of IRA is significant and positive in both estimations, thus confirming 
the earlier obtained results. The coefficient of the dummy interaction terms in both columns 1 
and 2 remain significant and with the same signs regardless of the freedom rating used as a 
proxy for the ideology index in both two equations. In other words, these estimates suggest 
that freedom differences in the performance effects of ira found in this section are similar to 
the ideological differences in the performance impact of ira found above and thus the earlier 
results are not driven by the ideological index used. 
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Table 3. 7: Two-step GMM Estimates of Access and Installed Capacity Equations. 
 Capacity Utilization Access Rates 
 (1)  (2)  
Variables Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
ln cap (t-1) 1.020*** 147.61   
     
ln access (t-1)   0.748*** 161.63 
     
ira 0.069*** 4.03 0.147** 2.49 
nfree 0.014 0.40 0.219*** 3.96 
free -0.138*** -9.10 -0.134 -1.65 
priv -0.032** -2.39 -0.061** -2.61 
struc -0.070*** -4.77 0.172*** 6.80 
iraXnfree -0.053** -2.09 -0.167*** -3.08 
iraXfree 0.061*** 4.85 0.029 0.35 
corr -0.024 -1.00 0.268*** 5.18 
ln gdpper 0.027 1.53 0.061* 1.74 
urban 0.001 0.34 0.005*** 0.46 
ln gen   0.004 3.70 
intercept -0.133 -1.38 0.288 1.47 
No of obs.  613  613 
No of countries  45  45 
Instruments  44  43 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.33(0.020)  -2.97 0.003 
AR(2) test (p value)  0.95(0.344)  -0.37(0.708) 
Hansen test (p value)  31.70(0.482)  29.80(0.476) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3.5. Conclusions and policy implications 
The common and important feature of electricity sector reforms in Sub Saharan Africa over 
the past two and half decades, has been the creation of independent regulatory agencies. 
These new institutional bodies were mandated to regulate and oversee the electricity market 
and look after consumer interest. IRAs were expected to depoliticise electricity price-setting 
and encourage private sector investment through transparent and predictable decisions. By 
fulfilling these regulatory tasks, IRAs were to increase the generating capacity and access to 
electricity services. Despite the anticipated performance improvements, there is some 
evidence that the region‟s electricity sectors are still bedevilled by low generation capacity, 
poor network infrastructure, and large group without access to services. 
Numerous studies have linked the poor outcomes to factors such as historical, economic, 
financial, and corruption related factors. However, political economy factors have received 
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less attention in the literature. For example, some studies have noted that, political ideology 
of governments may promote or constrain regulatory functions. The chaper focuses on the 
influence of political ideology on IRAs and their regulatory effectiveness. Panel data and a 
dynamic panel data estimator is used to investigate ideological differences in the effects of 
IRAs on total installed capacity and access rates. 
The result show that IRAs have positive and significant effects on both generation capacity 
and access rates. Similarly, the result show that there are significant ideological differences in 
the effects of IRAs on installed capacity and access rates. The largest negative effects of the 
interactions between IRAs and ideology on installed capacity and access rates is found in 
SSA countries with left-wing governments. The results are robust after controlling for 
additional variables and different measure of ideology that have impacts on electricity sector 
performance. 
What policy implications can be derived from the results? All the SSA countries that have 
implemented ESR aimed to achieve certain level of economic development through 
increasing the productivity of their electricity sectors and access to electricity. The results 
imply intrusion into regulatory functions especially by left-wing governments would lead 
reductions in investments need to increase generation capacity and expand access rates since 
regulatory decisions would be viewed by investors as politicised. This means that countries 
with left-wing governments cannot expect large inflows of private sector investments or a 
stable and efficient electricity sector, all necessary conditions for achieving a higher and 
sustained level of economic development. The implication of the results is that countries with 
left-wing governments can increase the growth rate of income by taking steps to reduce 
interferences in IRAs functions, because this will not only increase generation capacity, but 
would also lead to higher access rates. 
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The performance impacts of IRAs‟ are not uniform in all SSA countries. Therefore, while it 
may be necessary to strengthen the independence of IRAs in all SSA countries to signal 
credibility and attract the needed private sector investments to increase generation, expand 
transmission and distribution infrastructure and access rates, may not be equally pressing in 
all countries of the region. As noted, the need to reduce interference in regulatory functions to 
attract private sector participation into electricity generation and boost access rates is more 
pressing in countries with left-wing governments and countries with centrist governments 
than it is in countries with right wing governments. 
Therefore, SSA governments with different ideologies should place differential emphasis on 
policies to strengthen the independence of IRAs as a means of improving efficiency and 
access rates. While strengthening the independence of IRAs in left-wing governments may be 
critical for increasing capacity and access rates, it may not be as critical for right-wing or 
centrist governments, especially in increasing capacity. Then giving more independence to 
IRAs or not interfering in their functions in SSA countries by the same proportion will not 
only improve increase capacity and access, it will also help narrow the gap among the 
countries with different ideologies, since SSA countries with low installed capacity and 
access rates will benefit the most by boosting the independence of IRAs. 
These results should be interpreted with caution as the proxies for IRA and government 
ideologies do not reflect the degree, extent, or intensity of regulation nor the dynamics or 
incentives of governments. There is a need for further studies to investigate regime (e.g., 
democracy and autocracy) difference in the effects of reforms to enhance the understanding 
of the link between performance and politics as well as other institutional factors that may 
constrain regulatory functions and private investments. 
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Chapter 4: Electricity Access and Human Development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Abstract 
Despite implementations of electricity sector reforms and other policies to increase 
electricity access, there is limited empirical evidence on the impacts of electricity 
access post these policies implementations on human development. This chapter 
examines the impact of access to electricity on Human Development Index (HDI) 
and its three components (i.e., health, education, and income), using panel data on 
49 SSA countries from 2002 to 2013. Through dynamic panel estimation, the 
chapter shows that increased access to electricity has positively boosted human 
development. Similar results are found on the impact of electricity access on the 
three HDI components. The results suggest that eradicating energy poverty mostly 
associated with the Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most important channels of 
boosting human development. 
 
 
Keywords: human development, electricity access, Sub-Saharan African, dynamic panel data. 
JEL classification: C26, I15, I25, O15, Q48. 
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4.1. Introduction 
In most SSA, increasing access to electricity has been identified as the most important 
channel of enhancing economic development, even more important than access to finance or 
fighting corruption (IEA, 2016). This has been evidenced by the implementation of various 
initiatives aimed at increasing electrification rates and development of electricity markets 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa; UNECA, 2007; Osterkorn et al., 2010). 
Starting from 1990s, many SSA countries have implemented ESR to improve the financial 
and technical efficiency of their utilities (Imam et al., 2019) and to free up government 
resources to expand access to electricity (Jamasb et al., 2016). Additionally, SSA countries 
have recently signed up to multilateral initiatives such as the African Union‟s Agenda 2063 
and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of United Nations to expand access rates. 
Assessments of the effects of these interventions especially on ESR show modest access rates 
improvements post policy interventions (Imam et al., 2019; ESMAP, 2011). A joint report by 
the UNECA, Africa Union Commission (AUC), African Development Bank (AFDB) and 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) regional bureau for Africa on Africa‟s 
progress on the SDG 7 noted that, access to electricity has increased from 39.7% in 2008 to 
45.9% in 2014 (UN, 2018). Some studies have shown that increased electrification rates have 
had positive impacts on economic performance (Samli, 2011; Stern, 2011; Bacon and 
Kojima, 2016). However, recently the focus has shifted to effects of electrification on human 
development (Todaro and Smith, 2012). Since the aim of any public policy is to enhance 
citizens‟ welfare, higher access rates are expected to bring about positive socio-economic 
benefits. 
There is evidence of human development improvements where electricity has been provided, 
due to benefits from lightning, education, health, leisure and security (e.g., Davis, 1997; 
Karekezi and Majoro, 2002; Kirubi et al., 2009; Spalding-Fecher, 2005). Kirubi et al. (2009) 
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show that electricity provision in Kenya has benefited rural communities socially and 
economically by enhancing the productivity of workers. Similarly, Karekezi and Majoro 
(2002) in a study on South Africa and Zambia, find that electrification increased the number 
of businesses that offered various services in South Africa, while in Zambia electrification 
reduced the consumption of charcoal, wood and kerosene by 15, 35 and 47 % respectively. 
Notwithstanding, the benefits of improved access, Eberhard et al. (2011) noted that electricity 
provision in many SSA countries has been skewed towards higher income households and 
urban areas since utilities do not have incentives to extend the service to poor and 
unprofitable areas (Transnational Institute, 2002; Victor, 2005). This has been identified as 
one of the reasons why SSA countries continue to lag behind the rest of the world regarding 
provision of universal access to electricity (Ahborg et al., 2015). This has led some 
researchers to question the social benefits of policy interventions such as ESR (Auriol and 
Blanc, 2009), especially as 80% of the region‟s population still relies on traditional use of 
biomass to meet their energy needs (Hancock, 2015). Table 4.1 presents the number of 
people relying on traditional biomass for their energy needs in SSA countries compared to 
other developing regions of the world. 
Table 4. 1: Population relying on traditional biomass (million), by region, 2015. 
Source: IEA, Energy Access Outlook (2017). 
Without electricity access, it is difficult to fulfil basic human needs. Despite extensive policy 
discussions and efforts to increase access rates in the region by multilateral institutions, 
 Region  Population relying on biomass 
Developing Countries  2500 
Africa  784 
North Africa  1 
Sub-Saharan Africa  783 
Developing Asia  1648 
Latin America  57 
Middle East  10 
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governments and private bodies, the impact of electricity access on the human development 
of SSA countries has been under-explored. Therefore, the chapter examines the matter in 
SSA countries. Analysing the relationship between access rates and human development is 
important for two reasons. 
First, a significant number of studies on electrification and human development is focused on 
other developing countries in Asia or Latin America or use mixed panels of developed and/or 
developing countries. As a result, it is difficult for SSA policy makers to learn lessons from 
them because circumstances differ in terms of institutions, economic structure and electricity 
markets. Second, studies that assess the impact of policy interventions such as ESR on 
welfare indirectly through its effects on electricity access are mostly qualitative case studies 
combined with social cost-benefit analysis at micro level or single country cross-sectional 
household survey data (Lee et al., 2016). Thus, it is difficult to find empirical studies on SSA 
countries using a panel data approach. 
This chapter addresses these deficits and contributes to the literature in four ways. First, to 
the best of my knowledge this is the first study to analyse the impacts of improved electricity 
access on human development by solely focusing on SSA countries, thereby decreasing the 
cultural and institutional heterogeneity that characterized most cross-county studies. Second, 
the chapter extends the literature on ESR which has been largely focused on the direct 
impacts of reforms on social welfare in SSA countries (e.g., Imam et al., 2019; Eberhard et 
al., 2011; Eberhard et al., 2016) by focusing on realised used of electricity.  
Third, the chapter contributes to a better understanding of how infrastructure would help 
enhance the overall development and productivity of countries as well as quality of citizens‟ 
life (e.g., Mohanty et al., 2016; Ahborg et al., 2015; Sen et al., 2018). Fourth, the chapter also 
emphasises the importance of electricity access in achieving Goal 7 of the United Nations‟ 
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Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that aims to ensure access to affordable, reliable, 
sustainable and modern energy for all (UN, 2018). 
This chapter is organised into five sections. Section 4.2 reviews the relevant literature and 
discusses the channels through which electricity access impacts human development. Section 
4.3 presents the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4.4 introduces the empirical methodology 
and the data used in the study. Section 4.5 shows and discusses the results. Section 4.6 
concludes the chapter. 
4.2. Literature Review 
Electricity access accelerates human development through the integration of technologies into 
issues such as irrigation, creation of employment, enhancement of work, and improving the 
provision of both health care and education (Karekezi et al., 2012). As a result, most SSA 
countries have recognised its importance in this regard (Parshall et al., 2009) and have made 
increasing access to electricity their national priorities (APP, 2015; Deshmukh et al., 2013; 
Scott and Seth, 2013). Prioritising electricity access as a national objective in developing 
countries has its roots in the historical views about states‟ role in the provision of social 
services (Scott and Seth, 2013) and benefits from economies of scale in generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity (Banerjee, 2006; Pachauri and Brew-Hammond, 
2012). 
Recently, most SSA countries have signed up to various initiatives such as the Agenda 2063
1
 
of the African Union (African Union Commission, 2015), the Sustainable Development 
Goals of the United Nations (UN, 2018) and the Sustainable Energy for All
2
 (SE4All) - a 
multi-stakeholder partnership between civil society, governments and the private sector 
                                                          
1
 One of its goals is to connect SSA countries through world class infrastructure. 
2
 SE4All was set up to ensure universal access to modern energy services; double the global rate of 
improvement in energy efficiency; and double the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix. 
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Yumkella and Holliday, 2012). These agendas were all aimed at providing opportunities for 
the countries of the region to tackle the challenges of sustainable development (including 
poverty eradication) and climate change mitigation (Care and WWF, 2016) though access to 
modern, affordable and reliable energy. 
Furthermore, SSA countries like other developing countries have implemented extensive 
restructurings of their electricity sectors to facilitate market solutions and private sector 
investments and participation (Jamasb et al., 2015) aimed at complementing public resources 
to increase electricity access (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012; Estache et al., 2009). There have been 
some modest improvements in increasing electricity access post these policy interventions. 
For example, access to electricity has relatively improved significantly, with even a small 
acceleration since 2010 (IEA, 2015). For example, access increased from 35 to 43% between 
2012 and 2014 (IEA, 2017; Ahborg et al., 2015). 
Similarly, the corporatization of South Africa‟s state-owned utility ESKOM, has increased 
the percentage of people with access from a third of the population to about 70% of the 
population (Eberhard et al., 2005). It was also reported that electricity access has more than 
doubled in Ghana and Mali. and where electricity access has been provided in SSA countries, 
the social and economic conditions of people have improved in terms of education, health, 
lightning and security (Karekezi and Majoro, 2002; Kirubi et al., 2009; and Spalding-Fecher, 
2005). This shows that increasing or extending access to affordable and reliable electricity 
services to households, health centres, schools and businesses in the region, brings substantial 
long-term socio-economic benefits (Ahborg et al., 2015). 
However, apart from some of these modest achievements attributed to policies 
implementation, SSA have not succeeded in radically expanding electricity access. This is 
because, in absolute terms, the number of people without access has increased as 
infrastructure development has lagged behind the population growth (Lucas et al., 2016). As 
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a result, 588 million people are still without basic electricity access (IEA, 2017). 
Table 4. 2: Access Rates in SSA countries in 2016. 
 National Urban Rural Population without 
access (million) 
SSA Countries (Average) 42% 71% 22% 600 
Angola 35% 69% 6% 17 
Benin 32% 56% 11% 8 
Botswana 55% 69% 32% 1 
Burkina Faso 20% 58% 2% 15 
Burundi 10% 35% 7% 10 
Cameroon 63% 94% 21% 9 
Cape Verde 97% 100% 89% <1 
Central African Republic 3% 5% 1% 5 
Chad 9% 32% 1% 13 
Comoros 71% 89% 62% <1 
Congo 43% 56% 16% 3 
Cote d'Ivoire 63% 88% 32% 9 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 15% 35% 0% 68 
Djibouti 42% 54% 1% <1 
Equatorial Guinea 68% 93% 48% <1 
Eritrea 33% 86% 17% 4 
Ethiopia 40% 85% 29% 61 
Gabon 90% 97% 38% <1 
Gambia 48% 66% 13% 1 
Ghana 84% 95% 71% 5 
Guinea 20% 46% 1% 10 
Guinea-Bissau 13% 23% 1% 2 
Kenya 65% 78% 60% 17 
Lesotho 34% 63% 24% 1 
Liberia 12% 16% 3% 4 
Madagascar 23% 52% 7% 19 
Malawi 11% 49% 3% 16 
Mali 41% 83% 6% 11 
Mauritania 31% 47% 2% 3 
Mauritius 100% 100% 100% - 
Mozambique 29% 57% 15% 21 
Namibia 56% 78% 34% 1 
Niger 11% 54% 0% 18 
Nigeria 61% 86% 34% 74 
Rwanda 30% 72% 12% 8 
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Sao Tome and Principe 59% 70% 40% <1 
Senegal 64% 90% 44% 6 
Seychelles 99% 99% 99% <1 
Sierra Leone 9% 12% 6% 6 
Somalia 16% 35% 4% 9 
South Sudan 1% 4% 0% 13 
Sudan 46% 71% 31% 22 
Swaziland 84% 90% 71% <1 
Tanzania 33% 65% 17% 37 
Togo 35% 74% 5% 5 
Uganda 19% 23% 19% 33 
Zambia 34% 67% 7% 11 
Zimbabwe 34% 81% 11% 11 
Source: IEA, Energy Access Outlook (2017). 
 
Furthermore, there are significant differences among countries of the region in terms of 
electrification rates. For instance, in 2016, 86% of South Africa‟s population had electricity 
access, while in South Sudan only 1% had access. Disparity also exist between urban and 
rural areas in terms of access. Of the 80% of the population that live in rural areas, only 22% 
had electricity access, compared to 71% with access in urban areas (IEA, 2017). In Nigeria, it 
is estimated that only 34% of the rural and semi-urban population have electricity access 
while nationally, 61% of the population – over 74 million people have no access (IEA, 2017). 
Table 4.2 shows the disparities among and within SSA countries in terms of access rates. 
Much of the increased electrification in the region occurred in urban areas with rural areas 
being the most underserved (World Bank and IEA, 2015; Eberhard et al., 2016). 
This shows that policies aimed at diversifying electricity sources could have a significant 
impact on electricity access especially in sparsely populated rural areas far from the central 
grid and thus boost economic development. As a result, some countries of the region have 
created rural electrification agencies to extend services where the grid has not reached or 
unlikely to reach in the near future (Bhattacharyya, 2012). Such intervention has been a 
crucial part of socio-economic development (Cook, 2011) as it has been noted to have 
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boosted both agricultural and non-agricultural incomes (Kirubi et al., 2009) and in some 
countries, it has increased female labour participation rate (Dinkelman, 2011). 
While off-grid solutions have received favour and support of international organisations and 
donor agencies, there has been a relatively limited penetration in the region as in other parts 
of the world because limited efforts have been made to apply them for productive use or 
income generation (Bhattacharyya, 2012). Similarly, very limited effort has gone into hybrid 
off-grid solutions to provide a reliable and affordable solution, because of system complexity, 
added cost and over-emphasis on lighting-only solutions (Bhattacharyya, 2012). Pachauri and 
Brew-Hammond (2012) argue that, like other developing countries, the historical 
overdependence on the central grid and neglecting of mini-grid and stand-alone systems have 
hammered rapid electrification efforts in SSA countries. These show over reliance on central 
grid systems as the main factor constraining the efforts to extend electricity to the millions 
without access in the region. 
Compared to other developing regions of the world, the number of people without electricity 
access in SSA countries is the highest (IEA, 2017). The average number of people in 2016 
without access in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia are 3, 7 and 11%, respectively, 
while in SSA about 57% of the population lack access to electricity (IEA, 2017). See Table 
4.3 for disparities in terms of access rates among different develop regions of the world. 
Similarly, when the SSA countries electrification rates are compared with other developing 
countries, the disparities are glaring. For example, post policy interventions such as ESR 
implementations, electrification rates in Argentina, Peru and El Salvador respectively 
increased to 95, 72 and 76% from the respective pre-reform rates of 91, 38 and 62% (Jamasb 
et al., 2016). The number of households without electricity supply in Chile decreased to 14% 
in 2002 from 62% in 1982 after implementing reforms (Pollitt, 2004).  
Table 4. 3: Access Rates in Developing Countries in 2016. 
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Regions National Urban Rural Population without access 
(million) 
Developing Countries 82% 94% 70% 1060 
Africa 52% 77% 32% 588 
North Africa 100% 100% 99% <1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 43% 71% 23% 588 
Developing Asia
3
 89% 97% 81% 439 
Latin America 97% 98% 86% 17 
Middle East 93% 98% 79% 17 
Source: IEA, Energy Access Outlook (2017). 
The poor access rates in SSA countries relative to other developing countries has been 
blamed partly on the large cost of building of large-scale transmission and distribution 
networks to extend services to difficult terrain, dispersed and/or low populated areas; 
inability of poor households to pay connecting charges and the weak financial status of 
utilities (Ahborg et al., 2015; World Bank. 2017). It has been estimated that $40.8 billion 
(6.35% of Africa‟s GDP) of investments is required annually to achieve universal energy 
access in the region by 2030 and approximately two-thirds of this is needed for capital 
investment ($27.9 billion a year); the remainder is for operations and maintenance (Eberhard 
et al., 2016). Of the capital expenditure, about $14.4 billion is required for new power 
generation each year, and the remainder for refurbishments of existing networks (Eberhard et 
al., 2011). As a result, SSA countries lack the required infrastructure to ensure access to 
affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all its citizens despite various policy 
implementations (IEA, 2014). 
As a result, SSA countries suffer economically and socially due to low electricity access, 
insufficient generation capacity, unreliable service and poor transmission and distribution 
networks (Eberhard et al., 2011; World Bank and IEA, 2015). Lack of access to electricity is 
correlated with low levels of human development (approximated by the Human Development 
Index, HDI, and the percentage of population that have access to electricity). SSA countries 
                                                          
3
 Excluding China and India. 
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with low human development also tend to have low access to electricity as shown in Figure 
4.1. This relationship between human development and access above suggest that, individuals 
who lack access to reliable and affordable electricity access tend to lack opportunies for 
income generation and have low levels of education and life expectancy. Conversely, where 
access to electricity has been expanded, the health of the people, housing conditions and 
educational outcomes improve, thus contributing to overcoming poverty (Kerekezi et al., 
2012). 
This has led some studies to investigate the impact of infrastructure deficit on economic 
development of SSA countries. Calderón (2008) assessed the impact of infrastructure stocks 
on growth in SSA countries between the early 1990s and the early 2000s and find that if SSA 
countries were to catch up with the regional leader, Mauritius, in terms of infrastructure stock 
and quality, their per capita economic growth rates would have to increase by an average of 
2.2% per year. The study also finds that reaching the infrastructure stock of South Korea 
would increase their rates of economic growth by 2.6% annually. 
This is consistent with Escribano et al. (2008) finding that low access and unreliability of 
service have adversely affected the economic growth of SSA countries especially through 
firms‟ productivity. This finding which was based on a World Bank‟s survey data show that, 
ahead of other factors affecting firms‟ productivity, infrastructure accounts for 30–60%. Of 
this result, the electricity sector accounts for 40–80% of the infrastructure effect in half of the 
SSA countries analysed. Electricity access is not only critical for improving firms‟ 
productivity, but it is also indispensable for poverty eradication and thus human development, 
since it also serves as a solid basis for development of underserved and poor areas without 
access. 
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Figure 4. 1: Access to Electricity and Human Development in SSA countries in 2013. 
 
Source: UNDP and World Bank Development Indicators databases 
This is because once an area is connected to electricity, it would also have access to other 
amenities of life such as safe potable water, better health conditions, food security, as well as 
lighting and information. In addition, electricity access would also eliminate the time wasted 
to collect and use other traditional sources of energy, such as firewood, animal dung, and 
crop residues for cooking and heating (Goldemberg, 2000), which are established major 
sources of harmful indoor air pollution (Smith and Mehta, 2003). This shows that those 
without access not only spend significant portion of their income on energy consumption, but 
also sacrifice their labour time and health to have energy access. A survey conducted in 
Burkina Faso find that the poor spend 5.6 and 1.3% of their income on firewood and kerosene 
consumptions respectively (Gaye, 2007). 
The correlation between access to cleaner energy and poverty reduction is corroborated by a 
number of studies on other developing countries. Barnes et al. (2010) find evidence that 
increased access to cleaner and affordable energy contributes positively to monetary gains 
among the poor and leads to better quality of life, such as an improved diet and amount of 
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food intake and the ability to afford better health and education facilities, among other 
advantages. Khandker et al. (2012a) also find that providing electricity to rural areas have 
helped reduce poverty in India. Similarly, access to the central-grid in Bangladesh impacted 
positively on household income, expenditure and education where the household gain in total 
income due to electrification was around 21%, with a 1.5 percentage point reduction in 
poverty per year (Khandker et al., 2012b). Furthermore, access to communal grid electricity 
have benefited poor households relative to rich households in Vietnam (Khandker, et al., 
2013). 
This shows that access to affordable and reliable electricity can directly and indirectly benefit 
the poor through higher productivity and enhanced employment opportunities. Similarly, 
human development would be enhanced through electricity access which remove constraints 
enforced on the poor‟s economic and social wellbeing. In other words, access to electricity 
can be considered an indicator of human wellbeing (Pinheiro et al., 2011) and a key 
measurable index of life quality (Pettersson et al., 2012). These studies further emphasise the 
importance of electricity on human development because a lack of access to basic services 
would undermine inclusive development. A World Bank (2017) review show that 125 of the 
169 policy targets included in the SDGs are interconnected with energy. This represents 74% 
of the targets and justifies the argument to prioritize energy especially electricity access in 
developmental policies and agendas. 
Some studies have directly assessed the impact of energy access on human development. 
Kanagawa and Nakata (2008) find a significant correlation between electricity consumption 
and GDP as well as HDI for 120 countries, and the countries which achieved high electricity 
consumption per capita, witnessed high economic development. Ghali and El-Sakka (2004) 
find that per-capita energy and electricity consumption are not only highly correlated with 
economic development, but also with other indicators of modern lifestyle, which suggest that 
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more energy that is consumed, especially in the form of electricity, better human wellbeing 
would be achieved. Zahnd and Kimber (2009) show that electricity access is associated with 
health, education, social and economic benefits to the people who have previously lived in 
homes with excessive indoor air pollution. 
Furthermore, in India‟s Assam state, rural electrification has boosted both social and 
economic development as well as help achieve the poverty reduction goal of the government 
(Kanagawa and Nakata, 2008). Mazur (2011) provided similar evidence that electricity 
consumption has improved well-being in less-developed countries, particularly in populous 
China and India. Burney (1995) find increase in income growth leads to increase in electricity 
consumption, which is compounded by socioeconomic development, as reflected by increases 
in literacy, share of industry and urbanization. 
Holtedahl and Joutz (2004) studied the link between urbanization rate and electricity access 
and find two reasons why higher urbanization would lead to higher energy use. First, 
increased urbanization is accompanied with greater electricity access, since households can 
easily get connected to the grid. Secondly, households that already had access are likely to 
increase their consumption because of increased use of existing and new appliances. Wu et al. 
(2010) by utilising the Lorentz Curve, Gini Coefficient and Theil Indexes, assessed the 
inequality in energy access and find differences in the economic development levels of 
countries that are categorised into high, middle and low groups. Pasternak (2000), using a 
data on the 60 most populous countries in the world examined the relationship between 
electricity consumption and the HDI. The study finds that a threshold of annual electricity 
consumption of 4,000 kWh per capita is required to achieve an HDI value of 0.9 or greater. 
In a study related to SSA, Dinkelman (2011) compared labour market outcomes in rural 
communities in South Africa that gained access to electricity before 2001, to those that were 
yet to be connected. The study finds that the share of households using electric lighting rises 
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by 23 % and the share of those cooking with wood fall by 4% within five years in areas with 
access. Further, the results show that due to electrification, women are 13% more likely to 
participate in the local labour market. Broto et al. (2015) find that show Maputo people found 
the provision of street lighting to be important for safety, thus creating a welcoming 
neighbourhood. In a similar study, provision of lighting in areas with access in South Africa 
was found to improve safety and scare away reptiles from people‟s dwellings as well as 
improve access to entertainment thereby improving quality of life the people (Azimoh et al., 
2015; Prasad and Visagie, 2006). 
Notwithstanding the relevance of the reviewed studies and numerous policies interventions 
directed towards expanding electricity access in SSA countries, few studies have attempted to 
assess the impact of electricity provision in terms of human development. More importantly, 
none of the reviewed studies on the region have directly investigated the impact electricity 
access on human development using panel data. Similarly, while policy implementations may 
have led to modest increased in access rates, no evidence has been encountered that showed 
what has been achieved in terms human wellbeing in SSA countries. Lastly, most of the 
reviewed studies on are mostly on Asian developing countries and the few on SSA countries 
are single country case studies (Dinkelman, 2008). Therefore, the study uses a dynamic panel 
estimator to investigate the impact of electricity access on human development and its three 
components (life expectancy, income, and education) using a dataset on SSA countries. 
4.3.    Methodology 
4.3.1. Econometric model 
A Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is used to estimate a model to assess the impacts 
of electricity access on human development in SSA measured through HDI and its three 
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components. It is postulated that human development (hdi) depends on access rate (per capita 
electricity consumption; access) among other factors. The model estimated is given in (5): 
                             ∑      
 
   
                               ) 
where hdi represents the human development index (or either of its three components: life 
expectancy, life; education, edu; or income, income) of country i at year t, while         stand 
for the lagged values of hdi (or either of the three components). βs and  are parameters to be 
estimated, αi are country-specific effects and control for time-invariant unobservables and 
         
2
), is the stochastic error term, while time represents a linear time-trend, which 
takes into account technological progress. The vector of Q control variables (X) is introduced 
to control for some country-specific characteristics and minimize the biases that spur from 
these specific features. Controls such as corruption (corr), trade openness (trade), and total 
expenditures on health (heaexp) and education (eduexp) as percentages of GDP are also 
added. 
4.3.2. Estimation strategy 
As the data on the human development indexes indicate, human wellbeing tends to change 
over time slowly. Lagged values of the dependent variables (       ) are included in 
Equation (5) to capture these changes. Due to the dynamic structure of the model, the pooled 
OLS estimates of   is inconsistent when the time span is small (Nickell, 1981). Furthermore, 
if the electricity access or other control variables and the error term     in Equation (5) are not 
independent, unobserved variables would affect both the dependent variables and regressors, 
so the estimated coefficient    and    would be biased. This type of bias can be partially 
dealt with by controlling for fixed effects and time trend, however, if some unobserved 
variable changes over time and across countries, the problem would appear in the error term 
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   . Therefore, neither the Fixed Effects (FE) estimator nor the Random Effects (RE) 
estimator would produce consistent estimates in the presence of these dynamics and the 
endogeneity of regressors. 
Moreover, most studies on human developments impacts of electricity access may 
misestimate the benefits of electrification if endogeneity of human wellbeing is ignored. This 
is because not only electrification affects human development, but household income can also 
determine whether or not a household would have access. For example, higher-income 
households are more willing to get a connection as soon as the grid arrives (particularly if the 
connection fees are not fully subsidized), and utilities prefer to provide electricity to higher-
income communities (Bacon and Kojima 2016). 
In order to deal with these methodological issues, a dynamic panel two-step GMM estimator 
suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) that improved on the 
abovementioned estimators is used. The dynamic GMM estimator is not only appropriate for 
endogenous regressors that are correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the 
error term    , but also allows for the inclusion of country-specific effects (αi) to account for 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation within 
individuals, but not across them (Roodman 2009). 
The estimator does not rely on difficult and sometimes unreliable instruments as in the case 
of the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimator. This is because the dynamic Difference 
GMM (Diff-GMM) estimator relies on internal instruments within the panel to instrument for 
the endogenous regressors. In other words, past values of the regressors and HDI can be used 
as instruments, thus eliminating the need for external instruments. However, this variant of 
the dynamic panel estimator would remove the country-specific effects (αi) and all other 
time-invariant variables during estimation. As a result, the estimator is noted to perform 
poorly in the presence of persistent processes because the lagged levels may convey little 
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information on future changes (Roodman, 2008). In other words, the estimator tends to 
produce inconsistent estimates since the differencing produces weak instruments. 
The System GMM (Sys-GMM) estimator improves on the shortcomings of the Diff-GMM 
estimator and allows not only for the inclusion of time-invariant regressors – that gets 
eliminated in the Diff-GMM estimation – but also deal with all other sources of endogeneity. 
The estimator overcomes the problem of endogeneity of regressors and dynamics by using a 
potentially large matrix of available instruments and weights them appropriately. The 
inclusion of extra instruments, however, requires additional moment conditions; thus, the 
system GMM builds on a system of two equations: the original equation as well as the 
transformed one. In other words, the estimator works with all sources of endogeneity by 
treating the model as a system of equations in first differences and in levels thereby 
instrumenting the endogenous regressors in the transformed equation by lags of their levels, 
while instrumenting those in the level equation with lags of their first differences. Due to its 
superiority to other panel data estimators, a dynamic panel System GMM estimator is utilised 
to estimate Equation (5). 
Obtaining unbiased results while using the dynamic System GMM estimator depends on 
passing two tests. First, the Hansen test for overidentification restrictions which is a joint test 
of model specification and appropriateness of the instruments vector. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of the test indicates that instruments used in estimation are valid and the model is 
well specified. The second is the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for serial correlation of the 
disturbances up to the second order. The appropriate check of the test for serial correlation 
(AR) relates only to the absence of second-order serial correlation, AR(2), since the first 
differencing induces first-order serial correlation, AR(1), in the transformed errors.
4
 
                                                          
4
 Results are obtained using the command xtabond2 in Stata. This two-step estimator is developed, implemented 
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4.4. Data 
Dependent variables 
A panel data of annual country-specific observations from 49 SSA countries over the period 
2002-2013 is used.
5
 Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables utilised in this 
study. The selection of countries and time period is largely determined by data availability 
especially on electricity access and human development. The dependent variables in the 
model is the Human Development Index (hdi-index) which was developed by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1990 to provide a yardstick of comparing the 
progress made by member countries of the United Nations in enhancing human development. 
In other words, the index was specifically developed to measure the wellbeing of people, as 
the first HDI publication noted: 
“The real wealth of a nation is its people. And the purpose of 
development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy 
long, healthy and creative lives. This simple but powerful truth is too 
often forgotten in the pursuit of material and financial wealth.” (UNDP, 
1990, p.9). 
Human Development Report (HDR) is published annually by the UNDP to report the 
progress made by member countries, regions and member states in enhancing human 
development since 1990. At the core of the reports are the progress made in achieving quality 
of life, education, and a decent standard of living. Hence, the HDI measures human 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and explained in detail in Roodman (2009). 
5
SSA countries in the sample are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep. Congo, Cote d‟Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, 
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Countries contained in the sample were dictated by data availability 
especially data on access rates and HDI. 
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development through three key indicators: longevity, knowledge, and GDP (at Purchasing 
Power Parity, PPP) per capita.
6
 For this reason, the study not only use the HDI index to assess 
the impact of electricity access but also use the three indexes that make up the HDI in order 
to investigate the impact of electricity access. 
The life expectancy index (life-index), which is the health dimension of the HDI, is 
constructed by expressing life expectancy at birth as an index using a minimum value of 20 
years and a maximum value of 85 years. The education index (edu-index) is an average of 
mean years of schooling (of adults) and expected years of schooling (of children), both 
expressed as an index obtained by scaling with the corresponding maxima. The income index 
(income-index) is based on the GNI (2011 PPP International $) per capita expressed as an 
index using a minimum value of $75,000. As noted, the data on all these indexes are all taken 
from the HDI database of the UNDP. 
Independent variables 
In order to assess the impacts of electricity access on human development, per capita 
electricity consumption (comper) is used as explanatory variable in Equation (5). Although 
this choice of this independent variable may have some limitations, there are several reasons 
why it is a better proxy than other two alternative measures commonly used: IEA data on 
electricity access rates and night-time satellite imagery data captured by the US Defence 
Meteorological Satellite Program‟s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS).7 
The IEA data, which was first compiled in the “World Energy Outlook, 2002”, was based on 
various sources such as countries‟ self-assessed reports (World Bank and IEA, 2015), which 
magnifies the sources of errors and thus leads to overestimation of access rates (Min, 2010). 
                                                          
6
 See the technical notes of HDR 2011 on how the HDI was calculated and constructed. 
7
The data is being archived and provided to researchers by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) at its National Geophysical Data Centre. 
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Another drawback of the IEA data is that, it only indicates the extent of electricity 
infrastructure provision, and therefore is silent on quality, reliability and whether services has 
been consumed or not (World Bank and IEA, 2015; Ahlborg et al., 2015).
8
 
Similarly, night-time satellite imagery has some serious drawbacks too. For example, the 
measure includes people without access to electricity services residing in electrified towns 
(Doll and Pachauri, 2010). As a result, its reliability as an indicator of access rate is weak 
since it only measures stable outdoor lights, which can be a major problem in SSA countries 
where there are high incidences of load shedding (World Bank, 2009).
9
 
Therefore, using consumption per capita other than connection rates or satellite imagery as 
the main explanatory variable has the advantage of assessing how consumers were able to 
translate access to real use, rather than just the physical extension of electricity 
infrastructures. As result, if there are significant changes in service reliability, it is expected 
that consumption to be adversely affected. Moreover, as Ahlborg et al. (2015) have noted, 
using a per capita measure rather than measuring average consumption among the electrified 
minority has the advantage of comparing development patterns across SSA countries of 
different population sizes. Furthermore, per capita measures allow for the assessment of 
whether consumption levels have kept pace with population growth in each country. Data on 
comper is obtained from United Nations energy statistics database. 
Control variables 
Corruption (corr) is included in the model since it has the effect of reducing government 
expenditure on education and health because social spending would offer less opportunity for 
rent seeking by public officials (Mauro, 1998). Similarly, Gupta et al. (1998) show that 
                                                          
8
 For further discussion, see Ahlborg et al. (2015). We use this measure of electricity access to check the 
robustness of our results. 
9
 For further shortcomings of this data, see Doll and Pachauri (2010). 
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corruption reduces the level of social spending, fosters education inequality, lowers 
secondary schooling, and causes unequal distribution of resources. The control of corruption 
index obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2010) which is included in the World Bank 
Governance Indicator Database is utilised. The corruption index, which measures corruption 
in both public and private sectors, ranges from -2.5 (highly corrupt) to 2.5 (highly clean). 
Table 4. 4: Summary Statistics of the Data 
Variables Labels Unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables        
Human Development hdi-index Index 555 0.47 0.10 0.26 0.78 
Life expectancy  life-index Index 576 0.57 0.10 0.32 0.83 
Education edu-index Index 555 0.41 0.12 0.12 0.71 
Income income-index Index 564 0.48 0.14 0.18 0.86 
Independent Variables        
Access Rates access % 576 34.49 25.01 0.01 99.40 
Elect. Consumption, 
Per Capita 
comper kWh per capita 574 398.47 740.07 1.62 4,177.50 
Control Variables        
Corruption corr Index 576 -0.64 0.61 -1.87 1.22 
Education expenditure eduexp % 335 17.08 5.80 4.77 37.52 
Health expenditure healexp % 546 5.60 2.27 0.84 13.12 
Consumer price com-price Index 527 87.75 24.14 15.35 218.56 
Population growth poprate % 574 2.52 0.89 -2.63 4.77 
Particulate Matter pm25 Micrograms per cubic meter 230 38.43 19.44 9.52 118.31 
Globalization Index global Index 576 46.10 8.80 26.82 71.13 
Population Density popden Inhab./km
2
 574 88.43 116.08 2.38 620.03 
Political instability instab Index 586 -0.50 0.95 -3.32 1.20 
Government spending on education (eduexp) and health (heaexp) as percentages of GDP as 
are used as control variables since these are among the most significant investments by 
governments to enhance human capital and wellbeing. The role of education and health in 
enhancing human development has been extensively discussed in the literature. For example, 
education can enhance economic performance by increasing the efficiency of the workforce, 
reducing inequality, promoting health, reducing fertility levels, creating better conditions for 
good governance, and increasing the knowledge and the innovative capacity of an economy 
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(Aghion et al., 1999; Castelló-Climent and Doménech, 2008; Glaeser et al., 2004; Castelló-
Climent, 2008; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008). Similarly, 
increase in health capital reduces the time lost to illness and thus, health allows a more 
effective performance that increases productivity (Grossman, 1972). Data on both eduexp (% 
of government total expenditure) and heaexp (current health expenditure as % of GDP) are 
from Wold Bank Development Indicators Database. 
Another important control variable, the consumer price index (com-price) which reflects 
changes in the cost of living to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and 
services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly is also used. 
According to the World Bank (2012), if there are daily increases in the price of consumables, 
consumers‟ wellbeing especially of low-income households would be adversely affected. 
Other studies, such as Lee (2001), Egunjobi (1991) and Todaro (1989), have established a 
link between population growth and human development. These studies seek to answer 
questions such as: do rapid population growth make governments struggle to provide 
essential social services? Will population growth lead to increase in unemployment? Will 
population growth ensure adequate health care and basic education? Therefore, growth rate of 
population (poprate) is used in the estimations. Data on com-price is from Wold Bank 
Development Indicators Database, while data on poprate is from the United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2018). 
Lastly, a measure of air pollution, particulate matter (PM2.5) is include, because of the 
growing concern about its adverse effects on human development especially as it has been 
established that children who were exposed to high levels of air pollution are likely to have 
low levels of education and skills in adulthood (Dieter, 2012). The effects of air pollution on 
human development may depend on factors such as the type of pollutant and its concentration 
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level, duration of exposure, and the presence of other pollutants (Vichit-Vadakan et al., 
2010).  
The main sources of air pollution in SSA countries are fossil fuels, biomass consumption and 
poor waste management practices (IEA, 2017). Data on PM2.5, measured as percentage of 
the population who are exposed to ambient concentration of PM2.5 that exceeds WHO 
(World Health Organization) guideline value, is from Brauer et al. (2017) and is included in 
the World Bank Development Indicators Database. 
In order to check the robustness of the results, three additional regressors are add – 
globalization index (global), population density (popden) and political instability (instab) – to 
the human development and its three components equations. 
4.5. Results 
This section presents and discusses regression results of the human development (hdi) and its 
components (income per capita, income-index; life expectancy, life-index; and education, 
edu-index) equations using dynamic panel Sys-GMM estimator. The first subsection presents 
and discusses the coefficient estimates of the HDI equation, while the second subsection 
presents the coefficient estimates of the life expectancy, education and income equations. 
Regression statistics presented at the bottom of the tables with the parameter estimates 
indicate that all models fit the data well. The AR(1) and AR(2) test statistics indicate that in 
some of the estimations, there is first order serial correlation, but not at the second order, 
which evidences the inconsistency of OLS and the appropriateness of using a GMM 
estimator in the context (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In addition, the Hansen test of model 
specification and overidentifying restrictions indicates that all models are correctly specified 
with appropriate instruments. the estimation strategy differs from earlier studies that use 
static models or case studies on single countries to analyse the impacts of electricity access 
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on human development in SSA countries (e.g., Dinkelman, 2011). 
4.5.1. Human development equation 
The results
10
 of the two-step Sys-GMM estimates of the HDI equation are presented in Table 
4.5. The coefficient estimate of comper is positive and significant, suggesting that all things 
being equal, an increase in electricity access is positively associated with improvement in 
human development. This result reconfirms Dinkelman‟s (2011) finding that show how 
electricity access positively impacted on HDI in South Africa by providing opportunities for 
self-employment and importantly female self-employment. It is also in line with studies on 
other developing countries (e.g., Barnes et al., 2010; Klandker et al., 2012; Klandker et al., 
2013) that find electricity access enhances human development through increased food 
intake, improvements in diet, ability to afford education and health through increase in 
household income and reduction in the number of people in poverty. 
Although, Escribano et al. (2008) did not directly assessed the impact of access rates on 
human development, they find evidence that low electricity access has adversely affected 
HDI through economic performance in SSA countries. However, the intuition behind their 
results indicates that lack of access to electricity and unreliability of services have not only 
constrained the economic performance of SSA countries, but also have adversely affected 
human development. Thus, consistent with these studies result, the results suggest that 
electricity access is a key determinant of human development where it has been provided. 
However, the result differs from those of Madubansi and Shackleton (2007) who reported 
that after 11-year period of village electrification efforts, fuel wood consumption had not 
changed in five South African villages. Hiemstra-van der Horst and Hovorka (2008) also find 
                                                          
10
 This results and other subsequent ones in this chapter suffer from lower levels of observations during 
estimation. This is due to the inclusion of the variable pm in the estimations. After excluding the variable from 
the estimations there were not significant changes in results even though the number of observations increases to 
over 500 in some cases. 
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similar results in the case of Botswana. 
Table 4. 5: Two-Step GMM Estimates of HDI Equation 
Human Development Index (hdi-index) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
   
hdi-index(t-1) 0.843*** 22.23 
   
ln comper 0.007*** 3.86 
   
corr 0.004** 1.97 
   
eduexp -0.001 -1.32 
   
healexp 0.001*** 3.79 
   
com-price  -0.001*** -3.20 
   
pm -0.001*** -3.16 
   
poprate 0.001 0.72 
   
time 0.002*** 4.87 
   
intercept 0.143*** 4.19 
No of obs.  144 
No of countries  41 
Instruments  30 
AR(1) test (p value)  -1.47 (0.141) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -1.00 (0.319) 
Hansen test (p value)  17.67 (0.609) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This shows that if efforts are made to increase electricity access to the 590 million people 
without basic access (IEA, 2017) in the region, it would not only boost economic 
performance, but would also enhance human development. For example, expanding 
electricity to access would help fulfil the ambition of Goal 7 of the SDGs by 2030 of 
providing universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services. In order to 
achieve sustained level of socio-economic development, Brew-Hammond (2010) noted that 
SSA countries most effectively mobilisation both domestic and external funding through 
implementations of innovative policy frameworks that would attract private sector 
investments. 
The estimated coefficient for healexp is positive and significant, suggesting that an increase 
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in government expenditure on and health is associated with an increase in human wellbeing. 
This result contrasts with Filmer and Pritchett (1997) who find government spending on 
health did not lead to improvements in health measured as child mortality. However, the 
result is similar to those obtained by other researchers who find a positive relationship 
between public spending on health care and human development (e.g., Fan, et al., 2008). 
The coefficient for eduexp is not significant suggesting that there is no association between 
government spending on education and human development. This could be explained by low 
public spending on education by most SSA countries. Public spending on education as share 
of GDP in most SSA countries is below the 6% threshold recommended by UNESCO (2017). 
The result is consistent with other studies that find insignificant or a weak link between 
public spending and educational outcomes (Flug et al., 1998) and differs from Sequiera and 
Martins (2008). The estimates of both healexp and eduexp suggest government social 
spending is an important channel through which SSA countries can enhance human 
development, therefore increasing it would further boost human development. 
Regarding the other control variables, the coefficient of corr, is positive and significant 
suggesting that corruption has adversely affected human wellbeing thus confirming Mauro‟s 
(1998) finding that show how corruption reduces government expenditure on education and 
health. The coefficient of com-price is also positive and significant suggesting that increase in 
cost of living have affected the wellbeing of citizens in SSA countries during the period 
covered by this study. This result confirms a World Bank (2012) report that shows soaring 
prices especially of food have held back millions from escaping poverty particularly in Africa 
and Asia. 
The coefficient of pm is negative and significant indicating that exposure to air pollution have 
adversely affected human wellbeing in SSA countries. This is not surprising as about 80% of 
the population of SSA use solid fuels in cooking and this has been responsible for more than 
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50% of all deaths from pneumonia in children under 5 years and chronic lung diseases and 
cancers in adults over the age of 30 (WHO, 2016). However, the coefficient of poprate is not 
significant suggesting that population growth has no effect on human development. The 
coefficient of time is positive and significant signifying that, other things equal, human 
development has increased over time. 
4.5.2. Human development components 
The results of the impact of access rates on HDI‟s three components (life expectancy, 
education and income per capita) are presented in Table 4.6. In columns 1, 3 and 5, the 
coefficient estimates of comper are positive and significant, and confirm the result of the HDI 
estimation in Table 4.5. In other words, the results suggest that electricity access have 
positively boosted education, life expectancy and income per capita of SSA countries during 
the period covered by the study. Some studies have found evidence on the association 
between electrification and the three components of HDI. On the educational impact, 
Nanhuni and Findes (2003) find evidence that in Mali, lack of electricity access has led 
children to spend more time in resource collection and thus reduced the likelihood of school 
attendance, especially among girls. Mapako (2010) shows that access to reliable and 
affordable electricity for cooking has reduced collection times significantly in South Africa, 
and this has been translated into increased time for education, encouraged school attendance 
and reduced dropout rates (UNEP, 2008). 
Similar findings were established on the relationship between electricity access and health, 
and income. On the impact of access rates on income, Khandker et al. (2013) find evidence 
that households and small business incomes increased after getting connected to electricity, 
while Dinkelman (2011) finds evidence that in Kwazulu-Natal of South Africa, households‟ 
employment increased especially of women after electricity was extended to community. 
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The coefficient estimates of eduexp is significant in columns 1, 3 and 5, however, the public 
spending on education have negatively affected both income and health (columns 1 and 3), 
while positively affecting education (column 5). These estimates suggest that government 
spending on education has reduced income per capita and led to poor health outcomes but 
have boosted educational outcomes. The negative impact of education expenditure on health 
and income may not be unconnected with lower resources devoted by SSA governments to 
education in their national budgets. For example, most of SSA countries do not meet the 
international benchmark of 15% to 20% of GDP as education expenditure (UNESCO, 2012).  
When enough resources are not provided to educate the growing population in SSA countries, 
it would lead to lower income and poor health outcomes due to correlation between education 
and income/health. For instance, it has been established that an additional 4 years of 
education lowers 5-year mortality by 1.8 percentage points; it also reduces the risk of heart 
disease by 2.16 percentage points, and the risk of diabetes by 1.3 percentage points (Cuter 
and Lleras-Muney, 2006). However, government expenditure on health have positively 
impacted on all three components of human development as indicated by the coefficient of 
healexp. These results show that life expectancy, education and income are all responsive to 
government expenditure on health. 
The coefficient of corr is significant and positive in columns 1 and 5, while it is not 
significant in column 3. These estimates suggest that corruption has adversely affected 
income growth and education, while it has no effects on life expectancy. All three coefficient 
estimates of pm are significant and negative thus confirming the earlier result about human 
development effects of air pollution. However, the price index (com-price) has only 
negatively affected educational outcomes, while it has no effect on both life expectancy and 
income. The coefficient of the time trend (time) is significant in life expectancy and 
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education, but not in the income equation. The coefficient of poprate is significant and 
positive in columns 3 and 5, while it is not significant in column 1. The estimate suggest that 
population growth have boosted life expectancy and education, but it had no effect on 
income. 
The results on the impact of electricity access on the components of human development in 
Tables 4.6 have further amplified the earlier result in Table 4.5 although there are changes in 
the signs and estimates of some control variables. Overall, the results in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 
indicate the importance of infrastructure provision especially electricity on human 
development in SSA countries. 
Table 4. 6: Two-Step GMM Estimates of HDI Components Equations. 
Human Development Index (hdi) Components 
 Income Index  
(income-index) 
Life Expectancy Index (life-
index) 
Education Index  
(edu-index) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
       
income-index (t-1) 0.964*** 102.06     
       
life-index (t-1)   0.865*** 68.94   
       
edu-index (t-1)     0.855*** 18.39 
       
ln comper 0.002*** 3.14 0.006*** 3.90 0.010*** 3.39 
       
Corr 0.007** 2.49 -0.004 -1.62 0.008** 2.04 
       
Eduex -0.001*** -4.70 -0.001** -2.48 0.001** 2.48 
       
Healexp 0.001** 2.37 0.001*** 7.61 0.001* 1.91 
       
compri-index 0.001 1.49 0.001 0.99 -0.001** -1.98 
       
Pm -0.001** -2.56 -0.001*** -6.38 -0.001*** -2.67 
       
poprate 0.001 0.14 0.008*** 3.22 0.003* 1.66 
       
ln gnp   0.002* 1.95 0.003** 2.12 
       
Time -0.001 -0.02 0.001*** 4.50 0.001** 2.00 
       
intercept 0.039*** 5.90 0.100*** 5.37 0.099*** 2.62 
No of obs.  144  144  144 
No. of countries  41  41  41 
Instruments  35  35  35 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.38 (0.017)  1.37 (0.172)  -0.40 (0.688) 
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AR(2) test (p value)  1.07 (0.286)  -1.45 (0.148)  -1.61 (0.108) 
Hansen test (p value)  24.64 (0.483)  23.08 (0.515)  27.49 (0.282) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4.5.3. Robustness Analyses 
It is possible that the obtained results on the impact of access rates on HDI and its three 
components are affected by omitted variables bias, or the measure of access used to estimate 
the Equation 1. Therefore, the robustness of the obtained result is investigated. First, three 
additional regressors are added to the HDI equation and the components equations, one at a 
time, to see whether the earlier obtained result in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 change significantly. 
Lastly, we another measure of access rates (percentage of total population with electricity 
access) to re-estimate the all the models to see if results are influenced by the choice of the 
access variable. 
4.5.3.1. Additional Regressors 
According to Todaro (1989), it is not only the sheer number of people that affects human 
development, but its distribution or concentration also has an impact. This is because as the 
size of population rises, especially in areas that lack access to infrastructure, it would trigger 
migration to areas with access or people will migrate from rural to urban. This would lead to 
concentration of the population in geographic pockets within a country. Therefore, the annual 
population density, which is in people per square kilometres of land area is included to all the 
estimations. Data on popden is from the World Bank Development Indicators. 
Some studies have established a relationship between globalization and human development 
(see Sapkota, 2011), thus the level of globalization of SSA countries is included in the HDI 
and its three components equations. The KOF globalisation index that measures the 
economic, social and political dimensions of globalisation covering 24 variables over time, 
first developed by Dreher (2006) and recently updated by Gygli et al. (2019) is used. 
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Finally, some studies (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Justino and Verwimp, 2006) have 
argued that political instability and conflict negatively affect human development. For 
example, where wars and conflict have erupted, economic activity would be severely 
constraint due destruction of infrastructure, environmental degradation, restriction export and 
imports among many. As a result, human development would be constrained. An index of 
political violence and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism (instab) is 
included to all estimations. Data on the variable is obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
which is included in the World Bank Governance Indicator Database. 
Table 4. 7: Two-Step GMM Estimates of HDI Equation – Additional Regressors. 
Human Development Index (hdi) - Additional Regressors 
 Population Density Globalization Political Instability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
       
hdi-index (t-1) 0.906*** 32.57 0.905*** 37.64 0.923*** 33.90 
       
ln comper 0.003** 2.42 0.005*** 3.13 0.003** 2.15 
       
Corr 0.003* 1.77 0.003* 1.76 0.009*** 3.65 
       
Eduex -0.001 -0.90 -0.001 -0.36 -0.001*** -2.83 
       
Healexp 0.001*** 6.54 0.001*** 4.30 0.001* 1.88 
       
compri-index -0.001*** -3.20 -0.001** -2.53 -0.001** -2.26 
       
Pm -0.001*** -3.03 -0.001** -2.46 -0.001*** -3.17 
       
poprate 0.001 0.05 0.001 1.24 0.002*** 3.15 
       
ln popden -0.001** -2.33 -0.001** -2.14 -0.001 -0.75 
       
global-index   0.001 0.60 0.001** 2.47 
       
Instab     -0.002** -2.15 
       
Time 0.001*** 4.81 0.001*** 4.47 0.001*** 3.30 
       
intercept 0.077*** 3.38 0.089*** 3.82 0.058*** 2.65 
No of obs.  144  144  144 
No. of countries  41  41  41 
Instruments  36  37  38 
AR(1) test (p value)  -1.82 (0.069)  -1.87 (0.061)  -0.98 (0.327) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -0.89 (0.371)  -0.81 (0.415)  -0.94 (0.349) 
Hansen test (p value)  27.69 (0.322)  21.98 (0.637)  18.05 (0.840) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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The results of the robustness test are presented in Tables 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10. Columns 1, 3, 
and 5 in the tables present the coefficient estimates of comper and the rest of the variables 
when the popden, global and instab respectively, are added, one at a time, as regressors to the 
equations. Coefficients of access rates remain significant and with the right signs regardless 
of the additional regressors included in the equation. These estimates suggest that the access 
rate variable is not acting as proxy for some omitted regressors which should have been 
included in the global HDI or the other three equations. 
Table 4. 8: Two-Step GMM Estimates of Income Equation – Additional Regressors. 
Income Index (income-index) - Additional Regressors 
 Population Density Globalization Political Instability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
       
income-index (t-1) 0.906*** 46.60 0.936*** 64.04 0.922*** 52.76 
       
ln comper 0.002** 2.34 0.006*** 5.05 0.004*** 3.26 
       
Corr 0.014*** 3.56 0.007*** 3.94 0.010*** 2.76 
       
Eduex -0.001 -1.28 -0.001*** -3.92 -0.001*** -4.25 
       
Healexp 0.001*** 2.89 -0.001*** -4.40 0.001*** 2.69 
       
compri-index -0.001* -1.75 0.001 1.15 0.001 1.09 
       
Pm -0.001** -2.01 -0.001* -1.93 -0.001*** -2.66 
       
Poprate -0.003** -2.24 0.003*** 3.18 0.001 0.78 
       
ln popden -0.003** -2.51 -0.001 -0.55 -0.002*** -2.70 
       
global-index   0.001*** 3.42 0.001 0.32 
       
Instab     0.001 0.20 
       
Time 0.001*** 3.46 -0.001 -0.06 0.001 0.45 
       
Intercept 0.088*** 4.25 0.073*** 4.89 0.089*** 4.38 
No of obs.  144  144  144 
No. of countries  41  41  41 
Instruments  36  36  37 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.35 (0.019)  -1.95 (0.051)  -2.43 (0.015) 
AR(2) test (p value)  1.44 (0.149)  1.53 (0.127)  0.22 (0.824) 
Hansen test (p value)  26.67 (0.372)  22.27 (0.563)  21.93 (0.583) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. 9: Two-Step GMM Estimates of Life Expectancy Equation – Additional 
Regressors. 
Life Index (life-index) - Additional Regressors 
 Population Density Globalization Political Instability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
       
life-index (t-1) 0.832*** 58.29 0.832*** 55.61 0.970*** 76.66 
       
ln comper 0.008*** 6.51 0.008*** 4.85 0.001* 1.83 
       
Corr -0.003 -1.64 -0.002 -1.40 0.003* 1.84 
       
Eduex -0.001** -1.98 -0.001** -2.23 0.001*** 4.90 
       
Healexp 0.001*** 7.17 0.001*** 6.63 0.001*** 4.64 
       
compri-index 0.001* 1.96 0.001 1.63 -0.001 -0.78 
       
Pm -0.001*** -5.46 -0.001*** -5.23 -0.001*** -2.73 
       
Poprate 0.006** 2.51 0.007*** 2.77 0.001 0.53 
       
ln gnp 0.001 0.08 0.001 0.18 -0.001 -1.18 
       
ln popden 0.006*** 3.12 0.005*** 2.80 -0.001* -1.81 
       
global-index   -0.001 -0.01 0.001 1.12 
       
Instab     -0.001* -1.79 
       
Time 0.001*** 6.16 0.001*** 5.98 0.001 0.59 
       
Intercept 0.126*** 7.37 0.131*** 4.26 0.033** 2.35 
No of obs.  144  144  144 
No. of countries  41  41  41 
Instruments  36  37  40 
AR(1) test (p value)  1.75 (0.081)  1.61 (0.108)  0.83 (0.404) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -0.69 (0.493)  -0.84 (0.400)  -0.34 (0.733) 
Hansen test (p value)  23.68 (0.480)  24.16 (0.452)  20.65 (0.760) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  
130 
 
Table 4. 10: Two-Step GMM Estimates of Education Equation – Additional Regressors. 
Education Index (edu-index) - Additional Regressors 
 Population Density Globalization Political Instability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
       
edu-index (t-1) 0.825*** 17.31 0.798*** 19.35 0.804*** 20.05 
       
ln comper 0.015*** 4.59 0.015*** 4.44 0.012*** 3.50 
       
Corr 0.010*** 2.63 0.011*** 2.76 0.012*** 2.87 
       
Eduex 0.001** 2.26 0.001** 2.34 0.001** 2.49 
       
Healexp 0.001** 1.99 0.001** 2.09 0.002** 2.10 
       
compri-index -0.001** -2.21 -0.001** -2.46 -0.001*** -3.59 
       
Pm -0.001*** -3.09 -0.001*** -4.28 -0.001*** -5.28 
       
Poprate 0.005** 2.16 0.004* 1.88 0.004** 2.07 
       
ln gnp 0.004*** 2.71 0.004*** 3.06 0.003** 2.14 
       
ln popden 0.002 1.41 0.002 1.63 0.002 1.33 
       
global-index   -0.001 -1.28 -0.001 -0.60 
       
Instab     -0.004** -2.00 
       
Time 0.002** 2.23 0.002*** 3.21 0.003*** 4.22 
       
Intercept 0.127*** 3.25 0.166*** 3.94 0.156*** 3.79 
No of obs.  144  144  144 
No. of countries  41  41  41 
Instruments  36  37  38 
AR(1) test (p value)  -1.09 (0.926)  0.12 (0.907)  0.69 (0.490) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -1.52 (0.129)  -1.58 (0.113)  -1.48 (0.139) 
Hansen test (p value)  25.88 (0.359)  26.64 (0.321)  25.68 (0.370) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.5.3.2. Alternative measure of access rates 
The results are based on the United Nations electricity consumption data. It is possible that 
the obtained results were driven by this choice of data. In order to investigate this possibility, 
an alternative measure of access rates (access), which is percentage of totally population with 
electricity access from the World Bank development indicators database is used. The result of 
Sys-GMM estimates of using the World Bank index is presented in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. 
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The coefficient of access is positive and significant in both tables, suggesting that electricity 
access, when proxied by the World Bank access rate has also a significant positive impact on 
human development. The estimates of the coefficient for access in the two tables show the 
relationship between electricity access and human development when additional regressors 
are added to the model. The inclusion of the other regressors do not affect the statistical 
significance of the estimates of the coefficient for access rates. 
Table 4. 11: Two-Step GMM Estimates of HDI Equation-using access rates 
Human Development Index (hdi-index) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
   
hdi-index(t-1) 0.912*** 36.10 
   
access 0.001*** 4.66 
   
corr 0.002** 2.14 
   
eduex 0.001 0.08 
   
healexp 0.001*** 3.22 
   
com-price  -0.001*** -3.81 
   
pm -0.001*** -3.40 
   
poprate 0.001 0.05 
   
time 0.001*** 4.01 
   
intercept 0.041*** 3.32 
No of obs.  144 
No of countries  41 
Instruments  40 
AR(1) test (p value)  -1.84 
(0.066) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -0.79 
(0.431) 
Hansen test (p value) 
 32.61 
(0.340) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. 12: Two-Step GMM Estimates of HDI Components Equations-using access 
rates 
Human Development Index (hdi) Components 
 Income Index  
(income-index) 
Life Expectancy Index 
(life-index) 
Education Index  
(edu-index) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
       
income-index (t-1) 0.940*** 104.95     
       
life-index (t-1)   0.921*** 54.38   
       
edu-index (t-1)     0.964*** 56.57 
       
Access 0.001*** 2.71 0.001*** 2.69 0.001** 2.35 
       
Corr 0.004*** 4.94 0.004*** 2.82 0.003** 2.46 
       
Eduex -0.001*** -8.76 -0.001*** -4.63 -0.001*** -6.16 
       
Heaexp 0.001 0.93 0.001 1.49 0.002*** 9.09 
       
compri-index -0.001* -1.90 0.001** 1.99 0.001 0.18 
       
Pm -0.001*** -3.00 -0.001*** -4.44 -0.001*** -3.20 
       
Poprate -0.002*** -2.75 0.004*** 3.16 0.007*** 7.22 
       
ln gnp   -0.004*** -5.53 -0.001** -2.17 
       
Time 0.001** 2.03 0.001*** 3.98 0.001 0.44 
       
Intercept 0.041*** 6.83 0.093*** 7.59 0.011 1.02 
No of obs.  144  144  144 
No. of countries  41  41  41 
Instruments  40  38  39 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.32 (0.020)  1.75 (0.079)  -2.01 (0.044) 
AR(2) test (p value)  1.38 (0.166)  -1.05 (0.295)  -1.63 (0.102) 
Hansen test (p value)  28.38 (0.550)  25.16 (0.566)  27.27 (0.503) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.6. Conclusion 
Provision of access to electricity especially to rural and deprived areas is important for 
enhancing human development through increasing access to healthcare, quality education and 
improve income growth. Due to the recognition of its importance, SSA have implemented 
various policies at national and multilateral levels to increase access to unserved groups of 
the population. Although, there are some modest improvements in improving access rates 
after these policy interventions, electrification rates have remained low because the rate of 
expansion has not kept pace with the population growth. There is also disparity between 
urban and rural areas, with rural areas being mostly unserved. 
These have led some to question the socio-economic benefits of policies implemented to 
increase electricity access. Despite these scepticisms, there is a limited evidence on the 
impacts of electricity access on human development on the region. This study fills this gap in 
the literature by using panel data on 49 SSA countries and a dynamic panel estimator to 
investigate the effects of electricity access on human development. 
The result shows that access to electricity has a positive and significant effect on human 
development. The chapter also find a positive and significant effects of access rates on the 
three individual components of the HDI. These findings amplify the socio-economic benefits 
expanding electricity to the estimated 588 million people that lack access. In other words, 
extending electricity services to those without access will lead to improved economic 
performance of SSA countries by improving educational, health and income outcomes. 
This finding adds to the body of evidence that stress the importance of infrastructure on 
human development. It can also serve as an important reference for policy makers while 
designing policies for poverty reduction and inclusive economic development. This is 
because, connecting the estimated 588 million people to electricity would serve as one of the 
most important steps towards reducing poverty and achieving inclusive development 
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especially the SDGs. The results are robust after controlling for other variables that also have 
impacts on human development. 
Future research should investigate the effect of electricity access other social indicators such 
as income inequality, gender and poverty where data are accessible. Factors such as these are 
among some the major challenges currently confronting SSA countries. Similarly, future 
research should also investigate the difference between SSA countries with and without 
reformed electricity sectors in terms of human development. This would further enhance the 
understanding of what has been achieved or otherwise of the nearly three decades of 
electricity sector reforms in the region.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
5.1. Introduction 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of the influence of corruption on economic 
development of SSA countries. The introduction chapter identified important consequences 
of high corruption levels and their determinants, which have constrained the economic 
development of SSA countries. The chapter also shows how corruption distorts economic 
performance through a less explored but important component of economic development – 
i.e., the electricity sector. Although, the evidence on the effects of electricity on economic 
development is mixed, the lack of access to reliable electricity supply constitutes a brake on 
SSA government aspirations for economic development. This is reinforced by the awareness 
that electricity is critical for socio-economic development through efficient lighting (Fouquet, 
2008), information and communication technologies, and increased productivity in 
manufacturing (Kander et al., 2014). Therefore, where electricity has been provided, income 
has increased, and health and educational outcomes have improved. 
Corruption can cripple economic development by containing efforts to extend electricity to 
the millions without access in the region and inhibiting the efficiency of the sector. In order 
to mitigate these adverse effects of corruption and to increase efficiency and access rates, 
SSA countries have been implementing electricity sector reforms for more than two and half 
decades. Although, almost all countries of the region have implemented reforms, the extent of 
these reforms among them has differed. The differences were due to country-specific 
conditions, quality of institutions, and political preferences related to the reform agenda. In 
other words, due to a number of factors, not all countries have succeeded in implementing all 
aspects of the ESR advocated by reformers. For example, only 50% of the countries in the 
region have established IRAs, six countries have unbundled their state-owned utilities, only 
one has introduced a transitional electricity market, and significant number of countries have 
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introduced some form of private sector participation into their electricity markets. 
Each of these aspects of the reform model has been noted to have some corruption reducing 
potential. For example, the unbundling of the hitherto state-owned utilities serves to identify 
different sources of inefficiencies that constrain performance while competition among the 
unbundled units gives consumers freedom of choice and escape from corruption associated 
with the state-owned monopolist privatised firms as residual claimants have incentives to 
close all sources of inefficiencies including those related to corruption, and the creation of 
IRAs safeguards smaller firms from dominant firms, avoids collusions among firms, and 
safeguards firms from government corruption and consumers from exploitations. 
Despite each of the reform elements being infused with these corruption reducing potentials, 
no study has examined whether SSA countries have succeeded in reducing the negative 
association between corruption and performance through reforms. Neither is there a study 
that has empirically assessed whether reductions in the performance constraining effects of 
corruption have benefited SSA countries in terms of efficiency, access rates and income 
improvements. The investigation of these limitations underlines the analyses in this thesis. In 
other words, this thesis contributes to efforts aimed at understanding how well-designed 
micro level reforms reduce the negative effects of macro level institutional deficiencies such 
as corruption on micro and macro performance indicators such as electricity sector 
performance and economic development. 
The next section discusses whether the main research questions of the thesis highlighted in 
each of the three empirical chapters has been answered. Next, some policy implications 
derived from the results of the three main chapters are highlighted. The third section provides 
some key policy suggestions for SSA countries that considers implementing or redesigning a 
reform programme in its electricity market. A discussion on the limitations of the research 
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constitutes the fourth section. The final section discusses what has been done and what still 
needs to be done. 
5.2. Answers to main research questions 
Chapter 2 presents an econometric analysis of the effect of corruption on three indicators of 
electricity sector performance: technical efficiency, access rates, and GDP per capita. The 
indirect effects of corruption on these indicators were also considered through how reform 
implementations such as the creation of IRAs and private sector participations amplify or 
mitigate the relationship between corruption and electricity sector performance. The results 
show that levels of corruption in SSA countries are important performance determinants of 
all three indicators.  
Specifically, the results show that perceived corruption levels have an adverse and 
statistically significant effect on the three performance indicators – i.e., technical efficiency, 
access to electricity, and GDP per capita. However, in countries where independent 
regulators have been created, there has been an increase in access to electricity while 
technical efficiency has declined. In SSA countries where private sector investments have 
poured in, there has been improvements in economic performance, while there are no 
changes in electricity access and technical efficiency. 
The analysis on how reforms implementations determine the relationship between corruption 
and electricity sector performance shows that SSA countries that created independent 
regulators have reduced the adverse effects of corruption on technical efficiency, amplified 
the adverse effects of corruption on electricity access, and failed to mitigate the often-cited 
negative association between corruption and income level. The results also show that private 
sector participation has reinforced the influence of corruption on income while private 
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participation has no impact on the association between corruption and electricity access as 
well as between corruption and technical efficiency. 
Chapter 3 investigates the performance of reforms in the context of government political 
ideology due to the realization that performance is not only constrained in SSA countries by 
corruption alone, but also by political factors. The link between the political institutions and 
electricity sector is through the independent regulatory agencies created as part of the reforms 
to depoliticise electricity price-setting and encourage private sector investment through 
transparent and predictable decisions. Politicians can fill positions in these regulatory 
agencies with political and financial allies thereby interfering in regulatory functions to 
advance the agendas of their political parties. Such interferences lead to IRAs designing poor, 
unpredictable, non-credible, and inconsistent decisions thereby constraining performance. 
The findings show that access rates and installed capacity have improved in SSA countries 
post the establishment of independent regulatory agencies irrespective of ideology. In other 
words, government ideology does not matter if there are no intrusions into regulatory 
functions or if IRAs are allowed to exert their regulatory powers. However, there are no 
significant differences between SSA countries without IRAs/with different government 
ideologies on their desires to increase installed capacity. This shows that economic or social 
policy orientations of SSA governments does not differ in terms of installed capacity 
improvements. 
However, there are differences in terms of installed capacity improvements when SSA 
governments driven by ideological motives interfere in regulatory functions. The results show 
that independent regulation in left-wing governments reduces installed capacity relative to 
governments with centrist governments, while regulation in right-wing governments boost 
improvements in installed capacity relative to centrist governments. The differences in 
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generation capacity improvements, show that interventionist policies such as government 
financed provision of electricity and sheltering of utilities from competition tends to be less 
efficient compared to services provided by private utilities in competitive electricity markets. 
On access rates improvements by countries with different political ideologies, access to 
electricity are lower in countries with right-wing governments, while there are no significant 
differences between left-wing and centrist governments in extending access to those without 
services. In other words, the results indicate that SSA countries with right-wing governments 
motivated by beliefs that governments should minimise their involvement in the economy, 
tend to spend less on provision of electricity relative to countries with left or centrist 
governments. However, the opposite happens when regulation happens in left-wing 
governments. Left-wing governments constraint IRAs‟ efforts to incentivise utilities to 
increase access rates despite increasing access to the poor and underserved being one of their 
important social objectives. In contrast, there is no significant differences between 
governments with right-wing and centrist governments in terms of access rate improvement 
despite the perceptions that right-wing governments do not have incentives to build electricity 
supply infrastructures to extend services especially to unprofitable and poor areas. 
In chapter 4, extends the findings of chapter 2 and 3 and show how improvements in access 
rates post electricity sector reforms have impacted human development. The motivation is 
that if the aim of any public policy implementation such as ESR is to enhance citizens‟ 
welfare, then increased access rates should be expected to bring positive socio-economic 
benefits. The chapter analyses what has been achieved by expansion of access rates in SSA 
countries in terms human development post reforms and other policies implemented. 
There are some countries that provide evidence of wellbeing improvements in places where 
electricity services have been provided (e.g., Davis, 1998; Karekezi and Majoro, 2002; Kirubi 
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et al., 2009; Spalding-Fecher, 2005). However, other similar studies have questioned the 
social benefits of policy interventions such as ESR (Auriol and Blanc, 2009), especially as 
80% of the region‟s population rely on traditional use of biomass to meet their energy needs 
(Hancock, 2015). Similarly, Eberhard et al. (2011) argued that expansion of access rates have 
not benefited the poor in SSA countries, rather it has been skewed strongly towards higher 
income households and urban areas since privatised utilities do not have incentives to extend 
services to poor and unprofitable areas (Transnational Institute, 2002; Victor, 2005). 
Moreover, there has been extensive policy discussions on efforts to increase access rates in 
SSA countries by multilateral institutions, governments and private bodies, yet the human 
development impacts of electricity access relevant to SSA countries has been under-explored 
empirically. Therefore, chapter 4 examines these arguments through a macro level cross-
country approach. Specifically, a panel data on SSA countries was used to analyse the effects 
of improved electricity access on the HDI and its three different components. 
Findings from the analyses show that there are significant positive effects of increased access 
rates on human development in SSA countries. Similarly, the chapter find positive and 
significant effects of increased access rates on the three individual components of the HDI. In 
other words, increased access rates have boosted life expectancy, educational outcomes and 
income in SSA countries. These results are robust after controlling for additional variables 
that have effects on HDI and its three components and using a different measure of access 
rates. 
5.3. Policy implications of results 
Although, corruption levels tend to be high in SSA countries, an examination of the various 
channels through which it affects economic development can help point to the right policies 
that will mitigate its effects. As discussed in chapter 1, there are channels such investments, 
human capital, and income inequality through which corruption affects economic 
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development. The findings of chapter 2 suggest that policies such as electricity sector reforms 
help mitigate negative economic performance effects by reducing its effects on electricity 
sector performance. One policy implication of chapter 2 is that, it highlighted the importance 
of setting up of an independent regulator that is transparent, fair, and accountable with the 
capacity for producing credible and predictable policies and commitments to cost-reflective 
tariffs and protection of consumer interest. 
Establishing an institutional body would not only help reduce uncertainties surrounding 
issues related to market access, tariffs, and revenues but would also help improve the overall 
governance of the sector. Setting up of regulators helps reassure foreign investors who are 
concerned with political corruption in SSA governments, that the independent regulator 
would safeguard their investments. This is because the regulator reduces the need for risk 
mitigation measures such as World Bank guarantees, ring-fencing of revenues accruing to 
off-takers and other measures required by investors when investing in SSA countries‟ power 
markets. Thus, by serving as a risk mitigator, the regulator would help attract the crucial 
investments needed to upgrade and build new transmission and distribution infrastructures 
and increase generation capacities thereby improving the overall performance of the sector. 
The importance of an independent regulator was further emphasised by the findings in 
chapter 3. Although not explicitly stated, politicians furthering their private agendas (e.g., 
corruption) or policies of their political parties will intrude into regulatory functions and 
thereby constraint electricity sector performance. Reducing intrusion into regulatory 
functions especially by left-wing SSA governments will signal to investors that regulatory 
decisions are not politicised and thus help attract private investments needed to increase 
generation capacity and expand access rates. Increasing generation capacity and access will 
have fulfil one of the social policy objectives of left-wing governments that aimed at 
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improving the socio-economic conditions of the poor in SSA countries. Therefore, the results 
suggest that left-wing governments can increase the growth rate of income by reducing 
interference in IRAs functions. 
Chapter 3 results do not indicate that only SSA governments with left-wing governments may 
interfere regulatory functions, however, the adverse effects of regulatory interferences are 
severe in countries with left-wing governments. Thus, the results suggest SSA countries with 
different ideologies should pursue different policies to strengthen the independence of IRAs 
as a means of improving efficiency and access rates. While strengthening the independence 
of IRAs in left-wing governments may be critical for increasing capacity and access rates, it 
may not be as critical for right-wing or centrist governments, especially in increasing 
capacity. Then giving more independence to IRAs or not interfering in their functions in SSA 
countries by the same proportion will not only increase capacity and access, it will also help 
narrow the gap among the countries with different ideologies, since SSA countries with low 
installed capacity and access rates will benefit the most by boosting the independence of 
IRAs. 
Chapter 4 further amplifies the findings of earlier studies on the positive impacts of electricity 
access on socio-economic wellbeing especially on the poor. Thus, chapter 4 findings further 
stress the importance of both public and private investments in building and upgrading 
electricity supply networks that will help increase the number of people with electricity 
access. This is because, connecting the estimated 588 million people with access in the region 
to electricity would serve as an important step towards reducing poverty and achieving 
inclusive development especially the SDGs. 
5.4. Policy recommendations 
The main policy recommendations from the three empirical chapters are as follows: 
  
143 
 
 SSA countries or any developing country that is yet to implement or at earlier stages 
of electricity sector reforms should recognise the underlying differences between 
reforms in developed countries and developing countries. Therefore, SSA countries 
should pay attention to their local conditions such the size of their electricity markets, 
income levels, level of electricity access, and macroeconomic conditions among 
others before adopting and implementing electricity sector reforms. 
 More importantly, late reformers should note that institutions matter. In other words, 
SSA countries yet to implement or at early stages of reforms, should take into 
consideration institutional factors such governance, vested political interests, 
competition among political parties, and citizens‟ perceptions of the role of 
government, among others, before deciding which aspect of reforms to implement and 
at what time to do that. 
 Related to the above, governments should realise that not only their political 
opponents can hinder reform implementations, but also other strong and vocal anti-
reform interest groups such labour unions and managements of the reformed targeted 
state-owned utilities will curtail the reforms process. Therefore, extensive public 
awareness campaign should present the objectives and benefits of the reforms. 
Furthermore, since the political and economic conditions of interest groups will 
substantially be affected by the reforms, SSA countries should implement reforms 
under appropriate political conditions with the support of interest groups and citizens. 
 SSA countries receiving advise from multilateral bodies such as the IMF and the 
World Bank on electricity sector liberalization, should make the roles of these 
multilateral bodies less visible to avoid creating the perception that the reforms are 
imposed by foreign bodies. 
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 SSA governments should make expanding access to modern electricity services part 
of their national development priorities. Other policies apart from electricity sector 
reforms should also receive high political commitments aimed at accelerating efforts 
for integrating other sources of energy such as renewables to reduce the energy 
poverty bedevilling countries of the region. Political commitments should be 
translated into national energy plans backed by adequate financial and technical plans 
that will also make the country attractive to foreign investors. 
 Rural electrification based on decentralised solutions should be pursued by SSA 
countries. Decentralised systems such as mini-grids and setting them up in rural areas 
have the potential to reduce dependence on consumptions of biomass by the majority 
rural poor in SSA countries. Increasing access to electricity through rural 
electrification would boost health, educational, and income outcomes. 
5.5. Limitations of the research 
The research presented in this thesis has some limitations that must be acknowledged. 
Notwithstanding, I believe that none of the identified limitations undermine the results. The 
potential limitations of the analyses are the endogeneity of regressors, the limitation of 
datasets, and the use of dummy variables as proxies for reforms and institutional variables. 
In order to address endogeneity concerns a dynamic panel GMM model developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) was used due to its potentials for 
producing consistent estimates in the presence of endogeneity of regressors, unobserved 
country fixed effects and dynamics. Notwithstanding, although this estimator is superior to 
other alternative estimators, it has its limitations. First, the estimator relies on the lags of the 
dependent and regressors for identification. Therefore, there is the potential problem of weak 
instruments, which could become larger as the number of lags of the instrumental variables 
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increases Thus, increasing the instruments‟ lags due to the intuition that reforms have long 
passthrough years to have effects, may make them more exogenous, but may also make them 
weaker. Although, weak instruments do not appear to drive the results in this thesis, this may 
be a more important issue to be considered in other research. 
Similarly, in the analyses it is assumed that errors are serially uncorrelated, but this 
assumption may not hold for all variables. Additionally, as Griliches and Hausman (1986) 
have noted, using panel data estimators such dynamic GMM estimator, the bias resulting 
from errors in variables may be magnified. Since the estimator relies, at least partially on 
first-differencing, the GMM estimator may not eliminate measurement error bias unless 
strong and difficult to verify assumptions are made about serial correlation in the 
measurement error (Wintoki et al., 2012). Furthermore, the use of lags as instruments relies 
on an important assumption that should be noted by researchers. This is because since the 
GMM methodology assumes weak rational expectations (Muth, 1961; Lovell, 1986), then 
future unexpected changes in either of performance variables in the three chapters are purely 
an expectational error. 
This implies that the empirical model includes every regressor that could conceivably jointly 
affect both performance (dependent variable) and the regressors (Hansen and Singleton, 
1982). Since proxies mostly use in the analyses, this is unlikely to be the case. It is possible 
that any cross-sectional regression of, especially of the reform dummies, on electricity sector 
performance and human development to be misspecified and that there are omitted time-
varying unobserved regressors that affect both reforms and performance. Thus, researchers 
should be careful with relying on the statistical tests used to examine the validity of the 
lagged instrument set in justifying their use of dynamic GMM panel data estimation. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, misspecification problems are likely to be more 
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pronounced in OLS and fixed-effects estimations. Moreover, these estimators are generally 
not accompanied by specification tests. Therefore, although occasionally the specification 
tests accompanying the dynamic GMM estimator could be weak, the estimator dominates the 
OLS or fixed-effects estimation when making inference when the underlying economic 
process is dynamic. Lastly, the dynamic panel GMM estimator does not solves all 
endogeneity problems. Future research should use natural experiments or use strictly 
exogenous instruments for identifying the effect of reforms on performance. However, given 
the infrequent occurrence of natural experiments, such as unexpected regulatory changes, and 
the relative difficult of identifying and selecting exogenous instruments, inference from 
electricity reform research may continue to rely on secondary data. In this regard, the three 
chapters of the thesis contribute to the literature by providing economic justification for the 
use of dynamic GMM panel data estimation in electricity sector performance research 
discussing the conditions under which the GMM estimator improves inference beyond the 
OLS and fixed-effects estimators. 
The second shortcoming relates to the limits of the data sets. In the first, second, and third 
empirical chapters, the samples are composed of 47, 45, and 49 on SSA countries, 
respectively, for which I succeeded in obtaining data on all variables to analyse the models. 
The dependent variables and regressors used in the three empirical chapters could be over- or 
under-estimated if countries use different conventions, classifications, and methodologies 
while compiling on them. For example, the same definition of access rate may not be used by 
all countries when compiling and reporting data on the variable to multilateral databases such 
as the IEA database on access rates and the World Bank Development Indicators Database. 
Therefore, observations in data series may not have the same meaning across all countries in 
the three datasets. 
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Furthermore, reform indicators used in chapters were scored 2 and 3 as 0 if countries have 
not implemented either of the reform steps and 1 if otherwise. As pointed out in chapter 3, 
measuring reform steps this way does not reflect the degree, extent, or intensity of reforms 
implemented by SSA countries. Therefore, the reform indicators in chapters 2 and 3 do not 
capture whether reforms have succeeded or have failed. Second, the transmission and 
distribution losses as percentage of total electricity production used in chapter 2 as a proxy 
for technical efficiency (dependent variable). Using total generation as denominator to 
calculate losses1 tends to over-estimate the variable because countries not only transmit and 
distribute what they generate but also the electricity imported from other countries. 
Therefore, the appropriate denominator to use in calculating the variable should be total 
electricity supplied rather that total production.  
Similarly, in chapter 3, the ideology and privatisation indexes may be correlated and thus 
results should be interpreted with caution. Future research should use other methods to deal 
with this additional source endogeneity. Lastly, since electricity sector reform is a continuing 
process in SSA countries, the findings in this thesis cannot generalise since the reform scores 
used cannot cover all aspects of the reforms. 
5.6. Suggestions for future research 
In all SSA countries considered in this thesis, electricity sector market reform is an ongoing 
process especially as the reforms did not led to total withdrawal of governments from the 
sector. There are opportunities for future researchers to continue analysing the dynamics of 
these hybrid electricity markets. The hope is that future research will show whether the 
hybrid reform model leads to better outcomes compared to the standard model implemented 
in developed countries such as Chile and United Kingdom. 
                                                          
1
 The World Band development indicators, the United Nation energy statistics, the IEA and United States energy 
administration energy databases all report T&D losses as a percentage with respect to total electricity 
generation. Moreover, most empirical electricity efficiency studies used the T&D as percentage of total 
generation. 
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Due to the lack of data, the chapters focus on the reform progress rather than reform success 
or failure. Future research should investigate whether reforms have been successful, by 
developing reform indexes to measure regulatory quality, magnitude of private sector 
investments as well as the extent and intensity of reforms implementations. In the first 
empirical chapter, the ameliorating effect of reforms on the relationship between corruption 
and performance was investigated. The corruption index used in the chapter and as control 
variable in the two subsequent chapters may be biased. This is because, apart from the fact 
that corruption may mean different things to an average Ghanaian as opposed to the average 
South African, it is also possible that perceptions of corruption are influenced by perceptions 
of economic performance. Future studies should use other measures, where available, for 
instance data on the number of convictions reported by national judiciaries of SSA countries. 
In chapter 4, the impact of electricity access on human development was investigated. I 
would have liked to have examined the impact of access rates on other indicators of 
wellbeing such as income inequality, gender and poverty which are noted to be among the 
factors constraining the socio-economic development of the region. This desire was limited 
by the lack of data. Although there are few studies that look at these issues in country case 
studies, a deeper analysis is needed to better understand the interactions between electricity 
access and human wellbeing especially in countries that reformed their electricity sectors. 
Lastly, the fact that electricity reform is often part of wider economic liberalization policies, 
means that reforms may also impact other sectors of the energy industry as well. For instance, 
the dependence of Nigeria‟s electricity sector on the gas sector2 implies that a shock to the 
gas sector will adversely affect the electricity sector. This shows that progress or reforms of 
other sectors will contribute positively or negatively to the progress or success of electricity 
sector reforms in SSA countries. In this research, I did not consider these possible 
                                                          
2
 In 2017, Nigeria‟s electricity mix was dominated by gas-fired power plants which contributes 74% of electricity 
generation with large hydropower dams contributing 25% (Emodi, 2017). 
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interactions between electricity sector reforms and other sectors or with other macroeconomic 
variables, and how these interactions would affect the performance of the electricity sector. 
These relationships are important research areas open to further exploration. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I-1: Types of Management of Contracts in SSA. 
Table A1. 1: Types of Management Contracts in SSA 
Country 
Year of 
financial 
closure 
Name of Project 
Subtype of 
PPI 
Project 
status 
Segment 
Chad 2000 
Societe Tchadienne d‟Eau et 
d‟Electricite (STEE) 
Management 
contract 
Cancelled 
G*, T** & 
D*** 
Gabon 1993 
Societe Africaine de Gestion et 
d‟Investissement (SAGI) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Gambia 1993 
Management Service Gambia 
(MSG) 
Lease contract Cancelled G, T & D 
Gambia 2006 
National Water and Electricity 
Company Management Contract 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G 
Ghana 1994 Electricity Corporation of Ghana 
Management 
contract 
Concluded D 
Guinea-Bissau 1991 
Electricidade e Aguas de Guinea-
Bissau 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Kenya 2006 
Kenya Power and Lighting 
Company Management Contract 
Management 
contract 
Concluded T & D 
Lesotho 2002 
Lesotho Electricity Corporation 
(LEC) 
Management 
contract 
Active G, T & D 
Liberia 2010 
Liberia Electricity Corporation 
Management Contract 
Management 
contract 
Active T & D 
Madagascar 2005 Jiro syRano Malagasy (Jirama) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Malawi 2001 
Electricity Supply Corporation of 
Malawi Ltd (ESCOM) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Mali 1994 
Electricite et Eau du Mali 
(Management) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Namibia 1996 Northern Electricity Lease contract Concluded D 
Namibia 2000 Reho-Electricity Lease contract Active D 
Rwanda 2003 Electrogaz 
Management 
contract 
Cancelled G, T & D 
Rwanda 2003 Electrogaz 
Management 
contract 
Cancelled G, T & D 
São Tomé and 
Principe 
1993 Empresa de Agua e Electricidade 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Tanzania 2002 
Tanzania Electricity Supply 
Company (TANESCO) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Togo 1997 
Companie Energie Electrique du 
Togo 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G & D 
*Generation, **Transmission and ***Distribution 
Source: World Bank PPI database 
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Appendix I-2: Robustness Analyses. 
It is possible that the coefficient estimates in Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 may suffer from omitted-
variable bias. Here we check the robustness of the results by adding additional explanatory 
variables in the model, one at a time to the three estimated equations to examine whether this 
would significantly affect the results. 
Cubbin and Stern (2006) argue that a rapid growing share of industrial output (e.g., in heavy 
industry such as petrochemicals, aluminium, manufacturing) is expected to increase the 
demand for electricity. Similarly, Kaldor (1970) and Cornwall (1977) argue that expansion of 
the industrial sector is a driving force for economic development. Thus, excluding this 
variable (ind) from the estimated equations could, potentially, lead to biased estimates of the 
effects of ESR and corruption on the three indicators of performance. We therefore include 
the share of industrial value added as a percentage of GDP as an additional regressor in three 
equations. Several authors also find the degree of openness of an economy to influence 
electricity sector performance (e.g., Zhang et al., 2008). We also include exports (export) as 
percentage of GDP as an additional regressor in the performance equation. The data for 
export is obtained from the World Bank governance indicators database. 
Furthermore, several studies include a variable measuring population density to assess the 
ability of both public and private utilities to extend low cost and affordable electricity to 
populations spread over vast areas (e.g., Ahlborg et al., 2015; Estache et al., 2009; Min, 
2010). The data is from the World Bank development indicators database. 
Results of this exercise are presented in Tables A1.2, A1.3 and A1.4. Columns 1, 3 and 5 of 
each table presents the parameter estimates of the models when ind, export and popden are 
added, one at time, as an additional regressors to the three performance regressions. The 
coefficients of cor, ira, priv remained significant/not significant depending on the 
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performance indicator with the expected signs regardless of the additional regressors added to 
the three equations. The only exception is priv in two of the energy losses equations, which 
shows a significant and positive coefficient while this was found not significant in Table 2.3. 
Similarly, the coefficients of the two interactions of interest, iraXcor and privXcor, remain 
significant/not significant in most cases (except the coefficient iraXcor in the per capita GDP 
equations and privXcor in one of the energy losses equations and one of the per capita GDP 
equations) regardless of extra additions to the three regressions. 
Table A1. 2: Two-Step GMM Estimates of T&D Losses Equation 
Technical Impact (losses) 
  ind ind + export ind + export + popden 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
losses(t-1) 0.646*** 3.93 0.477** 2.11 0.421*** 2.82 
cor -30.031*** -4.38 -37.408** -2.00 -35.648** -1.97 
ira 20.383*** 3.07 50.552** 2.34 39.746** 2.57 
priv 11.361 1.17 41.181* 1.70 49.538** 2.29 
iraXcor 15.939* 1.94 28.549** 2.23 24.909*** 2.69 
privXcor 14.790 1.43 8.439 0.55 32.972** 2.32 
iraXpriv 4.042 0.44 -26.730** -1.98 -29.135** -2.27 
ln hols -5.170*** -2.62 -2.241 -0.80 -6.426** -2.05 
struc 1.052 0.34 -2.082 -0.57 1.913 0.57 
urban 0.304 1.11 0.587* 1.86 -0.030 -0.12 
ind -0.438 -1.02 0.236 0.90 0.498 1.54 
export 
  -0.273** -2.04 
-0.582* -1.73 
ln popden 
  
  
8.424*** 3.26 
time -0.233 -0.94 -0.209 -0.58 0.603** 2.02 
intercept 15.236 1.16 -50.491 -1.51 -18.420 -1.53 
No of obs. 217 206 206 
No of countries 22 22 22 
Instruments  20 20 22 
AR(1) test (p value) -2.33 (0.020) -1.68 (0.093) -1.99 (0.046) 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.73 (0.465) 0.21 (0.831) -0.61 (0.544) 
Hansen test (p value) 6.46 (0.487) 7.61 (0.268) 2.77 (0.906) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Therefore, we consider that the additional inclusions do not significantly alter the estimates of 
the coefficients for cor, ira and priv. Moreover, the estimates relative to the two interaction 
terms (iraXcor and privXcor) remain relatively stable regardless of which of the additional 
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variables is introduced in the performance equations. These results seem to indicate that the 
estimates presented in Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 are not suffering from omitted-variable bias. 
Table A1. 3: Two-Step GMM Estimates of Per Capita Energy Consumption Equation 
Welfare Impact (ln access) 
  ind ind + export ind + export + popden 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
ln access(t-1) 0.916*** 151.42 0.920*** 121.58 0.915*** 87.88 
cor 0.093*** 3.19 0.049** 2.22 0.068* 1.80 
ira 0.084** 2.42 0.130*** 5.60 0.127*** 3.81 
priv -0.003 -0.08 0.036 1.47 -0.012 -0.35 
iraXcor 0.044* 1.93 0.020* 1.89 0.077*** 3.90 
privXcor -0.009 -0.23 0.038 1.25 -0.020 -0.49 
iraXpriv -0.081* -1.72 -0.116*** -5.24 -0.091*** -3.01 
ln genper 0.046*** 5.59 0.031*** 3.47 0.048*** 4.43 
ln gdpper 0.005 0.49 0.011* 1.69 -0.006 -0.38 
struc 0.048*** 3.70 0.047*** 6.05 0.046*** 4.72 
urban 0.001*** 3.65 0.001** 2.10 0.001 -0.55 
ind 0.002*** 3.90 0.001 1.29 0.002*** 2.70 
export 
  
0.002*** 5.61 0.001*** 2.73 
ln popden 
    
-0.003 -0.70 
time 0.002*** 2.85 0.001* 1.71 0.003*** 2.61 
intercept -0.141*** -2.59 -0.246*** -4.88 -0.069 -0.75 
No of obs. 480 454 452 
No of countries 45 44 44 
Instruments  43 44 44 
AR(1) test (p value) -4.13 (0.000) -4.10 (0.000) -4.12 (0.000) 
AR(2) test (p value) -1.53 (0.125) -1.59 (0.111) -1.35 (0.178) 
Hansen test (p value) 26.55 (0.596) 28.10 (0.512) 22.12 (0.776) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Table A1. 4: Two-Step GMM Estimates of Per Capita Income Equation 
Economic impact (ln gdpper) 
  ind ind + export ind + export + popden 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
ln gdpper(t-1) 0.466*** 8.73 0.716*** 14.41 0.824*** 25.51 
cor 0.199** 2.44 0.185*** 3.51 0.085* 1.78 
ira 0.050 0.55 -0.056 -1.21 -0.014 -0.22 
priv 0.272*** 3.38 0.080* 1.79 0.214*** 3.69 
iraXcor -0.248*** -3.37 -0.116*** -6.66 -0.264*** -4.90 
privXcor 0.239** 2.04 -0.016 -0.32 0.266*** 4.27 
iraXpriv -0.116* -1.72 -0.062 -1.27 -0.121** -2.58 
struc 0.163*** 3.51 0.103*** 5.37 0.098*** 3.25 
urban 0.016*** 5.91 0.007*** 3.29 0.005*** 3.88 
ind 0.007*** 5.93 0.002*** 4.38 0.002** 2.46 
export 
  
0.004*** 4.83 0.002*** 2.98 
ln popden 
    
-0.005 -0.39 
time 0.001 -0.08 0.001 0.41 -0.001 -1.43 
intercept 2.810*** 10.76 1.587*** 6.19 0.947*** 4.96 
No of obs. 480 454 452 
No of countries 45 44 44 
Instruments  42 43 39 
AR(1) test (p value) -2.29 (0.022) -3.17 (0.002) -3.01 (0.003) 
AR(2) test (p value) -0.66 (0.510) -1.21 (0.226) -1.13 (0.257) 
Hansen test (p value) 26.38 (0.655) 20.35 (0.907) 21.06 (0.689) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix II-1: Electricity Consumption Per Capita as a Proxy for Access 
Table B1. 1: Two-Step GMM estimates of consumption per capita equation 
Consumption per capita (ln comper) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
ln comper (t-1) 0.793*** 10.43 
ira 0.086** 2.14 
left 0.045 1.05 
right -0.075 -0.68 
priv 0.017 0.47 
struc -0.419*** -3.58 
iraXleft -0.070* -1.94 
iraXright -0.006 -0.06 
corr 0.038 0.72 
ln gdpper -0.279*** -2.99 
ln gen 0.255*** 4.64 
urban -0.003 -0.66 
intercept -1.602 -1.65 
No of obs.  590 
No of countries  45 
Instruments  37 
AR(1) test (p value)  -1.87(0.061) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -0.66(0.512) 
Hansen test (p value)  23.37(0.498) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
